DOLLY BOLDING BAIL BONDS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Dolly Bolding Bail Bonds appeals a trial court's denial of its motion to discharge a bond forfeiture. The court reverses, holding that the plain language of Florida Statute § 903.26(5), which uses the mandatory term "shall," requires discharge of forfeiture when a defendant was confined in jail or prison at the time of required appearance, regardless of the court's concerns about legislative intent.
The trial court must discharge the forfeiture under the plain language of § 903.26(5), which mandatorily requires discharge when a defendant was confined in jail or prison at the time of required appearance. The discharge is subject to the bonded person paying transportation costs to return the defendant to the county.
[1] A court shall discharge a bond forfeiture when the defendant was confined in a jail or prison at the time of the required appearance, as mandated by statute.
[2] When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, courts must apply its plain and obvious meaning without resorting to rules of statutory interpretation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The court shall discharge a forfeiture within 60 days upon: ... (b) A determination that, at the time of the required appearance, the defendant was adjudicated insane and confined in an institution or hospital or was confined in a jail or prison.”
The mandatory statutory language requiring forfeiture discharge under § 903.26(5) that the court relied upon.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDolly Bolding Bail Bonds posted bond for a criminal defendant in Hillsborough County. The defendant failed to appear for arraignment, and the bond was…
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BLUE, Judge.
Dolly Bolding Bail Bonds (“Dolly”) contends the trial court erred when denying its motion to discharge the forfeiture of bond. Although we question that the legislature intended the result, we conclude we are compelled by the plain language of the statute relied on by Dolly to reverse.
The parties agree on the factual background. Dolly posted bond for a criminal defendant in Hillsborough County. When the defendant failed to appear for arraignment, the bond was estreated (forfeited), and Dolly was notified. Dolly located the defendant in a New Jersey jail or prison where he was incarcerated and had been incarcerated on the date of his arraignment. Subject to the payment of transportation costs, Dolly moved for discharge of the forfeiture under section 903.26(5), Florida Statutes (1999).
Section 903.26(5), as amended in 1999, provides in part that “[t]he court shall discharge a forfeiture within 60 days upon: ... (b) A determination that, at the time of the required appearance, the defendant was adjudicated insane and confined in an institution or hospital or was confined in a jail or prison.” (Emphasis supplied.) The 1999 amendment, relied on by Dolly, was the substitution of “shall” for “may” in this section. See Ch. 99-303, § 5, at 3272, Laws of Fla. Thus, it appears mandatory for a trial court to discharge a forfeiture in this case.
Previously, this court reversed a trial court’s discharge of a forfeiture on facts similar to this case. Pinellas Co. v. Robertson, 490 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). In the proceeding below, the State convinced the trial judge that this court’s decision in Pinellas was controlling, in part arguing that the failure to reference section 903.26 in the Pinellas opinion made forfeiture discharge a question of case law rather than statutory interpretation. The same argument has been made to this court.1
We conclude we are bound by the plain wording of the statute. “[Wjhen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.” Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984) (quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141, 137 So. 157, 159 (1931)). We are concerned that the legislative history of this amendment offers some indication that the legislature did not intend the result required by the plain meaning of the statute. If the intent was not to discharge a forfeiture when the bonded defendant fails to appear because he or she has been jailed or imprisoned in another state, we suggest the legislature clarify the language in section 903.26.
We reverse the trial court’s order denying discharge of the forfeitures in this case. The discharge of forfeiture, as conceded by Dolly at oral argument, is subject to Dolly paying the costs and expenses required to return the defendant to Hills-borough County. See § 903.27, Fla. Stat. (1999).
Reversed and remanded.
PATTERSON, C.J., and SALCINES, J., concur. . We find appealing the State’s argument that our decisions are capable of "trumping” legislative enactments; however, we graciously concede that this is not the function of the judicial branch in the absence of constitutional questions.
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Fla. Convalescent Ctrs. v. Reed Somberg, 840 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 2003)…tion the conflicting legislative history to put the Legislature on notice that, if they did not intend for the statute to operate according to its plain meaning, the Legislature should amend the statute. See, e.g., Dolly Bolding Bail Bonds v. State, 787 So. 2d 73, 74 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) ("We are concerned that the legislative history of this amendment offers some indication that the legislature did not intend the result required by the plain meaning of the statute. If the intent was not to discharge a forfeit…
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AL Estes Bonding, Inc. v. Pinellas Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 845 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…, but that does not require this court to review an order denying such a motion. This court has also reviewed by direct appeal a case that seems on jurisdictional grounds to be indistinguishable from this case. See Dolly Bolding Bail Bonds v. State, 787 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). It does not appear that anyone raised a jurisdictional issue in Dolly Bolding. In theory, a bail bondsman could refuse to pay the forfeiture and force judgment to be entered against the surety. We are hesitant to require such ac…1 / 2
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The Bd. OF Comm'rs OF Brevard v. Barber Bonding Agency, 860 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)…Public Service Mutual Ins. Co. v. State, 135 So. 2d 777, 779 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961); 8A Am Jur.2d Bail and Recognizance § 132. . See Public Service Mutual Ins. Co. v. State, 135 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961). . See Dolly Bolding Bail Bonds v. State, 787 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). . Fla. R.App. P. 9.030(2)(A)(v).…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Eugene Holly, M.D. v. Albert W. Auld, M.D., 450 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1984)
- A. R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141 (Fla. 1931)
- Abbey v. Abbey, 102 Fla. 1141 (Fla. 1931)
- Pinellas Cnty. v. Robertson, 490 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)