LAURA BROWN, APPELLANT,
v.
DANIEL THOMAS BROWN, APPELLEE
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The appellate court reversed the trial court's dismissal of a custodial parent's motion to relocate with minor children, holding that a relocation restriction in a dissolution decree is not absolute and may be modified upon proper showing, though such a move may constitute a substantial change in circumstances warranting a custody transfer.
The trial court should not construe relocation restrictions in a dissolution decree as mandating automatic custody changes or barring future modification of the restriction or determination of the children's best interests. The court retains jurisdiction to modify relocation restrictions upon proper showing, though a move or definite plan to move may constitute a substantial change in circumstances warranting a custody transfer if the noncustodial parent requests it.
[1] A trial court retains jurisdiction to modify orders regarding the custody, maintenance, and support of minor children within its jurisdiction.
[2] A trial court may modify a prohibition against relocation of a primary custodial parent with children if a proper showing is made.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The principle of law is well settled in this state that the trial court is vested with jurisdiction, upon a proper showing, to modify at any time an order or decree touching the custody, maintenance and support of minor children within its jurisdiction.”
Establishes the foundational principle that trial courts retain broad jurisdictional power to modify custody-related orders at any time.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLaura Brown, the primary custodial parent, sought emergency temporary relief and filed a petition to modify a final judgment of dissolution of marriag…
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PER CURIAM.
The appellant challenges the order by which the trial court dismissed her emergency motion for temporary relief and her petition for modification in which she sought permission to relocate with the parties’ minor children.
The trial court has apparently misconstrued the intent of a provision in the final judgment of dissolution of marriage that restricted the appellant from relocating while she was the primary custodial parent. “The principle of law is well settled in this state that the trial court is vested with jurisdiction, upon a proper showing, to modify at any time an order or decree touching the custody, maintenance and support of minor children within its jurisdiction.” Beasley v. Beasley, 154 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963). And if a final judgment of dissolution incorporates a prohibition against the relocation of the primary custodial parent with the children, the court may later modify that restriction, upon a proper showing. Landingham v. Landingham, 685 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
Thus, in the instant case, the trial court should not construe the provisions at issue as mandating an automatic change in custody, or as barring any future modification of the relocation restriction or future determination of the children’s best interests.
Accordingly, we reverse the order under review and remand this case for further proceedings on the appellant’s motion and petition.
We note, however, that a move or a definite plan to move by the primary custodial parent, taking into account all other appropriate factors, may constitute a substantial change in circumstances that warrants a transfer in custody, if requested, to the noncustodial parent. See Williams v. Williams, 619 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Dobbins v. Dobbins, 584 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
ERVIN, BOOTH and ALLEN, JJ., concur.
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In re The Marriage of Stefano Guizzardi v. Rosario Guizzardi, 89 So. 3d 967 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)…equests); see also § 26.012(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2004) (governing jurisdiction of the circuit courts stating that circuit courts have original jurisdiction “[i]n all cases in equity including all cases relating to juveniles”); see also Brown v. Broum, 790 So. 2d 453-54 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (confirming that a circuit court had the authority to modify provisions of a final judgment prohibiting relocation). Thus, while we agree that the trial court erred in applying section 61.13001 to the instant relocation reque…
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Young v. Luther, 856 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)…vacate the portion of the order denying (pending final hearing) the mother’s relocation request. The trial court should promptly schedule a hearing on Mrs. Young’s request to relocate so that the question can finally be resolved. See Brown v. Brown, 790 So. 2d 453, 454 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (holding relocation request may be granted upon a proper showing despite stipulation in dissolution judgment prohibiting wife from relocating while she was primary custodial parent). On remand, in deciding whether Mrs. Young…
Authorities Cited
- Dobbins v. Dobbins, 584 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Landingham v. Landingham, 685 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
- Beasley v. Beasley, 154 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963)
- Williams v. Williams, 619 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)