PATRICK MCGRATH III, MIAMIDADE COUNTY, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, AND LAUREEN VARGA, APPELLANT,
v.
THE CITY OF MIAMI, A MUNICIPAL LOWER CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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The Third District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court's judgment upholding a municipal parking tax ordinance, holding that the state statute authorizing the tax constitutes an unconstitutional special law rather than a general law under the Florida Constitution.
The statute is an unconstitutional special law because it anchors the 300,000 population classification to a specific date, preventing cities reaching that threshold after April 1, 1999 from being included, and thus fails to operate uniformly among a class of entities as required for a general law. Since non-ad valorem taxes may only be imposed pursuant to general law, the statute is unconstitutional.
[1] A municipality may not impose a non-ad valorem tax unless authorized by general law.
[2] A general law operates uniformly among a class of entities, while a special law relates to particular entities.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A general law is one that operates uniformly among a class of entities while a special law relates to particular entities.”
Establishes the legal standard for distinguishing between general and special laws under Florida constitutional tax law.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Florida Legislature enacted Section 218.503(5) in 1999, authorizing municipalities with a resident population of 300,000 or more as of April 1, 19…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Patrick McGrath III, and in-tervenors/appellants, Miami Dade County and Laureen Varga, appeal from a final declaratory judgment which granted summary judgment in favor of the appellee, City of Miami (“City”), finding an ordinance to be validly enacted and upholding the constitutionality of a parking tax statute. We reverse.
In 1999, the Florida Legislature enacted Section 218.503(5), Florida Statutes (2000) (“statute”), which provides for a parking tax and states in pertinent part that:
The governing authority of any municipality with a resident population of 300,-000 or more on April 1, 1999, and which has been declared in a state of financial emergency pursuant to this section within the previous two fiscal years may impose a discretionary per vehicle surcharge of up to 20 percent on the gross revenues of the sale, lease, or rental of space at parking facilities within the municipality that are open for use to the general public.
The statute was implemented by the City in July of 1999 when it passed and adopted ordinance No. 11813 (“ordinance”). Thereafter, the appellants/taxpayers challenged the constitutionality of the statute.
Under the Florida Constitution, a municipality may not impose any non-ad valorem tax, such as the parking tax at issue here, except as authorized by general law. See Art. VII, §§ 1(a) and 9(a), Fla. Const. Thus, in order to be constitutional, the statute must be a general law as opposed to a special law. See City of Tampa v. Birdsong, 261 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1972). A general law is one that operates uniformly among a class of entities while a special law relates to particular entities. See Dept. of Business Regulation v. Classic Mile, Inc., 641 So. 2d 1165 (Fla.1989).
The statute here constitutes a special law because by anchoring the 300,000 population classification to the specific date of April 1, 1999, it does not operate uniformly among all cities that reach the 300,-000 population threshold as is required of a general law. Cities that reach the population threshold after April 1, 1999 are forever excluded from the class. As worded, the statute is no different than if it had identified by name the three particular cities to which it relates. See Fort v. Dekle, 138 Fla. 871, 190 So. 642 (1939); Walker v. Pendarvis, 132 So. 2d 186 (Fla.1961); Ocala Breeders’ Sales Company, Inc. v. Florida Gaming Centers, Inc., 731 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).
Since a statute which constitutes a special law cannot impose a non-ad valorem tax, the statute is unconstitutional. See Alachua County v. Adams, 702 So. 2d 1253 (Fla.1997). Accordingly, the trial court erred in finding the ordinance was validly enacted and in granting summary judgment for the City. Therefore, the case must be reversed and the cause remanded to grant summary judgment in favor of the appellants/taxpayers.
Reversed.
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City OF Miami v. McGRATH, 824 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 2002)…PARIENTE, J. We have on appeal a decision of the Third District Court of Appeal declaring invalid a state statute. See McGrath v. City of Miami 789 So. 2d 1168 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Because we conclude that section 218.503(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), constitutes a special law authorizing the imposition of non-ad valo-rem taxes in violation of the F…
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Park A P'rs, Ltd. v. The City OF Miami, 844 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)…NESBITT, Senior Judge. Following invalidation of Section 218.503, Florida Statutes (1999), in McGrath v. City of Miami, 789 So. 2d 1168 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) affirmed 824 So. 2d 143 (Fla.2002), the matter was remanded to the trial court with directions for it to consider the effect of Florida legislative action relating to the amendment of the statute in 2001. Without notice to, or t…
Authorities Cited
- Basil J. Walker v. Pendarvis, 132 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 1961)
- Ocala Breeders' Sales Co., Inc. v. Fla. Gaming Ctrs., Inc., 731 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
- City OF Tampa v. Birdsong Motors, Inc., 261 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1972)
- Fort v. Dekle, 138 Fla. 871 (Fla. 1939)
- Alachua Cnty. v. Adams, 702 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1997)