ALTON HOBBS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Alton Hobbs appealed from summary denial of his Rule 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel in connection with his nolo pleas to attempted second degree murder and armed robbery. The court found his claim regarding counsel's misrepresentation about reserving the right to appeal the suppression denial to be legally and factually sufficient and remanded for further proceedings.
The court held that Hobbs' second claim was refuted by law upholding the legality of the attempted second degree murder offense, but his first claim regarding counsel's misrepresentation about appealing the suppression denial was legally and factually sufficient to warrant further proceedings. To satisfy the prejudice prong in plea-based ineffectiveness claims, the defendant need only allege a reasonable probability that absent counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on trial.
[1] A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel arising from the plea process requires a showing that counsel's errors prejudiced the defense, satisfied by an allegation tha…
[2] A defendant need not allege the existence of a defense to the charge to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“To demonstrate ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a movant must establish that (1) counsel made errors so serious that counsel is not functioning as guaranteed by the sixth amendment and (2) the deficient performance of counsel prejudiced the defense.”
States the foundational two-prong test for ineffective assistance claims from Strickland v. Washington
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHobbs entered nolo pleas to attempted second degree murder and robbery with a firearm. He alleged his trial counsel erroneously led him to believe he …
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Alton Hobbs, appeals from the summary denial of his motion for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to rule 3.850, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In his 3.850 motion, Hobbs alleged that ineffective assistance of trial counsel had led him to enter nolo pleas to attempted second degree murder and robbery with a firearm. Hobbs alleged that his lawyer had erroneously led him to believe that he was reserving the right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence. In his second claim, he alleged that his lawyer had provided ineffective assistance in failing to preserve for appeal the legality of his adjudications for attempted second degree murder. We find that the latter claim is refuted by the law upholding the legality and existence of this offense. See Brown v. State, 790 So. 2d 389 (Fla.2000). This leaves appellant’s first claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel leading to an involuntary plea.
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a movant must establish that (1) counsel made errors so serious that counsel is not functioning as guaranteed by the sixth amendment and (2) the deficient performance of counsel prejudiced the defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). This test has been extended to allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel arising out of the plea process. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). In such cases, the “prejudice prong” of the Strickland test is satisfied by an allegation “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, [the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Id. at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366. It is not necessary to allege, in addition, that a defense existed to the charge. See Worden v. State, 688 So. 2d 958 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); see also Mason v. State, 742 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). We note apparent conflict with the Third and Fifth Districts on this latter point. See, e.g., Siegel v. State, 586 So. 2d 1341 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); Diaz v. State, 534 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).
We find appellant’s first claim. of ineffective assistance of trial counsel — that his lawyer erroneously led him to believe he was reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress — to be legally and factually sufficient. See Helms v. State, 573 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). He alleged that counsel misled him to believe that he could later appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress notwithstanding his nolo pleas which did not expressly reserve the issue of suppression. Appellant alleged that this ineffective assistance rendered his pleas involuntary as they were based on this erroneous impression and understanding.
We reverse and remand for attachment of portions of the record which conclusively refute Hobbs’ claim, or for an evidentiary hearing thereon.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
POLEN, C.J., DELL and STEVENSON, JJ., concur.
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Grosvenor v. State, 874 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 2004)…nstead, the viability of the defense is relevant to the credibility of the assertion that the defendant would have insisted on going to trial if informed of that defense. See, e.g., Cordes v. State, 842 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Hobbs v. State, 790 So. 2d 1164, 1166 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Mason v. State, 742 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). Several other jurisdictions, including the overwhelming majority of federal circuit courts, also have adopted this approach.1 [*1180] Two districts, however, have interpr…
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Brigham v. State, 950 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…ecause the judgment and sentence in that case are not final; consequently, Brigham’s motion is premature. Case CRC01-01161CFANO-M The judgment and sentence Brigham sought to vacate in this case became final on November 4, 2002. See Mingo v. State, 790 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (stating that a judgment and sentence becomes final for purposes of the two-year period for filing a motion for postconviction relief when the thirty-day period for filing an appeal expires). Brigham, through counsel, timely moved…
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Meyer v. State, 997 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009)…ecome final within which to file a motion for post-conviction relief. If there is no appeal, the judgment and sentence do not become final for purposes of this rule until the thirty-day period for filing an appeal expires. See, e.g., Mingo v. State, 790 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Black v. State, 750 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Ramos v. State, 658 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). Thus, Meyer’s motion was timely filed because his conviction and sentence did not become final until April 7, 2006. REVERSED a…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (U.S. 1985)
- Siegel v. State, 586 So. 2d 1341 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)
- Mason v. State, 742 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
- Brown v. State, 790 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 2000)
- Helms v. State, 573 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
- Tesheira v. LEE, 688 So. 2d 958 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
- Diaz v. State, 534 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- Stewart v. Stewart, 534 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)