LAKE COUNTY BOYS RANCH, ETC., APPELLANT,
v.
KATHLEEN KEARNEY, ETC., ET AL, APPELLEE
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Boys Ranch appealed a venue transfer from Lake County to Leon County in a civil action against the Department of Children and Family Services. The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the transfer, holding that venue in actions against state agencies properly lies in the county where the agency maintains its principal headquarters absent an applicable exception.
The court affirmed the venue transfer. The general rule that venue in civil actions against state agencies lies in the county where the agency maintains its principal headquarters is absolute absent waiver or exception. The sword-wielder exception—allowing venue where a plaintiff seeks direct judicial protection from unlawful invasion of constitutional rights—was not properly invoked here because the complaint invoked various constitutional provisions with insufficient precision.
[1] Venue in civil actions against the state or its agencies properly lies in the county where the state, agency, or subdivision maintains its principal headquarters, absent…
[2] The sword-wielder exception to the venue rule for state agencies applies when a plaintiff seeks direct judicial protection from a real or imminent danger of unlawful inva…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It has long been the established common law of Florida that venue in civil actions brought against the state or one of its agencies or subdivisions, absent waiver or exception, properly lies in the county where the state, agency, or subdivision maintains its principal headquarters.”
Establishes the fundamental venue rule for actions against state agencies
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBoys Ranch, on behalf of a minor D.B. and the 'Children of Lake and Sumter Counties,' sued the Department of Children and Family Services, its Secreta…
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THOMPSON, C.J.
Boys Ranch of Lake County, and Boys Ranch as next friend of D.B., a minor, and as next friend of the “Children of Lake and Sumter Counties” (collectively “Boys Ranch”), appeal an order transferring venue from Lake County to Leon County. Boys Ranch sued the Department of Children and Family Services, Kathleen Kear-ney as Secretary of the Department, and appellee Pamela Paulik as Administrator of DCF’s district 13 (collectively DCF) which includes Lake, Sumter, Citrus, Her-nando, and Marion Counties. We affirm.
It has long been the established common law of Florida that venue in civil actions brought against the state or one of its agencies or subdivisions, absent waiver or exception, properly lies in the county where the state, agency, or subdivision maintains its principal headquarters. Carlile v. Game and Fresh Water Fish Comm’n, 354 So. 2d 362 (Fla.1977). Absent waiver or exception, this right is absolute. See Navarro v. Barnett Bank of West Florida, 543 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Boys Ranch contends that venue is proper in Lake County under the sword-wielder exception. This exception applies when a plaintiff seeks direct judicial protection from a real or imminent danger of unlawful invasion of the plaintiffs constitutional rights by a state agency or subdivision. See Dep’t of Corrections v. Ross, 680 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). In the instant case, we cannot say the transfer of venue was improper given the imprecision with which the complaint invokes various provisions of the United States and Florida Constitutions. See id; Florida Agency for Health Care Admin. v. St. John Medical Plans, Inc., 674 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Florida Dep’t of Corrections v. McCarty, 610 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).
AFFIRMED.
PLEUS and PALMER, JJ., concur.
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Cited By
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Addison v. City OF Tampa, 33 So. 3d 742 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)…(Fla.2004) (“[A] trial court must apply the home venue privilege unless one of the exceptions to the privilege is satisfied.”) (emphasis added); Dep’t of Agric. v. Middleton, 24 So. 3d 624, 627 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); Lake County Boys Ranch v. Kearney, 790 So. 2d 602, 603 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). “A trial court is ... bound to apply the privilege unless it determines that a recognized exception applies.” Middleton, 24 So. 3d at 627 (citing Sun-Sentinel, Inc., 865 So. 2d at 1288). The supreme court has recognized on…
Authorities Cited
- Carlile v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n of the State of Fla., 354 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1977)
- Navarro v. Barnett Bank OF W. Fla., 543 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin. v. ST. John Med. Plans, Inc., 674 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)
- Fla. Dep't OF Corr. v. McCARTY, 610 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- Dep't OF Corr. v. Ross, 680 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)