DONALD KENNETH JOYE, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
KIMBERLY BISHOP JONES, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 2001-07-13
No. 1D00-3052
ERVIN and MINER, JJ., concur.
789 So. 2d 508 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2001) Positive Treatment
Cited by 5 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

In this family law appeal, the father challenges a child support order for his out-of-wedlock son. While the court affirmed the paternity finding and rejected the father's claim that other children should reduce his obligation, it reversed the support award amount due to insufficient findings of fact linking the award to statutory guidelines.


Holding

The court affirmed the paternity finding and rejected the father's argument regarding other children, holding the trial court acted within its discretion in not reducing support based on those children without competent evidence of their support needs. However, the court reversed the child support award amount because the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact relating the award to parties' income and statutory guidelines, requiring remand for proper findings.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court must make findings of fact in accordance with child-support guidelines statutes when determining a child support award.

[2] A trial court abuses its discretion when it orders child support without findings of fact referencing the child-support guidelines statute.

Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“Because we cannot determine from the record either what income figures the lower court used (or imputed) in setting the child-support award, or how the trial court determined Appellant's appropriate child-support obligation, we reverse that part of the order and remand for findings of fact in accordance with the child-support guidelines statute.”

Establishes the core reason for reversal—lack of sufficient findings connecting the award to statutory guidelines and identifiable income figures.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Appellant is the biological father of a 6-year-old child born out of wedlock who lives with the mother, Appellee. The trial court found paternity but …

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
BROWNING, J.

BROWNING, J.

This is an appeal of an order establishing paternity and ordering an award of support for the parties’ 6-year-old son, who was born out of wedlock and lives with his mother, Appellee. Appellant, who is the child’s father, does not contest the finding of paternity. He contends, however, that the trial court abused its discretion in two respects.

First, while acknowledging that “no clear determination could be made” regarding Appellant’s actual income, the court ordered him to pay $150.00 a week for support of the child in question without any findings of fact referencing the child-support guidelines statute.1 Second, in setting a support award for that child, the trial court allegedly failed to consider Appellant’s four other children, who were born of his marriage to someone else. Because we cannot determine from the record either what income figures the lower court used (or imputed) in setting the child-support award, or how the trial court determined Appellant’s appropriate child-support obligation, we reverse that part of the order and remand for findings of fact in accordance with the child-support guidelines statute. Cifrian v. Cifrian, 715 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).

We affirm the order in all other respects.

Although Appellant filed an affirmative defense asking the trial court to consider his four other children (who are not Appellee’s children) in determining an appropriate amount of child support for the parties’ child, we find no abuse of discretion as to this issue. The child-support guidelines statute vests wide discretion in the trial court to take into account a parent’s obligation of support to other children, in the determination of what is a proper child-support award for the minor child who is the subject of the support action. Hutslar v. Lappin, 652 So. 2d 432, 434 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).

Significantly, Appellant failed to present any competent substantial evidence regarding the support needs of his other children, or concerning what financial impact (if any) that obligation might have on a child-support award for the parties’ child. In determining an appropriate amount of child support, the lower tribunal acted within its discretion in considering evidence pertaining to Appellant’s seemingly indulgent or extravagant lifestyle and his generous church contributions during periods when he claimed to be in dire financial straits. Johnson v. Johnson, 725 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).

Without sufficient findings relating the child-support award to the parties’ income and the child-support guidelines statute, we cannot adequately review the propriety of the challenged award. Cifrian. If the trial court elects to impute income to Appellant, then it must make findings in accordance with section 61.20(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1997); Smith v. Smith, 737 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).

The order is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for findings of fact relating to the award of child support.

ERVIN and MINER, JJ., concur. . § 61.30, Fla. Stat. (1997).


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Ogando v. Jany E. Munoz, 962 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)
    …an allowable deduction from gross income, in some circumstances it is a matter that can be considered as grounds for a deviation under other provisions of section 61.30.”)(citing Hutslar v. Lappin, 652 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)); Joye v. Jones, 789 So. 2d 508, 509 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)(noting that “child-support guidelines statute vests wide discretion in the trial court to take into account a parent’s obligation of support to other children, in the determination of what is a proper child-support award for…
  • Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Cochran, 253 So. 3d 731 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018)

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw