ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, A CORPORATION, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
v.
CHASE & COMPANY, A CORPORATION, DEFENDANT IN ERROR

Fla. | 1933-03-13
Whitfield, Terrell, Brown, and Buford, J. J., concur.
109 Fla. 50 Florida Supreme Court (1933) Caution
Also reported at: 146 So. 658
Cited by 9 cases

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Synopsis

The court affirmed a lower court's judgment for a shipper against a railroad company for negligent transportation of goods. The railroad argued that the suit was time-barred by a contractual limitation in the bill of lading, but the court found the railroad's negligence in providing improper equipment was the cause of the loss.


Holding

The court held that the contractual limitation period in the bill of lading did not bar the shipper's claim. The railroad's negligence in failing to provide proper equipment was the proximate cause of the loss, and this negligence superseded the contractual limitation defense.


Key Quotes

“Suits for loss, damage, injury or delay shall be instituted only within two years and one day after delivery of the property, or in case of failure to make delivery, then within two years and one day after reasonable time for delivery had elapsed provided that in cas'e the claim on which suit is based was made in writing within six months (whether or not filing of such claim is required as a condition precedent to recovery) suit shall be instituted not later than two years and one day after notice in writing ■shall be given by the carrier to the claimant that the carrier has disallowed the claim or any part or parts thereof specified in the notice.”

This quote establishes the contractual limitation period in the bill of lading that the railroad company relied upon.

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Facts & Procedural History

Chase & Company sued the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company for damages due to negligent transportation of a carload of celery. The railroad company…

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Opinion of the Court
Davis, C. J.

Davis, C. J.

Chase & Company sued the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company for the negligent transportation of a carload of celery from Wagner, Florida, to Chicago, Illinois. The action was in tort. Plaintiff recovered $1,-*52132.96 as damages, with interest'thereon from date of filing suit. The railroad company brings error.

. The shipment in question was shown to have been accepted for transportation and delivery in interstate commerce, under a bill of lading which, under the applicable Federal laws on the subject, constituted the contract of affreightment. It was provided in said bill of lading as follows :

“Suits for loss, damage, injury or delay shall be instituted only within two years and one day after delivery of the property, or in case of failure to make delivery, then within two years and one day after reasonable time for delivery had elapsed provided that in cas'e the claim on which suit is based was made in writing within six months (whether or not filing of such claim is required as a condition precedent to recovery) suit shall be instituted not later than two years and one day after notice in writing ■shall be given by the carrier to the claimant that the carrier has disallowed the claim or any part or parts thereof specified in the notice.”

Such contractual limitation as the foregoing, contained in a bill of lading covering an interstate shipment of goods •by rail, is in accord with the terms of the U. S. Transportation Act of 1920 (Feb. 28, 1920, 91 Stats. 491, 49 U. S. Code Ann. Section 20 [11] Interstate Commerce Act), and js valid and enforceable according to the intent of the Federal law. The Federal law on the subject has superseded all state statutes to the contrary, insofar as interstate shipments of goods are concerned. See A. C. L. R. R. Co. v. Wauchula Truck Growers Assoc., 95 Fla. 392, 118 Sou. Rep. 52; Missouri, Kansas & T. R. Co. v. Harriman, 227 U. S. 657, 33 Sup. Ct. 397, 57 L. Ed. 690; Ellis v. Davis, 260 U. S. 682, 43 Sup. Ct. 243, 67 L. Ed. 460; Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Bewsher, 6 Fed. (2nd) 947.

*53Only in the event a bill of lading is completely silent on the subject of an agreed period of limitation for bringing actions, can a state statute of limitations apply to it. We construe the Federal statutes as authorizing, but not requiring, a Federal contract on the subject of limitations of time for bringing actions, to be made through provisions inserted in bills of lading issued by railroad companies to cover the transportation • of interstate shipments' of goods.

The invocation by the carrier of the paramount Federal right, given by the Federal statutes, ‘to insert in bills of lading covering interstate shipments, provisions concerning a contractual limitation of time for bringing suits on the obligation assumed by the carrier under thei bill of lading, inures to the benefit of the shipper as' well as the carrier, and the shipper’s right of action will not be barred in a less period of time, than that stipulated in the- bill of lading, although state statutes exist which do provide for a shorter period of limitation on actions, that would be applicable to-the shipment in the absence of a limitation by contract, set forth in the authorized form of bill of lading used.

Other points rais'ed and argued, both orally and in the briefs, have had our careful consideration. They merit no detailed discussion in this opinion. The case was tried by the judge without a jury. There is substantial evidence" to sustain the "trial judge’s findings which, under the circumstances, have the weight of a jury’s' findings.

An obligation was on the railroad company to furnish to the shipper proper railroad equipment for the transportation of plaintiff’s carload of celery. The equipment furnished was without the necessary permanent false floors which were shown to be reasonably necessary to insure safe transportation of celery in a refrigerator car. That the celery was lost through deterioration in transit, as a result of the lack of permanent false floors in the cars, which *54under the circumstances here shown, it was the duty of the railroad company to furnish as part of its regular equipment for the particular shipment accepted by it, cannot be successfully refuted on this record. See 56 Interstate Commerce Commission Reports 540. Therefore there is no occasion for a new trial and motion for new trial was properly denied. The judgment should be affirmed, and it is so ordered.

Affirmed.

Whitfield, Terrell, Brown, and Buford, J. J., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Hoagland v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 75 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1954)
    …l policy as to lawful contractual time limitations and one which in the interest of uniformity should be construed to exclude state statutes of limitation. * * * ” This rule works both ways. In the case of Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Chase & Co., 109 Fla. 50, 146 So. 658, the railroad company attempted to take advantage of the state statute of limitations which provided for shorter period of time than the contract period in the bill of lading. Suit was brought within the time stipulated in the bill of l…
  • Life Scis., Inc. v. Emery AIR Freight Corp., 341 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)
    …ds, have no effect upon Rule 120 because the regulation of shipments of goods in interstate commerce has been preempted by federal authority. Hoagland v. Railway Express Agency, 75 So. 2d 822 (Fla.1954); Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Chase & Co., 109 Fla. 50, 146 So. 658 (1933); [*273] Scheibel v. Agwilines, Inc., 156 F. 2d 636 (2d Cir. 1946); Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 189 F. 2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951). Therefore, the validity of this tariff limitation period under federal law is critical. Life Sci…
  • Scheibel v. Agwilines, Inc., 156 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1946)
    …denied 277 U.S. 586, 48 S.Ct. 433, 72 L.Ed. 1000; or though the legislation was in negative form similar to section 183b. See Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Wauchula Truck Growers Ass’n, 95 Fla. 392, 395, 118 So. 52; Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Chase & Co., 109 Fla. 50, 146 So. 658. These authorities seem to us more in point than cases cited by the appellant which have sustained additional or supplemental state regulations. Accordingly the district court was right in ruling that the one year limitation in clause 1…

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