DAVID AGUAYO, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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David Aguayo challenged his sentence under Florida's Prison Releasee Reoffender Act on multiple constitutional grounds. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, finding that all of Aguayo's challenges had been previously rejected in controlling precedent establishing the Act's constitutionality.
All of Aguayo's constitutional challenges to the Act have been previously addressed and rejected by the Florida Supreme Court in controlling precedent. The Court approved the district court's decision to the extent it is consistent with Grant, McKnight, Cotton, and Ellis.
[1] A defendant has the right to present evidence to prove ineligibility for sentencing under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act and to challenge the State's evidence of elig…
[2] The Prison Releasee Reoffender Act does not violate ex post facto principles, the single subject rule, equal protection, or double jeopardy.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a defendant has the right both to present evidence to prove that the defendant does not qualify for sentencing under the Act and to challenge the State's evidence regarding the defendant's eligibility for sentencing as a prison releasee reoffender”
Establishes that defendants have procedural protections in sentencing proceedings under the Act
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAguayo was sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender under Florida's Prison Releasee Reoffender Act. He challenged his sentence on several grounds, in…
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LEWIS, J.
We have for review Aguayo v. State, 747 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. The petitioner challenges his sentence under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act (the “Act”) on several grounds, all of which have been previously addressed by opinions of this Court. See Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla.2000) (rejecting an ex post facto challenge to the Act and holding that the Act violates neither the single subject rule for legislation nor principles of equal protection); McKnight v. State, 769 So. 2d 1039 (Fla.2000) (holding that a defendant has the right both to present evidence to prove that the defendant does not qualify for sentencing under the Act and to challenge the State’s evidence regarding the defendant’s eligibility for sentencing as a prison releasee reoffender); State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla.2000) (holding that the Act does not permit a “victim veto” which would violate a defendant’s due process rights by precluding application of the Act in some instances but not others, as well as holding that the Act is not void for vagueness and does not constitute a form of cruel or unusual punishment); Ellis v. State, 762 So. 2d 912 (Fla.2000) (recognizing that publication in the Laws of Florida or the Florida Statutes gives all citizens constructive notice of the consequences of their actions). Accordingly, we approve the decision of the district court to the extent it is consistent with Grant, McKnight, Cotton, and Ellis. We also deny as moot the motion of the petitioner’s counsel to withdraw from representation.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, and PARIENTE, JJ., concur. QUINCE, J., dissents.
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Authorities Cited
- Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2000)
- State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000)
- Ellis v. State, 762 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 2000)
- McKNIGHT v. State, 769 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 2000)
- Lacy Eugene Caulder v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 747 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
- Aguayo v. State, 747 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)