DANIEL GOVEA, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Govea appealed the denial of his Rule 3.800(a) motion seeking resentencing based on unconstitutional 1995 sentencing guidelines. The appellate court found that although Govea received a plea-negotiated sentence, the agreed-upon 35-year sentence for attempted capital sexual battery exceeded the statutory maximum for that crime, rendering the sentence illegal and requiring vacation and remand for resentencing.
A defendant cannot agree to a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum provided by the legislature for an offense. The court vacated the sentence on Count I and remanded for resentencing, allowing the state an opportunity to withdraw from the plea agreement if it chooses.
[1] A defendant cannot agree to a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum provided by law for the offense.
[2] A court may address patent sentencing errors even if they were not preserved at trial or raised in the initial motion.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A defendant cannot agree to a sentence which exceeds the statutory maximum provided by the legislature for the offense.”
Establishes the fundamental principle that even plea-negotiated sentences cannot exceed statutory maximums
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGovea was sentenced in 1997 to 15 years in prison followed by 20 years probation (totaling 35 years) on Count I for attempted capital sexual battery, …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Unconstitutional Sentencing Guidelines cases and more on FLexlaw
Govea appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion filed in March of 2000, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), in which he alleged that he had been sentenced in 1997, under the unconstitutional 1995 guidelines, and was entitled to be resentenced. See Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla.2000). We quash his sentence on Count I and remand for further proceedings.
This proceeding is unusual.
The trial court below denied relief to Govea because it found he had been sentenced 'pursuant to a plea agreement to a term of 15 years in prison, followed by 20 years on probation.
Thus, the unconstitutional guidelines were not implicated in the sentencing. See Young v. State, 766 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); Dunenas v. Moore, 762 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).
However in this case, the agreed-to sentence’s length (35 years) for Count I exceeds the statutory maximum for the crime of which Govea was convicted — attempted capital sexual battery. See §§ 794.011(2); 777.04; 775.082(3)(b), Fla. Stat. A defendant cannot agree to a sentence which exceeds the statutory maximum provided by the legislature for the offense. See Larson v. State, 572 So. 2d 1368 (Fla.1991); Gifford v. State, 744 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
The state argues this issue cannot be raised because of the amendments to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800 and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(d), which require that sentencing errors be preserved by objection at sentencing or the filing of a Rule 3.800(b) motion. It cites Maddox v. State, 760 So. 2d 89 (Fla.2000). However, Maddox was a direct appeal, and there is no provision for a Rule 3.800(b) motion to be filed pending an appeal of an order denying a Rule 3.800(a) motion.
In this case, the problem is whether this issue can or should be raised in this An-ders appeal when it was not addressed in Govea’s 3.800(a) motion, or by the trial court. In this case, appellant’s Anders counsel first raised the issue in a footnote. Based on that, plus this court’s review of the record, we ordered the state to file an answer brief. In Rodriguez v. State, 766 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), the court reversed an order denying a Rule 3.800(a) motion, which raised a Heggs issue. The court determined that the Heggs issue was meritless, but sua sponte noted that the sentences for two of the four counts exceeded the statutory maximum, and accordingly, it remanded to correct those sentences. Cf. Kinsey v. State, 728 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (although sentencing error was not preserved, court has jurisdiction based on preserved error and will also address serious, patent sentencing errors).
The Florida Supreme Court explained in In re Anders Briefs, 581 So. 2d 149 (Fla.1991), that minor sentencing errors could be raised in an Anders brief, while still allowing defendants to file pro se briefs, but that other substantial sentencing errors which warrant adversarial presentation to the court with assistance of counsel, should not be raised in an Anders brief. But ethically it seems appellate counsel filing Anders briefs are obligated to point out patent sentencing errors, or other fundamental errors not previously addressed in the case. And, by ordering the state to file an answer brief on the legality of the sentence, in essence we transformed this proceeding to one in which the issue of the legality of the sentence was raised and addressed in an adversarial manner. The alternative would be to affirm the trial court below, but without prejudice to Govea to raise this same issue in a second motion filed pursuant to Rule 3.800(a).
That would be a round-about way of achieving the same thing, but duplicitous of court time and effort.
Accordingly, we elect to follow Rodriguez and remand this cause for further proceedings.
However, should Govea elect to pursue his resentencing below, the state should also be accorded an opportunity to withdraw from the plea agreement. See Gibson v. State, 772 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Howell v. State, 764 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Gault v. State, 762 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). If the state is willing to adhere to the plea agreement, the court must impose a sentence which does not exceed the statutory maximum term for the crime.
Sentence VACATED on Count 1; REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
THOMPSON, C.J., and ORFINGER, R.B., J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
R & B Holding Co., Inc. v. Christopher Advertising Grp., Inc., 994 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)…ed this as an issue on appeal. After the briefs were submitted, the parties were requested by the court sua sponte to address this issue at oral argument.” See also Food Lion, L.L.C. v. Henderson, 895 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); Govea v. State, 785 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). The Agency has cited a number of cases stating the general rule that an issue is waived if not stated in the brief. Those cases do not, however, address a court’s power to order supplemental briefing of an issue on the court’s…
-
Lynnie R. Clary v. State, 818 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…ecommends that this case be remanded so that Clary can decide whether he wishes to withdraw his pleas. Should he do so, the state requests the opportunity to withdraw from the plea agreement and to proceed to trial on all counts. See Govea v. State, 785 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). It appears that under these circumstances where fundamental error has occurred at the plea stage,6 Clary’s plea in this case is fatally flawed. This cause must be remanded so that the trial judge can properly advise Clary of hi…
-
Walters v. State, 812 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…he State the opportunity to proceed to trial on the above charges and any others that were resolved through the plea agreement. See Latiif v. State, 787 So. 2d 834 (Fla.2001); St Lawrence v. State, 785 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); Govea v. State, 785 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); Laventure v. State, 695 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). Sentence VACATED; REMANDED for resentencing. HARRIS and SAWAYA, JJ., concur. . The statute provides for a penalty of “imprisonment for life or for a term of years not les…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (13 total)
- Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2000)
- Maddox v. State, 760 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 2000)
- In re App. Court Response to Anders Briefs, 581 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1991)
- Myren Wayne Larson v. State, 572 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. 1991)
- Durwin D. Dunenas v. Moore, 762 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)
- Alvarez Alberto Rodriguez v. State, 766 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)
- Gifford v. State, 744 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
- Howell v. State, 764 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
- Gibson v. State, 772 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
- Kinsey v. State, 728 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)