JOSE MANUEL ROJAS, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed Jose Manuel Rojas' criminal conviction because the trial court erroneously disallowed his peremptory challenge of a juror. The court clarified the three-step process required to evaluate challenges to peremptory strikes and found that Rojas' stated reason for striking the juror—that her husband was a federal law enforcement officer—was gender-neutral and should have been allowed.
The court reversed Rojas' conviction because the trial court erred in disallowing the peremptory strike. The court held that Rojas' stated reason for striking the juror—that her husband is a federal law enforcement officer—was gender-neutral and should have been allowed as a valid peremptory challenge.
[1] A trial court must follow a three-step process when determining whether a peremptory challenge is improperly based on race.
[2] The first step in evaluating a peremptory challenge requires the objecting party to show the venireperson is a member of a distinct racial group and request an explanatio…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The resolution of whether a peremptory challenge is to be allowed by the trial judge where a party objects to the other side's use thereof as being racially based is to be reached in a three-step process.”
Establishes the foundational framework for evaluating peremptory challenge objections
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDuring jury selection in Rojas' trial, Rojas attempted to use a peremptory challenge to strike a proposed juror whose husband is a federal law enforce…
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FLETCHER, Judge.
We must reverse Rojas’ conviction because the trial court erred when it disallowed Rojas’ peremptory strike of a proposed juror. As we have been faced with a barrage of appeals in which it is contended that peremptory challenges were improperly rejected by the trial court, we remind all concerned of the process required to be followed in judging the propriety of peremptory challenges.
“The resolution of whether a peremptory challenge is to be allowed by the trial judge where a party objects to the other side’s use thereof as being racially based is to be reached in a three-step process. The first step requires the non-striking party to make a timely objection that the peremptory challenge is based on racial grounds; to show that the venireperson is a member of a distinct racial group; then to request that the court ask the striking party to explain the reason for the strike. See Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d 759, 764 (Fla.1996).
The second step in the process requires the proponent of the strike to come forward with a race neutral explanation. If the proponent’s explanation is facially race neutral, then the court must take the third step. That is, the court must decide whether the facially race neutral explanation is or is not a pretext, given all the circumstances surrounding the strike. The trial court’s focus in step three is not on the reasonableness of the explanation, but rather its genuineness. In evaluating genuineness the trial court is analyzing a subjective issue, the decision turning primarily on the trial court’s assessment of the striking party’s credibility — which is solely within the purview of the finder of fact. If the court finds the explanation is not pretextual the strike will be sustained. Melbourne, 679 So. 2d at 764.”1
Pringle v. State, 792 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).
In making its ruling the trial court needs to keep in mind that it is dealing with a peremptory strike, not one for cause. Separating in one’s mind the “rules” relating to peremptory challenges from those relating to cause challenges makes the trial court’s task less confusing (which, in defense of the trial judge, we recognize it can be).
However, we must reverse because the denied strike should have been allowed as the reason given for Rojas’ strike was a gender neutral one2 contrary to the trial court’s conclusion that it was not.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
. Gender-based challenges are prohibited as well, Abshire v. State, 642 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 1994); Pringle v. State, 792 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) at footnote 1. Our discussion here is applicable thereto.
. The proposed juror’s husband is a federal law enforcement officer. Rojas defended his strike on this basis, which is gender neutral.
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Hayes v. State, 94 So. 3d 452 (Fla. 2012)…tor requested a gender-neutral reason for the peremptory strike of juror Haupt (step one), and defense counsel offered a facially gender-neutral explanation after the trial court requested that he do so (step two). Id. at 103 (citing Rojas v. State, 790 So. 2d 1219, 1221 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001), for the proposition that a prospective juror’s relationship to a law enforcement officer is a gender-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory strike). In turning to step three — the trial court’s assessment of the genuin…
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Whitby v. State, 933 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)…(Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Murray v. Haley, 833 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Daniels v. State, 837 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); Fleming v. State, 825 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Shuler v. State, 816 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Rojas v. State, 790 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Jones v. State, 787 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Lewis v. State, 778 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Thornton, 781 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Baber v. State, 776 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Hamdeh…
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State v. Whitby, 975 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. 2008)…erred in failing to determine the "genuineness of the challenges”); Shuler v. State, 816 So. 2d 257, 259 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (reversing because trial court erred "in accepting as genuine the State’s reasons for striking [the juror]”); Rojas v. State, 790 So. 2d 1219, 1221 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (reversing because defense’s reason for the strike was gender-neutral); Jones v. State, 787 So. 2d 154, 157 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (reversing because trial court erred in ruling that defense’s reasons for the strike were not fa…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Jeanie H. Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1996)
- Abshire v. State, 642 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 1994)
- Eugene v. State, 792 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
- Pringle v. State, 792 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)