FELIX ALVAREZ, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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The court held that a misdemeanor speedy trial period cannot be revived by consolidating misdemeanor counts with felonies in an information filed after the misdemeanor period has expired.
[1] A writ of prohibition may be granted on speedy trial grounds when the applicable speedy trial period has expired.
[2] A misdemeanor speedy trial period is not revived by consolidation with felony counts if the information charging both is filed after the misdemeanor speedy trial period h…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAlvarez was arrested on April 26, 2000, and an information charging both felonies and misdemeanors was filed on August 7, 2000. The misdemeanor speedy…
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PER CURIAM.
We grant this petition for a writ of prohibition on speedy trial grounds. It was error to deny discharge on those counts in the information constituting misdemeanors.
Alvarez was arrested on April 26, 2000. The information was filed on August 7, 2000, charging him with numerous felony counts and eight counts alleging offenses that were identified as “misdemeanors.”
We grant the petition because the ninety-day speedy trial period applicable to misdemeanors ran as to those counts before the information was filed.
We recognize that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(f) provides that when misdemeanors are consolidated with felonies, they are governed by the speedy trial period applicable to felonies. This court has previously determined that this rule may not be used to revive a misdemeanor count subject to speedy trial discharge that is filed after the misdemeanor speedy trial period has run (here, ninety days after the April 26, 2000 arrest). See Goldman v. State, 645 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)(following Livingston v. State, 564 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)). The 1980 committee note to this rule, previously numbered 3.191(b)(2), explains that “[t]o claim benefit under this provision, the crimes must be consolidated before the normal time period applicable to misdemeanors has expired.” The Goldman and Livingston opinions found that note to be “highly persuasive.”
The state attempts to distinguish those decisions by pointing out that in this ease, the misdemeanors and felonies were initially charged in a single information. We can discern no reason not to apply Goldman to the situation presented here and limit rule 3.191(f) to cases in which the charging document that joins felony and misdemeanor counts is filed before the expiration of the misdemeanor speedy trial period.
Therefore, the petition is granted. Alvarez is to be discharged on those counts in the information that do not constitute felonies.
STONE, SHAHOOD, and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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State v. Roxie Lynn Hanna, 858 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)…e August 16th episode, the subsequent consolidation of these charges with the felonies would not revive the misdemeanor counts because the speedy trial time had already expired. State v. Robbins, 830 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Alvarez v. State, 791 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). Because we conclude that the various charges did not arise from the same criminal episode, however, Appellee’s speedy trial time did not commence to run on each charge until Appellee was arrested on the particular charge. Furthe…
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Brady v. State, 934 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)…to misdemeanors has expired.” In re Rules of Criminal Procedure, 389 So. 2d 610, 616 (Fla.1980). Thus a misdemeanor charge cannot be revived by consolidating or joining it with a felony charge after the time for speedy trial runs. Alvarez v. State, 791 So. 2d 574, 575 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Goldman v. State, 645 So. 2d 1089, 1091 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Livingston v. State, 564 So. 2d 612, 613 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); see also State v. Robbins, 863 So. 2d 168, 168 (Fla.2003) (Wells, J., dissenting) (stating that Alva…1 / 2
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State v. Robbins, 830 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Alvarez v. State, 791 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Livingston v. State, 564 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). GRIFFIN and ORFINGER, R.B., JJ., concur. HARRIS, J., dissents, with opinion.…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Livingston v. State, 564 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- Goldman v. State, 645 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)