THOMAS JEROME THOMAS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Trial court properly re-sentenced appellant to a habitual violent felony offender minimum mandatory term after vacating his prison releasee reoffender sentence, as no double jeopardy attached and the court could accomplish its sentencing goal through alternative minimum mandatory provisions.
When a trial court vacates a prison releasee reoffender mandatory sentence and re-sentences a defendant, it may impose a habitual violent felony offender minimum mandatory term without violating double jeopardy, provided the new sentence does not exceed the original sentence length.
[1] When a trial court vacates a sentence and re-sentences a defendant, it may impose an alternative minimum mandatory sentence under a different statute without violating do…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThomas Jerome Thomas was originally sentenced to a prison releasee reoffender mandatory term for attempted first-degree murder. The trial court vacate…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Prison Releasee Reoffender Act cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Thomas Jerome Thomas, the appellant, argues on appeal that the trial court erred in re-sentencing him to a habitual violent felony offender minimum mandatory term after it vacated his prison releasee reoffen-der mandatory term. We affirm.
Because the trial court vacated the appellant’s previous sentence on his one count of attempted first-degree murder, no double jeopardy attached on re-sentencing. See Smith v. State, 754 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). Upon re-sentencing, the trial court could not re-sentence the appellant to a longer period of incarceration, but it could accomplish its sentencing goal of imposing a minimum mandatory sentence. See Blackshear v. State, 531 So. 2d 956 (Fla.1988); Herring v. State, 411 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). The trial court stated at the re-sentencing hearing that its intent was to impose a minimum mandatory sentence. As it was mistaken that the appellant qualified as a prison releasee reoffen-der, the trial court could accomplish its sentencing goal by exercising its discretion and imposing a minimum mandatory sentence under the habitual violent felony offender statute. See § 775.084(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (1999); see also State v. Hudson, 698 So. 2d 831 (Fla.1997) (court’s sentencing discretion extends to imposing minimum mandatory term).
AFFIRMED.
BOOTH, WOLF and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- State v. Hudson, 698 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1997)
- Blackshear v. State, 531 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1988)
- Smith v. State, 754 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)
- Herring v. State, 411 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)