T. E. BARGESSER, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, DEFENDANT IN ERROR
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
T. E. Bargesser was convicted of larceny of a Ford coupe. On writ of error, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that circumstantial evidence of recent unexplained possession of stolen property, disbelieved by the jury, sufficiently supports a guilty verdict.
The conviction is affirmed. The unexplained possession of recently stolen property, coupled with the jury's disbelief of the defendant's proffered explanation, constitutes sufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict for larceny, even without direct proof of the actual taking.
“a verdict of guilty of larceny may be found from the unexplained possession of goods recently stolen”
Establishes the rule allowing conviction based on circumstantial evidence of recent possession
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBargesser was found in possession of a Ford coupe that had been recently stolen from A. Sillin. The identity of the automobile was well-established. B…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Strum, J.
Plaintiff in error, who will hereinafter be referred to as the defendant, was convicted of the larceny of one Ford coupe, the property of A. Sillin.
On writ of error to review the judgment of conviction the sole contention of the defendant is that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict.
To sustain the judgment of conviction the State relies upon the rule heretofore announced by this Court in McDonald v. State, 56 Fla. 74, 47 South. Rep. 485, that a verdict of guilty of larceny may be found from the unexplained possession of goods recently stolen. The guilt of the accused does not follow as a presumption of law from the unexplained possession of property recently stolen, but the presumption of guilt in such a case is one that the jury may infer as a matter of fact, of which they are the-sole judges, to to be considered in connection with all the other circumstances of each particular case. In cases where the defendant undertakes to sufficiently explain his possession of the property such explanation may appear to' be reasonable and highly plausible, but if the jury does not believe it, they have the right to convict upon the evidence furnished by the possession of the stolen goods alone, even though the State does not put in any evidence to directly prove the falsity of the explanation offered by the defendant. McDonald v. State, supra.
In this case there was ample evidence to show that the automobile in question was recently stolen and that it was found in defendant’s possession as he was endeavoring to dispose of it.
The evidence of the identity of the automobile is ample. There is no direct proof of the actual taking of the automobile by this defendant. Although the defendant undertook'to explain his possession of the automobile, the jury nevertheless found him guilty, thereby demonstrating that the defendants explanation was not believed by the jury and that the same was not sufficiently credible to raise in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt of the defendants guilt.
The jury are the judges of the reasonableness, probability and credibility of the explanation offered by the defendant. Leslie v. State, 35 Fla. 71, 17 South. Rep.
555. If, as is patently the case here, the jury did not believe the defendants explanation of his possession of the automobile, there is ample evidence to sustain the conviction under the rule announced in McDonald v. State, supra, and from the facts proven by the State, the jury might have fairly inferred that the defendant was the perpetrator of the theft. Larceny may be proven by circumstantial evidence of such a nature and probative force that the jury could legally infer guilt therefrom beyond a reasonable doubt. Kennedy v. State, 31 Fla. 428, 12 South. Rep. 858; Kirkland v. State, 82 Fla. 118, 89 South. Rep. 356.
The established rule is that where there is evidence from which all the elements of the crime may have been lawfully found or inferred, and it does not appear that the jury was not governed by the evidence, the verdict will not ordinarily be disturbed by this Court on the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence. McDonald v. State, supra; Carr v. State, 84 Fla. 162, 92 South. Rep. 879; Parrish v. State, 105 South. Rep. 130.
Affirmed.
Ellis, C. J., and Brown, J., concur. Wi-iitfield, P. J., and Terrell and Buford, J. J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (24 total)
-
State v. Young, 217 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1968)…lone, even though the state had not put in any proof directly to prove the falsity of the account given.” Accord: Collier v. State, 1908, 55 Fla. 7, 45 So. 752; McDonald v. State, 1908, 56 Fla. 74, 47 So. 485; Bargesser v. State, 1928, 95 Fla. 401, 116 So. 11; Ferguson v. State, 1946, 157 Fla. 324, 25 So. 2d 799. [*571] It can be seen, therefore, that the rule of evidence respecting possession of recently stolen goods is no different, in kind, from the rule respecting the probative value of any other cir…
-
Casso v. State, 182 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)…that this offense “may he proven by circumstantial evidence of such a nature and probative force that the jury could legally infer guilt therefrom beyond a reasonable doubt.” Cross v. State, 96 Fla. 768, 119 So. 380; Bargesser v. State, 95 Fla. 401, 116 So. 11; Kirkland v. State, 82 Fla. 118, 89 So. 356; Johnson v. State, 157 Fla. 328, 25 So. 2d 801. The language used by the Supreme Court of Florida in Murray v. State, supra, is quite apropos here: “The evidence in this case might well have sustained a…
-
Romanello v. State, 160 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964)…ion 918.09, Florida Statutes, F.S.A.; Way v. State, 67 So. 2d 321 (Fla.1953). The failure to explain is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be derived when considered with the other facts in the case. Bargesser v. State, 95 Fla. 401, 116 So. 11 (1928). See also Tilly v. State, 21 Fla. 242 (1885), in which the defendant offered no testimony and the unexplained possession was held sufficient to support the verdict of guilty; Ferguson v. State, 157 Fla. 324, 25 So. 2d 799 (1946), where convic…
Previewing 3 of 24 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Parrish v. State, 90 Fla. 25 (Fla. 1925)
- Angus McDonald v. State, 56 Fla. 74 (Fla. 1908)
- Kennedy v. State, 31 Fla. 428 (Fla. 1893)
- Smith v. Blanche D. Rentz, 82 Fla. 118 (Fla. 1921)
- Kirkland v. State, 82 Fla. 118 (Fla. 1921)
- Carr v. State, 84 Fla. 162 (Fla. 1922)