J. GERARD CORREA, ESQ., APPELLANT,
v.
GARY M. CHRISTENSEN, ETC., APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 2001-02-09
Nos. 5D99-2345, 5D99-2346
COBB and SHARP, W„ JJ., concur.
780 So. 2d 220 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (2001) Positive Treatment
Cited by 25 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Attorney Gerard Correa appealed dismissals of his attempts to recover compensation for legal services rendered in administering two estates. The court affirmed the dismissals, holding that Correa failed to satisfy the requirements for both a charging lien and an attorney's fee award.


Holding

The court affirmed the trial court's dismissals. A charging lien requires that the attorney's services produce a positive judgment or settlement, not merely administrative work. Additionally, Correa failed to serve his fee motion on the personal representative or his attorney, failing to meet a prerequisite for any fee award. For Marjorie's estate, the filing deadline was missed and the estate had closed, precluding recovery against the personal representative.


Headnotes

[1] A charging lien requires that an attorney's services produce a positive judgment or settlement for the client, to which the lien can attach.

[2] An attorney's efforts to merely administer an estate, without producing a tangible return or positive judgment for the estate or personal representative, are insufficient…

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Key Quotes

“It is not enough to support the imposition of a charging lien that an attorney has provided his services; the services must, in addition, produce a positive judgment or settlement for the client, since the lien will attach only to the tangible fruits of the services.”

Establishes the legal standard for charging liens and why Correa's administrative services did not qualify.

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Facts & Procedural History

Correa represented the personal representatives in the probate of the estates of Marvin and Marjorie Christiansen. For Marvin's estate, Correa filed a…

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Opinion of the Court
THOMPSON, C.J.

THOMPSON, C.J.

This consolidated appeal involves the unsuccessful attempts by Attorney Gerard Correa to obtain compensation for having represented the personal representative in .the probate of the estates of Marvin Chris-tiansen and Marjorie Christiansen. We affirm in all respects.

Correa sought to recover compensation from the estate of Marvin Chris-tiansen in two ways. Both of these efforts were dismissed by the trial court. Cor-rea’s first effort to win remuneration concerns his 1993 notice of charging lien. It is not enough to support the imposition of a charging lien that an attorney has provided his services; the services must, in addition, produce a positive judgment or settlement for the client, since the lien will attach only to the tangible fruits of the services. See Sinclair, Louis, Siegel, Heath, Nussbaum, & Zavertnik, P.A. v. Baucom, 428 So. 2d 1383 (Fla.1983). In the instant case, Correa’s efforts, which were merely to administer the estate, produced no tangible return for the estate or for the personal representative, whose duties were to administer the estate. The personal representative, as personal representative, received no fund or positive judgment or settlement out of Correa’s efforts. Although the trial court did not adopt this rationale in its reasoning, as a matter of law the charging lien fails because of this defect.

Correa also sought attorney’s fees via motion, but failed to serve the motion on the personal representative or his attorney. The trial court ruled that since Cor-rea did not serve his motion seeking attorney’s fees on the personal representative or the attorney for the personal representative, a prerequisite to any possible award of fees was not met. In this case, we agree with that result. Correa was aware that he was supposed to serve any papers on the attorney for the personal representative, but for reasons of his own chose to serve instead a bare certificate of service.

As for the estate of Marjorie Chris-tiansen, Correa did not file his notice of lien and motion to impress the lien against the personal representative until 13 months after the order of summary administration had been entered. The court ruled that Correa was not entitled to fees in because the estate had been closed for some time. Section 735.206(3)(e), Florida Statutes, states:

(e) The petitioners for the order of summary administration shall be personally liable for all lawful claims against the estate of the decedent, but only to the extent of the value of the estate of the decedent actually received by each petitioner, exclusive of the property exempt from claims of creditors under the constitution and statutes of Florida.

In addition, Correa points out subsection (d) provides, “Property of the decedent that is not exempt from claims of creditors and that remains in the hands of those to whom it may be assigned by the order shall continue to be liable for claims against the decedent until barred as provided in this law.” This language creates a claim against the legatees, but not against the personal representative, from whom Correa sought his fees.

AFFIRMED.

COBB and SHARP, W„ JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By (17 total)

  • Roberta Santini, M.D. v. Cleveland Clinic Fla., 65 So. 3d 22 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)
    …us Limitation of Final Judgment Amount “By definition, an attorney’s charging lien cannot attach to property not involved in the suit and not before the court.” Cole v. Kehoe, 710 So. 2d 705, 706 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); see also Correa v. Christensen, 780 So. 2d 220, 220 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (“It is not enough to support the imposition of a charging lien that an attorney has provided his services; the services must, in addition, produce a positive judgment or settlement for the client, since the lien will attach…
  • Franz Edward Mitchell v. Coleman, 868 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)
    …of a charging lien that an attorney has provided his services; the services must, in addition, produce a positive judgment or settlement for the client, since the lien will attach only to the tangible fruits of the services.” Correa v. Christensen, 780 So. 2d 220, 220 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). A charging lien may issue in a dissolution action and attach to the proceeds that are awarded to the client as part of the equitable distribution of property. See Litman v. Fine, Jacobson, Schwartz, Nash, Block & England, P…
  • …of the Charging Lien Under Florida law, a charging lien attaches only to the “tangible fruits” of the attorney’s services. See Rudd, 960 So. 2d at 887 (quoting Mitchell v. Coleman, 868 So. 2d 639, 641 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)); Correa v. Christensen, 780 So. 2d 220, 220 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). “If the litigation produces no judgment of monetary value for the client, the court may not impose a charging lien for the attorney’s benefit.” Walia, 28 So. 3d at 989. To support a charging lien, a firm must do more tha…

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