GILBRIDE, HELLER & BROWN, P.A., ET AL., PETITIONERS,
v.
FLOYD WATKINS, RESPONDENT

Fla. | 2001-03-22
No. SC00-657
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
783 So. 2d 224 Florida Supreme Court (2001) Positive Treatment
Cited by 5 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court held that in a legal malpractice claim arising from underlying litigation, the two-year statute of limitations begins to run when the Florida Supreme Court resolves review of the underlying case, not when the District Court's mandate issues. This case resolves a certified question of great public importance regarding the proper commencement date for malpractice limitations periods.


Holding

The statute of limitations begins to run from the date the Florida Supreme Court resolves review of the underlying case. A final judgment is not final for limitations purposes until timely filed appeals or petitions for review by the Supreme Court are resolved.


Headnotes

[1] The statute of limitations for a legal malpractice claim predicated on errors or omissions in litigation does not commence until the litigation is concluded by a final ju…

[2] When review of a district court decision in an action underlying a legal malpractice claim is sought in the Florida Supreme Court, the two-year statute of limitations beg…

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Key Quotes

“when a malpractice action is predicated on errors or omissions committed in the course of litigation, and that litigation proceeds to judgment, the statute of limitations does not commence to run until the litigation is concluded by final judgment. To be specific, we hold that the statute of limitations does not commence to run until the final judgment becomes final.”

Establishes the foundational rule from Silvestrone that the limitations period does not begin until litigation concludes and the judgment becomes final.

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Facts & Procedural History

Watkins hired GHB to defend him in litigation brought by NCNB National Bank and to file a counterclaim. Watkins lost at trial. The Third District Cour…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

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Opinion of the Court
HARDING, J.

HARDING, J.

We have for review a decision on the following question certified to be of great public importance:

WHERE REVIEW OF A DISTRICT COURT DECISION IN AN ACTION UNDERLYING A LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM IS SOUGHT IN THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT, DOES THE TWO-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PERIOD OF SECTION 95.11(4)(a), FLORIDA STATUTES, BEGIN TO RUN FROM THE DATE THE DECISION BECOMES FINAL BY THE SUPREME COURT’S RESOLUTION OF THAT REVIEW, OR DOES THE PERIOD RUN FROM THE DATE OF THE DISTRICT COURT’S MANDATE?

Watkins v. Gilbride, Heller & Brown, P.A., 754 So. 2d 759, 763 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution. For the reasons expressed below, we hold that the statute of limitations begins to run from the date the decision becomes final by this Court’s resolution of the case.

The facts of this case, as set forth by the district court, are as follows:

This malpractice action arises out of a lawsuit brought by NCNB National Bank of Florida [NCNB] against Watkins. Watkins hired [Gilbride, Heller & Brown (GHB)] to defend him against NCNB’s action, and to file a counterclaim for damages. Watkins lost the NCNB litigation. An appeal was taken to this court which affirmed the trial court’s decision, and on September 21, 1993, denied Watkins’ subsequent request for rehearing. See Watkins v. NCNB Nat’l Bank of Fla., N.A., 622 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). Watkins then hired new counsel who sought review by a petition for writ of certiorari to the Florida Supreme Court, which petition was denied by that court on January 14, 1994. See Watkins v. NCNB Nat’l Bank of Fla., N.A., 634 So. 2d 629 (Fla.1994).

On January 12, 1996, just shy of two years after the supreme court’s action, Watkins filed a malpractice claim against GHB. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of GHB finding the two-year statute of limitations began to run on the date we denied rehearing (September 21, 1993) and expired on September 21, 1995, thus the claim was barred.

Id. at 760. On appeal, the district court reversed, concluding that the statute of limitations began to run only after this Court denied Watkins’ petition for review (January 14, 1994). The district court relied on this Court’s previous opinion in Silvestrone v. Edell, 721 So. 2d 1173 (Fla.1998), wherein we held that when a malpractice action is predicated on errors or omissions committed in the course of litigation, and that litigation proceeds to judgment, the statute of limitations does not commence to run until the litigation is concluded by final judgment. To be specific, we hold that the statute of limitations does not commence to run until the final judgment becomes final.

Id. at 1175.

We agree with the court below that, for the purposes of determining when the limitations period begins to run, “a final judgment is not final until a timely filed appeal to, or petition for review by, the supreme court is resolved.” Watkins, 754 So. 2d at 762. See also Chapman v. Garcia, 463 So. 2d 528, 529 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (“[Ujntil the Florida Supreme Court resolves the issue if further review is sought — the question has not been resolved to finality.”); Wilson v. Clark, 414 So. 2d 526, 530 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (“[Ajn action continues to have life ... until a timely filed petition for review in the Florida Supreme Court is acted upon”). This conclusion is consistent with the purposes of the bright-line rule announced in Silves-trone: to provide certainty and reduce litigation concerning when the statute starts to run. See 721 So. 2d at 1176. Accordingly, we approve the result below.

It is so ordered.

WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Ginsberg v. ChemMED Corp., 929 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)
    …o run. Without such a rule, the courts would be required to make a factual determination on a case by case basis.... ” Id. at 1176. The supreme court’s preference for a bright-line rule has been reaffirmed. Gilbride, Heller & Brown, P.A. v. Watkins, 783 So. 2d 224, 226 (Fla.2001) (“This conclusion is consistent with the purposes of the bright-line rule announced in Silvestrone: to provide certainty and reduce litigation concerning when the statute starts to run.”) See also, Steele v. Kehoe, 747 So. 2d 931, 93…
  • First Union Nat'l Bank v. Turney, 832 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)
    …n v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999) (requiring state prisoner to seek discretionary review, if available, in order to. exhaust state remedies for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254); Gilbride, Heller & Brown, P.A. v. Watkins, 783 So. 2d 224, 225-26 (Fla.2001) (holding statute of limitations in malpractice case runs from the date Florida Supreme Court denies discretionary review, if sought); Wilson v. Clark, 414 So. 2d 526, 530 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (stating cause of action survives “unti…
  • Vega v. Rier (Fla. 3d DCA 2021)
    …rt, “for the purposes of determining when the limitations period begins to run, ‘a final judgment is not final until a timely filed appeal to, or petition for review by, the supreme court is resolved.’” Gilbride, Heller & Brown, P.A. v. Watkins, 783 So. 2d 224, 225-26 (Fla. 2001). Vega filed his legal malpractice action against Rier on April 3, 2018, which is well within the two-year range of the statute of limitations calculated from either this Court’s March 24, 2017 order or from the Supreme Court’s…

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