ULRICK PLASIR, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Defendant Ulrick Plasir appeals his cocaine trafficking conviction, challenging the trial court's denial of a for-cause juror challenge based on a venire member's equivocal responses about whether the defendant's failure to testify would affect his impartiality. The Florida appellate court reversed, finding the juror's responses demonstrated lack of neutrality and impartiality.
The trial court erred in denying the for-cause challenge. The prospective juror's responses were not reflective of a final, neutral, and detached determination to serve as a fair and impartial juror, making the denial of the challenge reversible error.
[1] A prospective juror's equivocal responses regarding their ability to follow instructions on a defendant's right to remain silent raise reasonable doubt as to their impart…
[2] A trial court errs in denying a for-cause challenge to a prospective juror whose responses are not reflective of a final, neutral, and detached determination to sit as a…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Those responses were "not reflective of a final, neutral, and detached determination to sit as a fair and impartial juror."”
Establishes the legal standard for evaluating juror impartiality and the reason the court reversed the trial court's denial of the for-cause challenge.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDuring voir dire, a prospective juror was asked if the defendant's decision not to testify would "bother" him. The juror responded that it would depen…
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PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence for trafficking in cocaine. For the following reasons, we reverse.
During voir dire, a potential juror was asked if it would “bother him” if the defendant did not testify. The venire member responded: “I really can’t say. It would depend on what the rest of the evidence was and if I came to the end and there was a question that I know that only the defendant could answer and he hasn’t testified, then it could have some impact.” Defense counsel then asked the potential juror whether there was a possibility that “you are going to be back there saying I wish Mr. Plaisir had straightened this out for me?” The potential juror stated that it was “possible”. The trial court intervened and recited the instruction regarding a defendant’s choice not to testify. When the court asked if he could follow that instruction, the venire member responded “I could follow that instruction.” The court then asked “You think you can?” and he answered “Yes.”1
The defense challenged the venire member for cause; the court rejected the challenge. The defense then exercised a peremptory challenge to strike the objee-tionable venire member. After exhausting its remaining peremptory challenges and being denied any additional challenges, a juror to whom the defense objected served on the jury.
We reverse. The trial court erred in denying the for-cause challenge of the juror whose responses are quoted above. Those responses were “not reflective of a final, neutral, and detached determination to sit as a fair and impartial juror.” Price v. State, 538 So. 2d 486, 489 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); see also Brown v. State, 728 So. 2d 758, 759 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (holding that prospective juror’s response of “Yeah, I think so” when asked whether he would be able to follow trial court’s instructions was equivocal, and raised reasonable doubt as to whether he could serve as fair and impartial juror); Coggins v. State, 677 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
. We note that "[I]t is not defense counsel’s obligation to rehabilitate a juror who has responded to questions in a manner that would sustain a challenge for cause. The appropriate procedure ... is for either the prosecutor or the judge to make sure the prospective juror can be an impartial member of the jury.” Bryant v. State, 601 So. 2d 529, 532 (Fla.1992).
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Citator
Cited By
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Crews v. State, 921 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)…hat if there is any reasonable doubt about a juror’s ability to follow the law, the court should grant a challenge for cause. Garcia v. State, 805 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Kerestesy v. State, 760 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Plasir v. State, 785 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Brown v. State, 728 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). The only possible relevant Sloppy factor is whether there was failure to examine the juror or a perfunctory examination of the juror. While it would have been preferable to have…
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Bartee v. State, 849 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)
Authorities Cited
- Price v. State, 538 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
- Bryant v. State, 601 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1992)
- Coggins v. State, 677 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)
- Brown v. State, 728 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)