BILLIE JOE GAFFORD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Gafford appealed a sentencing correction made more than 30 days after the original sentence was imposed, claiming the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction. The court held that sentences exceeding plea agreement terms must be challenged within 30 days under Rule 3.170(c), not Rule 3.800(b)(2), and the 30-day deadline is jurisdictional, barring the trial court's later correction.
The trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion filed six months after sentencing. Sentences exceeding plea agreement terms are violations of the plea agreement, not sentencing errors, and must be challenged under Rule 3.170(c) within 30 days. The 30-day deadline is jurisdictional, and failure to comply waives appellate review of the issue.
[1] A sentence that exceeds the terms of a plea agreement is considered a violation of the plea agreement, not a sentencing error, and must be challenged under Florida Rule o…
[2] Failure to file a motion to withdraw a plea within 30 days of sentencing waives the issue for appellate review.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Under the 1997 amendment, a sentence that exceeds the terms of a plea agreement is no longer considered a "sentencing error," but is instead determined to be a "violation of the plea agreement" that must be challenged under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170(c) within 30 days after the trial court renders the sentence.”
Establishes the critical distinction between sentencing errors and plea agreement violations post-1997, requiring challenge under Rule 3.170(c) within 30 days.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGafford pleaded guilty in four cases with a negotiated maximum sentence of 29.9 months' prison and probation. On September 15, 1999, the trial court i…
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PER CURIAM.
The issue that we decide is whether a trial court has jurisdiction, more than 30 days after the imposition of sentence, to correct an alleged sentencing error pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2). Billie Joe Gafford pled guilty in four cases in exchange for a maximum sentence of 29.9 months’ prison and probation.
On September 15, 1999, the court imposed a sentence in one case of 16.5 months in prison followed by two years’ probation, concurrent with sentences in the other three cases of 24.3 months in prison followed by two years’ probation. After filing a notice of appeal, defense counsel, approximately six months after the rendition of sentences, filed a motion to correct a sentencing error under rule 3.800(b)(2), asserting that the sentences exceeded the 29.9 month cap and asking the court to either conform the sentences to the plea agreement or allow Gafford to withdraw his plea. The court granted his motion and sentenced Gafford to 16.5 months in prison in the first case and 29.9 months in the remaining three, with no probation. Gafford claims on appeal that the trial court erred by increasing his sentence in violation of North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), characterizing certain comments at the hearing below as vindictive.
We reverse, because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider Gaf-ford’s motion to correct the asserted sentencing error under rule 3.800(b)(2).
Before January 1, 1997, when a sentence exceeded the terms of a plea agreement, the defendant could seek a remedy by a 3.800(b) motion to correct sentencing error. Under the 1997 amendment, a sentence that exceeds the terms of a plea agreement is no longer considered a “sentencing error,” but is instead determined to be a “violation of the plea agreement” that must be challenged under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170© within 30 days after the trial court renders the sentence. See Green v. State, 700 So. 2d 384, 387 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Hall v. State, 765 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).
Failure to file a motion to withdraw the plea within 30 days waives the issue for appellate review, and the defendant is limited to filing a motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. See Fla.R.App.P. 9.140(b)(2)(B)(ii); Meriweather v. State, 26 Fla.L. Weekly D408, — So. 2d -, 2001 WL 98595 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Weidner v. State, 767 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).
Courts have characterized the 60 day time limit for reducing or modifying a sentence under rule 3.800(c) as jurisdictional. See, e.g., Knapp v. State, 741 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Hussey v. State, 739 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Bowling v. State, 688 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). Accordingly, the 30 day limit under 3.170(0 is also jurisdictional; therefore, the trial court did not have the authority to consider Gafford’s motion below, and the issue was not preserved for appeal.
We REVERSE and REMAND Gaf-ford’s sentence with directions to reinstate the original sentence, without prejudice to Gafford’s right to seek relief under rule 3.850.
ERVIN, WEBSTER and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (27 total)
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Griffin v. State, 114 So. 3d 890 (Fla. 2013)…o withdraw plea, noting that the rule requires that such a motion be filed within thirty days of rendition of sentence and Griffin’s motion was filed nine years after his sentence was rendered. Citing the district court decision in Gafford v. State, 783 So. 2d 1191, 1192 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001), the trial court explained that the thirty-day limit is jurisdictional and thus the court did not have the authority to consider Griffin’s rule 3.170G) motion. Griffin argues that the limit is not jurisdictional and that ot…
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Barber v. State, 901 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…ncing error subject to relief under Rule 3.800(b). Rather, it must be preserved through a motion to withdraw. See Williams v. State, 873 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Williams v. State, 821 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 2d DCA [*366] 2002); Gafford v. State, 783 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); see also Leonard v. State, 760 So. 2d 114 (Fla.2000). Gafford indicates that a motion to withdraw a plea under similar circumstances must be made pursuant to Rule 3.170(Z), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, within 30 days aft…
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Bermudez v. State, 901 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…withdraw the plea within thirty days after rendition of the sentence, but only upon the grounds specified in Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)(a)-(e).” (emphasis added.) This thirty-day limit is jurisdictional. Gafford v. State, 783 So. 2d 1191, 1192 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.020(h) defines “Rendition (of an Order)” as “[a]n order is rendered when a signed, written order is filed with the clerk of the lower tribunal.” Application of this definition clearly…
Previewing 3 of 27 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (U.S. 1969)
- Weidner v. State, 767 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
- Green v. State, 700 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)
- Hussey v. State, 739 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
- Hall v. State, 765 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
- Wilson v. State, 741 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
- Knapp v. State, 741 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
- Denissa Bowling v. State, 688 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)