MIGUEL ANGEL SALDO, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Miguel Angel Saldo appealed his conviction for aggravated battery and habitual offender adjudication, arguing that Florida's habitual offender statute violates the Sixth Amendment by allowing judges rather than juries to make factual findings that increase sentences beyond statutory maximums. The court rejected this argument, holding that Apprendi v. New Jersey does not apply to recidivism enhancements based on prior convictions.
The habitual offender statute does not violate the Sixth Amendment or Apprendi because recidivism statutes that enhance sentencing based on proof of prior criminal convictions are outside the scope of Apprendi's ruling and do not require jury findings.
[1] Facts that increase a criminal penalty beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt, unless they fall under the recidivis…
[2] Prior convictions are an exception to the rule requiring jury determination of facts that increase a criminal penalty.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Apprendi makes clear that recidivism statutes, which enhance sentencing based on the 'fact of prior convictions', do not require those facts to be submitted to the jury and are outside the scope of the ruling in Apprendi.”
Establishes that prior conviction enhancements are categorically excluded from Apprendi's jury requirement
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA jury convicted Saldo of aggravated battery, a lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder. The trial court adjudicated him an habitual…
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NESBITT, Senior Judge.
A jury found the Defendant guilty of aggravated battery, a lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder. The court adjudicated the Defendant an habitual offender and sentenced him to thirty years in state prison. The Defendant subsequently entered a guilty plea as to the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and the court once again adjudicated the Defendant an habitual offender and sentenced him to forty months in state prison, the sentence to run concurrent with the thirty year sentence. The Defendant filed a notice of appeal followed by a motion to correct an illegal sentence. In that motion, Defendant argued that the habitual offender statute is unconstitutional because it provides for the trial judge rather than the jury to make factual determinations on matters resulting in the Defendant receiving more than the statutory maximum sentence for an offense.
The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion and this appeal followed.
The Defendant maintains that Section 775.084, Florida Statutes (2000), im-permissibly permits a judge to sentence a Defendant beyond the statutory maximum if the judge finds that certain facts exist by a preponderance of the evidence. Citing to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), the Defendant argues that such factual determinations must be made by a jury. The Defendant claims that the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Apprendi supports the conclusion that it unconstitutional to remove from the jury any findings of fact that could result in a sentence greater than the maximum for the particular of-fence. As Judge Cope observed in Robbinson v. State, 784 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001), a careful reading of Apprendi refutes such a claim as applied to the enhancement of a penalty based on proof of prior criminal convictions. Apprendi makes clear that recidivism statutes, which enhance sentencing based on the “fact of prior convictions”, do not require those facts to be submitted to the jury and are outside the scope of the ruling in Apprendi. See United States v. Powell, 109 F. Supp. 2d 381 (E.D.Pa.2000).
Subsequent to Apprendi, our sister courts in Wright v. State, 780 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)(concluding that nothing in Apprendi overrules the Florida Supreme Court’s holding in Eutsey v. State, 383 So. 2d 219 (Fla.1980), that the determination that a defendant could be sentenced as an habitual felony offender was independent of the question of guilt in the underlying substantive offense and did not require the full panoply of rights afforded a defendant in the trial of the offense), and Gordon v. State, 787 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), have expressly rejected similar challenges. Like these courts, we find no merit to the challenge posed.
Accordingly, we affirm the order under review.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (20 total)
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Benny Jones v. State, 791 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)…prior felony convictions. We agree with our sister courts that Apprendi does not apply to the enhancement of a penalty based on proof of prior criminal convictions, and therefore we affirm the denial of the appellant’s motion. See Saldo v. State, 789 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Gordon v. State, 787 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Wright v. State, 780 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); see also McDowell v. State, 789 So. 2d 956 (Fla.2001). AFFIRMED. BARFIELD, WOLF and LEWIS, JJ., CONCUR.…
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Calloway v. State, 914 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…(Fla. 3d DCA 2004); Frumenti v. State, 885 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); McBride v. State, 884 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Fyler v. State, 852 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Jones v. State, 791 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Soldo v. State, 789 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Dennis v. State, 784 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Gordon v. State, 787 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). A defendant qualifies for sentencing under the four classifications of the habitual offender statute, section 775.084, if…
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Tillman v. State, 900 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…der sentence. See Grant v. State, 815 So. 2d 667, 668 n. 3 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); see also Fyler v. State, 852 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003), review denied, 860 So. 2d 977 (Fla.2003); Jones v. State, 791 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Saldo v. State, 789 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Gordon v. State, 787 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). Thus, we join our sister courts in determining that Blakely, also, does not require that a jury make factual determinations concerning a defendant’s qualification for habitual…
Previewing 3 of 20 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (U.S. 2000)
- Fredford James Eutsey v. State, 383 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1980)
- Wright v. State, 780 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)
- Graddy Robbinson v. State, 784 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)
- Gordon v. State, 787 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)