BOBBY BOWLING, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Bobby Bowling was convicted of cocaine possession after police found drugs during a traffic stop. The appellate court reversed, holding that the officer lacked any objective basis to stop Bowling's vehicle for the alleged traffic violation.
The court held that the officer lacked any reasonable basis to stop Bowling's vehicle because the taillights (brake lights) automatically signal when brakes are applied, and the officer could not have observed a violation from his position in the trailing vehicle.
[1] A traffic stop is unlawful when the arresting officer lacks an objective basis to believe a traffic violation has occurred.
[2] A driver's brake lights, which activate upon braking, provide an appropriate signal to following vehicles when stopping or suddenly decreasing speed.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Because the arresting officer had no objective basis to stop Mr. Bowling's vehicle, we reverse.”
States the court's primary holding that the stop was unjustified
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn August 15, 1999, Officer Kondek followed Bowling's minivan on a residential street in Tarpon Springs. The officer stopped Bowling and cited him for…
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BLUE, Acting Chief Judge.
Bobby Bowling appeals his conviction and order of probation for possession of cocaine following the denial of his disposi-tive motion to suppress. The cocaine was found during a search of Mr. Bowling’s car that followed a traffic stop for violation of section 316.155(3), Florida Statutes (1999). Because the arresting officer had no objective basis to stop Mr. Bowling’s vehicle, we reverse. See Holland v. State, 696 So. 2d 757 (Fla.1997).
On August 15, 1999, at approximately 6:15 p.m., Mr. Bowling was driving his minivan north on a residential street in Tarpon Springs. Mr. Bowling was closely followed by a second car, which was followed by Tarpon Springs’ police officer Kondek’s car. Officer Kondek had followed the second car for one block; none of the three vehicles were speeding. The three vehicles came to a sudden stop, and Mr. Bowling’s minivan made a left turn. The officer followed, stopped Mr. Bowling, and eventually issued a traffic citation for violating section 316.155(3), which provides: “No person may stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle without first giving an appropriate signal in the manner provided herein to the driver of any vehicle immediately to the rear, when there is opportunity to give such signal.”
Although there was discussion and testimony at the suppression hearing as to whether the stop was valid based on a violation of section 316.155(2), failure to give a proper turn signal, the motion and the court’s ruling were clearly based on Mr. Bowling’s alleged stop without signaling the vehicle immediately to the rear. One problem with the State’s case is that the driver of the second vehicle did not testify.
Additionally, the officer testified that the proper signal for slowing suddenly or stopping was the use of the taillights. The officer testified that after he effectuated the stop, he determined that Mr. Bowling’s taillights were in fact working. Obviously, if Mr. Bowling’s vehicle stopped suddenly, it was because of the application of the brakes, and the taillights properly signaled the stop. From his position in the third vehicle, the officer was simply not able to see Mr. Bowling’s brake lights.
In sum, the officer was unable to show any reasonable basis for stopping Mr. Bowling’s car.
Accordingly, the motion to suppress should have been granted. Mr. Bowling did not violate section 316.155(3) and should not have been stopped by the officer.
The evidence obtained as a result of the improper stop should have been suppressed. We therefore reverse the conviction and order of probation and direct that the information be dismissed.
Reversed and remanded.
CASANUEVA and STRINGER, JJ., concur.
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Jones v. State, 842 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…bable cause that Jones had committed a traffic infraction, the stop of Jones was illegal. Accordingly, any evidence seized as a result of the illegal stop should have been suppressed. Graham v. State, 60 So. 2d 186, 188 (Fla.1952); Bowling v. State, 779 So. 2d 613, 614 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Reversed and remanded. SALCINES and SILBERMAN, JJ., Concur. . The judgment erroneously states that Jones pleaded guilty to the charges.…
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Gordon v. State, 901 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…e only ground relied on by the State to justify the stop of Gordon’s Cadillac. Because the traffic stop was unlawful, the evidence obtained as result of it should have been suppressed. See Moody v. State, 842 So. 2d 754 (Fla.2003); Bowling v. State, 779 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Although Deputy Gershin and Deputy Deutseh apparently had a good faith belief that driving with an air freshener or other object hanging from the rearview mirror is a traffic infraction in Florida, the deputies’ misapprehension o…
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Myrick T. Nelson v. State, 922 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)…id not violate section 316.1985(1), and there was no probable cause for the vehicle stop. Because the traffic stop was invalid, the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. See Moody v. State, 842 So. 2d 754 (Fla.2003); Bowling v. State, 779 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Accordingly, we reverse Mr. Nelson’s judgment and sentence, and we remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opin…
Authorities Cited
- Holland v. State, 696 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 1997)