LYNDA STERN AND DR. HERBERT STERN, HER HUSBAND, APPELLANTS,
v.
LUIS ALFONSO ZAMUDIO, APPELLEE
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The Sterns sued for damages from a 1993 automobile accident and obtained a jury verdict of $780.75. The defendant's proposal for settlement of $5,000 was rejected, and the trial court awarded attorney fees to the defendant under Florida's offer-of-judgment statute. The appellate court reversed, holding that the defendant's settlement offer was defective because it failed to specify the amount attributable to each plaintiff as required by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442.
The defendant's undifferentiated lump sum settlement offer was defective because it violated Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442(c)(3), which requires that a joint proposal state the amount and terms attributable to each party. Therefore, the sanctions of section 768.79 were not enforceable against the Sterns, and the order granting attorney fees must be reversed.
[1] A proposal for settlement must comply with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442, which applies to all such proposals made after its effective date of January 1, 1997.
[2] A joint proposal for settlement must state the amount and terms attributable to each party.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[a] joint proposal shall state the amount and terms attributable to each party.”
The mandatory requirement of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442(c)(3) that establishes why the defendant's undifferentiated lump sum offer was defective.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLynda Stern alleged personal injuries from an automobile accident on April 25, 1993, and her husband Dr. Herbert Stern sought consortium damages. On O…
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STRINGER, Judge.
Appellants, Lynda and Dr. Herbert Stern, sue for damages arising from an automobile accident which occurred on April 25, 1993. Lynda Stern alleged personal injuries as a result of the accident, and Dr. Herbert Stern, her husband, sought consortium damages. On October 29, 1999, prior to trial, appellee served a proposal for settlement, pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1993), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442, in the amount of $5,000 without specifying the amount attributed to each plaintiff. The offer was not accepted by the Sterns, and at trial, the Sterns received net verdicts totaling $780.75. Consequently, the trial court entered an order granting appellee’s request for attorney fees pursuant to section 768.79. Appellants challenge this order. We reverse.
While the trial court correctly applied the substantive portions of the statute in effect at the time of the accident (section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1993)), it erred in failing to apply rule 1.442, which applies to all proposals for settlement authorized by Florida law made after its effective date, January 1, 1997. Subsection (c)(3) of the rule provides that “[a] joint proposal shall state the amount and terms attributable to each party.” Therefore, the undifferentiated lump sum offer in this case was defective, and the sanctions of section 768.79 were not enforceable against the Sterns. The order granting attorney fees is therefore reversed. See USAA v. Behar, 752 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Allstate Indemnity Co. v. Hingson, 774 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).
As to the other points raised by appellant, we affirm without discussion.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
THREADGILL, A.C.J., and WHATLEY, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Thompson v. Andrew K. Hodson, M.D., 825 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)…ateriale, 787 So. 2d 173, 175-76 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (holding that an offer was invalid because it failed to state the amount attributable to each of multiple plaintiff offerors as required by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442); Stern v. Zamudio, 780 So. 2d 155, 155 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (holding that an offer was invalid because it failed to state the amount attributable to each of multiple plaintiff offerees as required by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442); Ford Motor Co. v. Meyers, 771 So. 2d 1202, 12…
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Hibbard v. McGRAW, 918 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…(medical expenses and loss of consortium). The defendants’ proposal for settlement was therefore unclear and ambiguous. Accordingly, the defendants were not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees under section 768.79. See, e.g., Stern v. Zamudio, 780 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)(sanctions of section 768.79 were not enforceable where lump sum offer was defective). II. Damages. As to the issue of damages, Carr contends the trial' court erred in determining the net recovery. Carr provides this court with t…
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Hibbard v. McGRAW, 862 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)…(medical expenses and loss of consortium). The defendants’ proposal for settlement was therefore unclear and ambiguous. Accordingly, the defendants were not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees under section 768.79. See, e.g., Stern v. Zamudio, 780 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)(sanc-tions of section 768.79 were not enforceable where lump sum offer was defective). II. Damages. As to the issue of damages, Carr contends the trial court erred in determining their recovery and provides this court with two d…
Authorities Cited
- United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Raymond J. Behar, M.D., 752 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
- Allstate Indem. Co. v. Solen Hingson and Annette Hingson, 774 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)