FLUOR ENTERPRISES, INC., ETC., ET AL., APPELLANT,
v.
TRI-CITY ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS, INC., ETC., APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 2001-05-25
No. 5D00-2341
COBB and PALMER, JJ., concur.
784 So. 2d 1260 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (2001) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Holding

The court held that a written demand for arbitration is a condition precedent that must be satisfied before a court can compel arbitration, even if the issue of whether the condition precedent is satisfied is typically for the arbitrator.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court may deny a motion to compel arbitration when a condition precedent to arbitration, such as a written demand, has not been satisfied, even if the question of…

[2] Requiring an arbitrator to determine that an undisputed condition precedent to arbitration has not been met would be an exercise in futility.

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Facts & Procedural History

Fluor, a general contractor, sought to compel arbitration with its subcontractor, Tri-City, based on a contract provision requiring Tri-City to join a…

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Opinion of the Court
PETERSON, J.

PETERSON, J.

Fluor Enterprises, Inc., et. al. (Fluor), a general contractor, appeals an order denying its motion tp compel arbitration with Tri-City Electrical Contractors, Inc. (TriCity), a sub-contractor, in a dispute over a construction contract. Prior to this action, Tri-City agreed with Fluor that in the event Fluor and the owner, MIG/Orlando Development, Ltd. (MIG), were required to arbitrate a dispute which arose out of or was directly related to Tri-City’s work, Tri-City would join in the arbitration proceedings. Fluor and MIG are currently involved in negotiations over work that may have been allegedly hindered by TriCity, but no action has been taken beyond the negotiations. That is, neither Fluor nor MIG has demanded arbitration. TriCity alleges that Fluor owes it over $150,000 under the contract between them and filed this action almost nine months ago in an attempt to collect. Fluor then unsuccessfully attempted to have the trial judge refer this matter to arbitration.

The trial court denied Fluor’s motion to compel arbitration because it considered a written demand for arbitration to be a condition precedent that had not been satisfied. Normally, the issue of whether a condition precedent to arbitration had been satisfied is a question for the arbitrator to resolve, not the trial court. See Executive Life Ins. Co. v. John Hammer & Assoc., Inc., 569 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). In the instant case, however, it is undisputed that the condition precedent to arbitration (i.e., either Fluor or MIG make demand for arbitration) has not been satisfied. Requiring an arbitrator to acknowledge this undisputed fact would be an exercise in futility.

Accordingly, the order denying arbitration is affirmed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. If Fluor and MIG proceed beyond the discussion stage over their dispute and arbitration is initiated, Fluor may then renew its motion to compel arbitration.

AFFIRMED and REMANDED.

COBB and PALMER, JJ., concur.


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Cited By

  • Hubbard Constr. Co. v. Jacobs Civil, Inc., 969 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)
    …See Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Cates, 604 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Lyons v. Krathen, 368 So. 2d 906, 908 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). The rationale for this view was explained by this court in Fluor Enterprises, Inc. v. Tri-City Electrical Contractors, Inc., 784 So. 2d 1260, 1260 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), when we stated that requiring an arbitrator to acknowledge an undisputed fact “would be an exercise in futility.” As the court explained in O’Keefe, if the failure to file a demand for arbitration is pursuant to a broad ag…

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