GARY ALLAN JOHNSON, APPELLANT,
v.
BETH ANN JOHNSON, APPELLEE
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In a divorce case involving a prenuptial agreement, the court held that a waiver of claims to premarital property does not waive the right to seek alimony based on income generated by that property. The trial court erred in denying the husband alimony based solely on his waiver of claims to the wife's separate property.
A waiver of claims to a spouse's separate premarital property does not waive the right to seek alimony. While separate property is not subject to distribution, it may constitute income from which alimony obligations may be met under Florida law. The trial court must reconsider the husband's alimony claim using the standard needs and ability analysis.
[1] A prenuptial agreement waiving claims to a spouse's separate property does not waive a claim for alimony derived from income generated by that separate property.
[2] Separate property, though not subject to distribution, may constitute income from which alimony obligations can be met.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The husband did not waive alimony by the agreement; he merely waived any claim to the wife's separate property. However, it is clear that one's separate property, while not subject to distribution, may still constitute income from which alimony obligations may be met.”
Establishes the key distinction between waiving claims to separate property versus waiving alimony rights, and confirms that income from separate property can support alimony obligations.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties executed a prenuptial agreement in which the husband waived any interest in property obtained by the wife as a result of her previous marr…
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HARRIS, J.
In a prenuptial agreement, the husband waived “any interest in or claim to any property [obtained by the wife as a result of her previous marriage].” From an annuity received as a result of her former husband’s death, the wife receives in excess of $3,000 per month. Her husband, after a fifteen-year marriage, now lives on social security disability payments of some $800 per month. The trial judge denied alimony to the husband finding that he had waived any right to claim any portion of the wife’s premarital assets and that all of her income came from such assets. The husband did not waive alimony by the agreement; he merely waived any claim to the wife’s separate property.
However, it is clear that one’s separate property, while not subject to distribution, may still constitute income from which alimony obligations may be met. See section 61.08(2)(d) and (g), Fla. Stat. This was a long-term marriage in which the wife will continue to receive substantial income while the husband is required to subsist on social security disability payments. On remand, the court should consider the husband’s claim based on the usual needs and ability standard.
Concerning the validity of the premarital agreement, it appears that there was indeed a failure to fully disclose the wife’s assets. This issue seems irrelevant, however, since the court treated the wife’s previously owned assets as non-marital and the result would not change. Its only relevancy would be if the husband waived alimony by the agreement. Since we have held that a waiver of a claim to a spouse’s premarital property does not waive a claim for alimony based on income that such property provides, we need not consider the issue further.
Finally, we believe it appropriate to mention the failure of the court to grant the husband’s motion for continuance. Just before the matter was scheduled for trial, the husband decided that his attorney had failed in his representation.
The record bears out the husband’s concern. He discharged his attorney at the docket call on Monday even though the court indicated that he would have to proceed to trial on the following Thursday. Then, after docket call and with little notice, the court ordered that the trial commence the next day. The husband was totally unprepared to represent himself in this matter, particularly on such short notice. This case had only been filed a few months earlier and no previous continuances had been requested or granted. . Further, there is no indication that the husband’s firing his lawyer was done for the purpose of prolonging the litigation. While we do not reverse on this ground, we encourage judges, when a party has a valid reason to discharge his lawyer, to permit a reasonable time to employ a substitute and to prepare.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
THOMPSON, C.J., and SAWAYA, J., concur.