ALVIN JULIUS PARRISH, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 2001-03-14
No. 3D00-1154
Before COPE, FLETCHER and SORONDO, JJ.
780 So. 2d 287 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2001) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Holding

A habitual offender sentence can be imposed even if a sentencing guidelines scoresheet is prepared, and claims regarding habitualization are procedurally barred if previously rejected on direct appeal.


Facts & Procedural History

Alvin Julius Parrish sought postconviction relief, arguing he should not have been sentenced as a habitual offender. His claim was based on the trial …

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Alvin Julius Parrish appeals an order denying his motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We affirm.

Defendant-appellant Parrish contends that he should not have been sentenced as a habitual offender. This claim is procedurally barred. Defendant challenged his habitualization on direct appeal from his conviction, and the challenge to habitualization was rejected without discussion. See Parrish v. State, 589 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).

Defendant’s claim is time-barred as well. See Fla. R.Crim.P. 3.850(b). Assuming there were no procedural bar, the defendant’s claims are without merit. Relying on Whitehead v. State, 498 So. 2d 863 (Fla.1986), superseded by statute as stated in, inter alia, Studnicka v. State, 679 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), defendant contends that a habitual offender sentence could not be imposed without the trial court stating reasons for an upward sentencing departure. The Whitehead decision does not apply to the defendant’s case, because defendant’s crime date was hr 1989. For crimes committed on or after October 1, 1988, the sentencing guidelines do not apply to habitual offender sentences. Studnicka, 679 So. 2d at 821; Ch. 88-131, §§ 6, 9, Laws of Fla.

Defendant contends that because a sentencing guidelines seoresheet was signed by counsel and the trial judge, this means that the judge had elected to sentence the defendant under the guidelines. That is not so. A sentencing guidelines seoresheet is routinely prepared for consideration by the sentencing judge, but the judge is free to impose any sentencing option allowed by law including, in this case, a habitual offender sentence. The seoresheet and sentencing documents all reflect that a habitual offender sentence was imposed.

Affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By

  • LaFLEUR v. State, 812 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
    …2001)(finding that “[w]e need not address that claim [an incorrect calculation in his sentencing guidelines scoresheet] because defendant was sentenced as a habitual offender and the guidelines scoresheet is irrelevant”); see also Parrish v. State, 780 So. 2d 287, 288 (Fla. 3d DCA)(holding that appellant’s improper sentencing argument was procedurally barred because he was sentenced as an habitual offender), rev. denied, 799 So. 2d 218 (Fla.2001). Nevertheless, appellant argues it is clear that the trial jud…
  • Stanley v. State, 947 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)
    …guidelines, it is clear the his Heggs challenge is facially insufficient. Next, where, as here, a habitual offender sentence is imposed for offenses committed after October 1988, the guidelines are irrelevant and inapplicable. See Parrish v. State, 780 So. 2d 287, 288 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)(“For crimes committed on or after October 1, 1988, the sentencing guidelines do not apply to habitual offender sentences.”). Thus, again, as a matter of law, Stanley’s motion was facially insufficient because it did not aver…
  • Emmett T. COX v. State, 76 So. 3d 353 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)
    …PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Stanley v. State, 947 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (holding for crimes committed on or after October 1, 1988, the sentencing guidelines do not apply to habitual offender sentences); Parrish v. State, 780 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (same); Studnicka v. State, 679 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (same).…

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