MARY ANN MCDANIEL, APPELLANT,
v.
ROBERT E. MCDANIEL, APPELLEE
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Mary Ann McDaniel appealed an order clarifying the parties' 1995 divorce judgment, which contradicted an earlier 1996 order on the same issue. The appellate court struck the later order due to the trial court's unreasonable 40-month delay in ruling, finding such delay violates judicial administration rules and undermines confidence in the judiciary.
The appellate court struck the August 1999 clarification order and remanded for reconsideration in light of the February 1996 order. The court held that the 40-month delay between the May 1996 hearing and the August 1999 ruling was per se unreasonable and unacceptable under Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.050(f).
[1] A trial court's unreasonable delay in ruling on a motion can lead to inconsistent rulings and undermine confidence in the judicial system.
[2] A judge has a duty to rule upon and announce an order or judgment on every matter submitted to that judge within a reasonable time.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Such a delay is per se unreasonable and unacceptable.”
Establishes that the 40-month delay in ruling violates fundamental judicial administration principles
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe former spouses were divorced by final judgment in April 1995. The former husband sought clarification of paragraph 12 regarding which temporary or…
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STRINGER, Judge.
The former wife, Mary Ann McDaniel, challenges an order granting the former husband, Robert McDaniel’s, motion to clarify their April 1995 final judgment of dissolution of marriage. The former husband sought clarification of paragraph 12 of the final judgment, specifically concerning which temporary orders were incorporated by reference into the final judgment. The order on clarification dated August 30, 1999, stated that the court intended to incorporate by reference only those temporary orders “regarding the parenting issues and the children” and “did not intend to incorporate, by reference, those temporary orders regarding the financial circumstances and responsibilities of the parties.” Rather than clarifying the final judgment, the order further confused the issue because it was inconsistent with a previous order dated February 26, 1996, wherein the trial court came to the opposite conclusion. The February 1996 order interpreted the final judgment to incorporate by reference all temporary orders, including those dealing with financial matters.
' This confusion was precipitated by the excessive delay between the hearing on the motion to clarify, held in May 1996, and the order granting the motion entered forty months later. Such a delay is per se unreasonable and unacceptable. Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.050(f) states:
Duty to Rule within a Reasonable Time. Every judge has a duty to rule upon and announce an order or judgment on every matter submitted to that judge within a • reasonable time. Each judge shall maintain a log of cases under advisement and inform the chief judge of the circuit at the end of each calendar month of each case that has been held under advisement for more than 60 days.
In addition to resulting in inconsistent rulings, we have previously noted that such unreasonable delays cause litigants and their counsel needless anxiety and expense and undermine confidence in the judicial system. See McCartney v. McCartney, 725 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).
Accordingly, we strike the August 1999 order granting the former husband’s motion to clarify and remand for reconsideration in light of the order entered on February 26,1996.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
BLUE, A.C.J., and GREEN, J., concur.
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Locke v. Locke, 832 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)…ly fashion. See Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.050(f). As our court has previously pointed out, “unreasonable delays cause litigants and their counsel needless anxiety and expense and undermine confidence in the judicial system.” McDaniel v. [*972] McDaniel, 780 So. 2d 227, 228 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (citing McCartney v. McCartney, 725 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)). In addition to creating anxiety and expense, a delay in the entry of an order can cause inaccuracies to creep into the final judgment, warranting a new hea…
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Johnson v. Johnson, 268 So. 3d 183 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018)
Authorities Cited
- McCARTNEY v. McCARTNEY, 725 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)