MICHAEL NORRIS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Michael Norris appealed his prosecution for drug paraphernalia and methamphetamine possession, arguing the statute of limitations had expired. The Florida District Court of Appeal agreed, holding that the State failed to demonstrate the delay in executing the arrest capias was reasonable, thereby barring prosecution.
The Court held that the statute of limitations barred prosecution because the State failed to demonstrate that its delay in executing the capias was reasonable. The burden was on the State to show the delay was not unreasonable, and it presented no evidence of efforts to locate Norris or justify the delay.
[1] Prohibition is an appropriate remedy for a criminal defendant to challenge a trial court's jurisdiction when the prosecution is barred by the statute of limitations.
[2] When a criminal defendant challenges a prosecution as untimely, the State bears the burden of proving that the prosecution is not barred by the statute of limitations.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons or other process is executed without unreasonable delay.”
Establishes the legal standard for when prosecution commences under the statute of limitations
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceNorris committed the offenses on April 3, 1995, and was arrested the next day. He was diverted to drug court but failed to appear on August 22, 1995, …
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NORTHCUTT, Acting Chief Judge.
Michael Norris contends the statute of limitations barred his prosecution for possession of drug paraphernalia and possession of methamphetamine. We agree with him because the State failed to show that its delay in commencing the prosecution was not unreasonable.
The offenses leading to the instant charges occurred on April 3, 1995, and Norris was arrested the next day. He was diverted to drug court, but failed to appear on August 22, 1995, and a capias was issued. The State filed an information on April 9, 1996, upon which the court set an arraignment for April 22, 1996. No summons issued for Norris’s appearance, and the capias remained outstanding until November 17, 1999, when he was arrested and brought to a first appearance. Norris moved to dismiss the charges, asserting the statute of limitations bar. The 1993 statute in effect at the time of Norris’s offenses controls. Brown v. State, 674 So. 2d 738, 739 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
Accordingly, the prosecution for Norris’s misdemeanor and third-degree felony must have commenced within two years and three years, respectively, after he committed them. § 775.15(2), Fla. Stat. (1993). A prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons or other process is executed without unreasonable delay. § 775.15(5). The burden is on the State to demonstrate that a delay in the execution of a capias was not unreasonable. Brown, 674 So. 2d at 740-741. An unexcused delay in serving appropriate process until after the statute of limitations has run bars prosecution for the offenses charged. Neal v. State, 697 So. 2d 903, 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).
Under section 775.15(6), Florida Statutes (1993), the limitation period does not run during any time when the defendant is continuously absent from the state or has no reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state, but in no case does that provision extend the applicable limitation period by more than three years. Brown, 674 So. 2d at 738 n. 2.
Here, the State did not contradict Norris’s testimony that he had lived at the same address in Polk County from the time of the offenses until July, 1999. Nor did it demonstrate that it had made any effort whatever to locate Norris in order to serve the outstanding capias. Rather, the court below appeared swayed by Norris’s acknowledgment that he used an alias in connection with a marijuana possession charge in 1998. However, this one use of an assumed name did not prove that the State could not have located Norris if it had bothered to look. In short, the State tendered no evidence to demonstrate that the delay in executing the capias was reasonable. That being the case, the statute of limitation barred Norris’s prosecution for these offenses. Neal, 697 So. 2d at 906-907.
Reversed and remanded with directions to discharge the defendant.
DAVIS, J., and CAMPBELL, MONTEREY, (Senior) Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Breffnay Cunnell v. State, 920 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)…fendant in another state who has been charged by information or indictment with a crime in this state shall not constitute an unreasonable delay. An unexeused delay in executing service bars prosecution for the offense charged. See Norris v. State, 784 So. 2d 1188, 1189 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (citing Neal v. State, 697 So. 2d 903, 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)). However, in accordance with section 775.15(6),3 a statute of limitations is tolled if a “defendant is continuously absent from the state or has no reasonably as…
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Armengol Hernandez v. State, 915 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…When a criminal defendant challenges his prosecution as untimely commenced, the State has the burden to establish that the prosecution is not barred by the statute of limitations. See State v. King, 282 So. 2d 162, 164 (Fla.1973); Norris v. State, 784 So. 2d 1188, 1189 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Neal v. State, 697 So. 2d 903, 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). For these purposes, prosecution is commenced “when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictmen…
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Williams v. State, 833 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)…that it made a diligent search to locate and serve the appellant within the statute of limitations period. See § 775.15(5), Fla. Stat. (1995); Fleming, 524 So. 2d at 1147; Coleman v. State, 655 So. 2d 1239, 1239 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Norris v. State, 784 So. 2d 1188, 1189 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Neal v. State, 697 So. 2d 903, 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Bonel v. State, 651 So. 2d 774, 776 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). The record does not reflect that the state presented any evidence that it attempted to locate the appellant and…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Brown v. State, 674 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- Neal v. State, 697 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)