D.H., A CHILD, PETITIONER,
v.
ENOC ESTEVES, SUPERINTENDENT, BROWARD REGIONAL JUVENILE DETENTION CENTER, RESPONDENT
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A juvenile detainee challenges his 21-day secure detention order, arguing that Florida law authorizes extended detention only for absconders from a "probation program," not mere "probation." The court holds that "probation" and "probation program" are functionally equivalent under the statute and denies the habeas corpus petition.
The court holds that there is no meaningful distinction between "probation" and "probation program" for purposes of section 985.215(2)(a), and therefore the 21-day detention order is legally authorized.
[1] A child alleged to be an absconder from probation may be held in secure detention for up to 21 days prior to a detention hearing.
[2] For the purposes of statutory authorization for secure detention, there is no meaningful legal distinction between "probation" and a "probation program."
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“we agree with DJJ's position that there is no meaningful distinction between "probation" and a "probation program" for purposes of section 985.215(2)(a)”
Establishes the court's central holding that the statutory distinction the petitioner relies upon does not exist.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceNearly three years prior, the petitioner pleaded no contest to burglary of a conveyance and petit theft, with adjudication withheld and community cont…
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PER CURIAM.
Petitioner, a child, seeks release from secure detention. Nearly three years ago he pleaded no contest to charges of burglary of a conveyance and petit theft. Adjudication was withheld and he was placed on community control. Recently he was charged with possession of cocaine, grand theft auto, petit theft, two counts of trespass after warning, and failing to maintain contact with his juvenile probation officer, as well as other charges relating to an alleged failure to comply with conditions of probation. He was taken into custody and appeared before the court for a detention hearing.
At the hearing, the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) asked the court to order that he be held in secure detention for 21 days and for a violation hearing within that time. Petitioner’s counsel argued that he was charged with absconding from probation, not from a probation program and therefore the text of section 985.215(2)(a) does not authorize a 21-day detention. See § 985.215(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2000) (“Subject to the provisions of subsection (1), a child taken into custody and placed into ... secure detention care prior to a detention hearing may continue to be detained by the court if: (a) The child is alleged to be an escapee or an absconder from a ... probation program 1... ”).
His petition for a writ of habeas corpus, based on the same argument, seeks release from the trial court’s ensuing 21-day detention order.
We agree with DJJ’s position that there is no meaningful distinction between “probation” and a “probation program” for purposes of section 985.215(2)(a). According to section 985.03(43) “[probation is an individualized program.... ” The mere fact that the statutes envision the possibility of “day treatment probation programs,” some of them being more “intensive and structured,” does not mean that any individual placement into mere “probation” is any less a “probation program.”
In any case, when petitioner was placed into “probation” in 1998, section 985.215(2)(a) spoke only of “community control program” — the term “probation” did not appear in the statutory text. The term “program” was added in 2000, but neither the 1998 nor the current version refer to probation or community control without the word “program.” Consequently, we agree with DJJ that there is no real difference between probation and a probation program. As petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his current detention is not legally authorized we deny his petition for writ of habeas corpus.
POLEN, C.J., FARMER and STEVENSON, JJ„ concur.
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Z.B. v. Dep't OF Juv. Just., 938 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)…o avoid legal processes.” DJJ filed a response in opposition arguing that a trial court may detain a juvenile in secure detention if the juvenile is alleged to be an absconder from probation. See § 985.215(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005); D.H. v. Esteves, 790 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). DJJ stated that the juvenile statutes do not define absconder, but cited to T.C. v. Layne, 725 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), where the court upheld a juvenile’s secure detention upon a finding that leaving home-based supervis…