DANNY WILLIS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Danny Willis appeals the trial court's denial of his Rule 3.800(b)(2) motion for resentencing. The court holds that Willis is entitled to resentencing under the 1994 sentencing guidelines because his offense falls within the Trapp window and his 1995 guideline sentence could not be imposed under the 1994 guidelines without a departure. The trial court erred by relying on an amended 1995 scoresheet that designated the wrong offense as primary.
Willis is entitled to resentencing under the 1994 sentencing guidelines. The trial court's reliance on the amended 1995 scoresheet was invalid because it scored the wrong offense as primary. Count II, not Count I, is the correct primary offense for sentencing purposes.
[1] A defendant is entitled to resentencing under Heggs v. …
[2] A defendant must be sentenced under the guidelines in effect when a continuing enterprise offense began.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Under Heggs, Appellant is entitled to be resentenced if his offense was committed within the window established by Trapp v. State, 760 So.2d 924, 928 (Fla.2000), and his sentence under the 1995 guidelines could not be imposed under the 1994 guidelines without a departure.”
Establishes the legal standard for resentencing eligibility under Heggs and Trapp
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWillis was convicted of offenses charged in Count I and Count II, with Count II charging a felony with a continuing date of enterprise beginning Novem…
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[*699] BROWNING, J.
Appellant appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2). Appellant raised two grounds on appeal, only one of which merits discussion. Appellant argues the trial court reversibly erred by relying on Appellee’s amended 1995 scoresheet, which scored the wrong offense as primary, and by denying Appellant’s request for resentencing under Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla.2000). We agree and reverse on this first ground, and affirm as to Appellant’s second claim because it was not preserved for appeal. See Maddox v. State, 760 So. 2d 89, 98 (Fla.2000); Harvey v. State, 786 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Taylor v. State, 26 Fla. L. Weekly D560 (Fla. 2d DCA Feb.23, 2001).
Under Heggs, Appellant is entitled to be resentenced if his offense was committed within the window established by Trapp v. State, 760 So. 2d 924, 928 (Fla.2000), and his sentence under the 1995 guidelines could not be imposed under the 1994 guidelines without a departure. Appellant meets both criteria.
Appellant’s primary offense, Count II, charges a felony “with a continuing date of enterprise.” Appellant is required to be sentenced under the guidelines in effect when the enterprise began, i.e., on November 1, 1995, which falls within the window established by Trapp. Appellant’s recommended range under the 1994 sentencing guidelines is 162.3 to 270.6 prison months, and his recommended range under the 1995 guidelines is 274.5 to 457.5 prison months. Thus, Appellant’s sentence under the 1995 guidelines could not have been imposed under the 1994 guidelines without a departure. Accordingly, Appellant is entitled to be resentenced under the 1994 guidelines.
Appellee’s computation of its amended 1995 scoresheet is invalid and does not change this result because it scored the wrong offense as the primary offense. The correct primary offense is Appellant’s conviction under Count II, and not Count I as argued by Appellee. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.701(d)(3); see also Jeter v. State, 604 So. 2d 1250, 1251 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Echols v. State, 660 So. 2d 782, 785 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
REVERSED and REMANDED for re-sentencing under the 1994 sentencing guidelines, using Count II as the primary offense. All other issues are affirmed.
DAVIS and PADOVANO, JJ., concur.
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Viera v. State, 833 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)…nced under the 1994 guidelines. Since the 42.6 months imprisonment sentence falls outside the 1994 recommended guideline range, the appellant is entitled to be resentenced. See Toomajan v. State, 785 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); Willis v. State, 785 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). [*266] Reversed and remanded for resentenc-ing.…
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Willis v. State, 823 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)…BROWNING, J. Pursuant to Willis v. State, 785 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) {Willis I), the trial court’s denial of Danny Willis’ (Appellant) motion to correct sentence under Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla.2000), was reversed. In Willis I, 785 So. 2d at 699, this court concluded that because Appella…
Authorities Cited
- Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2000)
- Maddox v. State, 760 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 2000)
- Xzavier Trapp v. State, 760 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2000)
- Harvey v. State, 786 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)
- Echols v. State, 660 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
- Jeter v. State, 604 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)