ROSA EDWARDS, APPELLANT,
v.
LEE R. NORMAN AND STAR TRUCKING, INC., APPELLEES
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Rosa Edwards appeals summary judgment dismissing her personal injury claim after she accepted a settlement check for property damage with a release document. The court reversed, holding that parol evidence regarding alleged misrepresentations about the scope of the release must be considered before summary judgment can be granted.
The court reversed summary judgment, holding that parol evidence of the alleged representations made during execution of the release must be considered because such evidence can be introduced to show the written agreement was obtained by fraudulent means, creating a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment.
[1] A release of all claims is not a bar to a personal injury action if the release was obtained by fraud or misrepresentation.
[2] Parol evidence is admissible to show that a written agreement was obtained by fraudulent means, even if the agreement appears clear and unambiguous on its face.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A trial court should enter a summary judgment only when there is no genuine issue of material fact.”
Establishes the standard for summary judgment that requires genuine factual disputes to preclude summary judgment.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn January 15, 1998, Edwards was rear-ended by a semitrailer operated by Norman and owned by Star Trucking. The insurer's adjuster provided Edwards wi…
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DAVIS, Judge.
Rosa Edwards appeals the trial court’s final judgment entered in her personal injury action against Lee R. Norman and Star Trucking, Inc. The trial court entered the final judgment after granting Norman and Star Tracking’s motion for summary judgment. We reverse.
On January 15, 1998, Edwards was rear-ended by a semitrailer operated by Norman and owned by Star Tracking. Prior to Edwards filing a cause of action, Star Tracking’s insurance carrier hired an independent adjuster to investigate the property damage claim. Edwards’ vehicle was taken to a repair shop which gave a repair estimate of $5,005.36. Approximately a month after the accident, the adjuster advised Edwards that he had a check for the damage to the vehicle. He arranged a meeting with her at a gas station near the interstate at which he gave her a check made payable jointly to Edwards and the repair shop in the exact amount of the estimate. Further, the check had the notation: “FULL/FINAL SETTLEMENT OF ALL PROPERTY DAMAGES.” At the same time, Edwards signed a document entitled “RELEASE of All Claims.” Edwards delivered the check to the repair shop and the car was repaired.
Edwards subsequently filed a complaint against Norman and Star Trucking, seeking damages for her personal injuries. Norman and Star Tracking’s amended answer raised the affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction based on the release Edwards had executed. In reply to this defense, Edwards alleged that the release was obtained by unlawful means, fraud and misrepresentation.
At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the trial court had for its consideration the deposition testimony of Edwards and the adjuster. Edwards testified at deposition that, prior to signing the release, she asked the adjuster if the release applied only to the property damage and he assured her that it did. Norman and Star Trucking argued that the release was clear and unambiguous and, accordingly, the parol evidence of Edward’s deposition testimony should not be considered. Edwards urged the trial court to consider the parol evidence, arguing that it raised factual issues as to the circumstances of the execution of the release and its validity. The trial court, however, granted the motion for summary judgment and entered a final judgment.
Our review of a final judgment based on the granting of summary judgment is de novo. See Walsingham v. Dockery, 671 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). A trial court should enter a summary judgment only when there is no genuine issue of material fact. See Anderson v. Aamco Transmissions of Brevard, Inc., 265 So. 2d 5 (Fla.1972). The issue before this court is whether the parol evidence regarding the circumstances of the signing of the release is admissible. If Edwards’ testimony regarding the alleged representations made to her by the adjuster is considered, there remains an issue of fact that must be resolved in order to determine the validity of the release. Although evidence of an oral agreement may not be used to alter the terms of a written agreement, it can be introduced to show that the written agreement was obtained by fraudulent means. See Pena v. Tampa Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 363 So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). Having determined that parol evidence should have been considered, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
THREADGILL, A.C.J., and GREEN, ' J., concur.
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Rollins v. Alvarez, 792 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…swer the questions posed by this litigation. Because of these material facts and unanswered questions, we remand this cause to the circuit court for further proceedings. REVERSED and REMANDED. GRIFFIN and SAWAYA, JJ„ concur. . Edwards v. Norman, 780 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Krol v. City of Orlando, 778 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); Sierra v. Shevin, 767 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). . There is no dispute that the effect of this transfer to the trustee destroyed any tenancy by the entireties that…
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McKEEVER v. Rushing, 41 So. 3d 920 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)…ment by mistake, or that a party secured the execution of the document by fraud or misrepresentation, then the trial court may consider other facts related to the execution of the document in determining its scope and meaning. See Edwards v. Norman, 780 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Milford v. Metro. Dade County, 430 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). In this case, the McKeevers clearly raised both the intent of the parties and mistake as unresolved issues of fact. The letters presented to the court without obj…
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Joya Indus., Inc. v. City OF Hollywood, 789 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)…al court in effect granted summary judgment, the standard of review is de novo and requires that the evidence be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Sierra v. Shevin, 767 So. 2d 524, 525 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Edwards v. Norman, 780 So. 2d 162, 163 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). In Munoz v. City of Coral Gables, 695 So. 2d 1283, 1288 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), we stated that “a claimant to seized currency must come forward with sworn proof of a possessory and/or ownership interest in the same to acquire s…
Authorities Cited
- Major Ronald Walsingham v. Kriegel, 671 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
- Pena v. Tampa Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 363 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- Anderson v. Aamco Transmissions OF Brevard, Inc., 265 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1972)