NACALE FUDGE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Fudge appealed his convictions for leaving the scene of an accident, driving with a suspended license, and reckless driving, arguing that only felonies can be scored as additional offenses under Florida's sentencing guidelines. The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that misdemeanors may be scored as additional offenses despite the guidelines' primary application to felonies.
Misdemeanors qualify as additional offenses under Florida's sentencing guidelines. Although the guidelines apply only to felonies as primary offenses, the Legislature intended for misdemeanors to be scored as additional offenses, as evidenced by the Criminal Punishment Code worksheet which lists misdemeanors as additional offenses scoring 0.2 points each.
[1] Misdemeanors can qualify as "additional offenses" for sentencing purposes under the Criminal Punishment Code, even if the sentencing guidelines primarily apply to felonie…
[2] The Criminal Punishment Code worksheet assigns 0.2 points to each misdemeanor listed as an additional offense.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“courts may depart from the literal meaning of a statute when such literal interpretation would lead to an illogical result or one not intended by the Legislature”
Establishes the principle allowing deviation from statutory language when literal interpretation produces illogical results
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFudge was convicted of three offenses: leaving the scene of an accident involving injury (a felony), driving with a suspended license (a misdemeanor),…
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Fudge appeals from his judgment and sentences for leaving the scene of an accident involving injury,1 driving with a suspended license2 and reckless driving.3 On appeal, Fudge argues that only felonies qualify as additional offenses under the sentencing guidelines and thus the trial court erred in using the reckless driving offense, a misdemeanor, as an additional offense to score victim injury points. We disagree and affirm.
Fudge is correct that the sentencing guidelines apply only to felonies, that is, misdemeanors cannot be scored as primary offenses at conviction. State v. Troutman, 685 So. 2d 1290 (Fla.1996); Armstrong v. State, 656 So. 2d 455 (Fla.1995); Bordeaux v. State, 471 So. 2d 1353 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). We also acknowledge that the introductory language in section 921.0021 tends to support Fudge’s argument that additional offenses must be felonies:
921.0021 Definitions. — -As used in this chapter, for any felony offense, except any capital felony, committed on or after October 1,1998, the term:
(1) “Additional offense” means any offense other than the primary offense for which an offender is convicted and which is pending before the court for sentencing at the time of the primary offense.
(7)(a) “Victim injury” means the physical injury or death suffered by a person as a direct result of the primary offense, or any additional offense, for which an offender is convicted and which is pending before the court for sentencing at the time of the primary offense, (emphasis added). Nonetheless, courts may depart from the literal meaning of a statute when such literal interpretation would lead to an illogical result or one not intended by the Legislature. Parker v. State, 406 So. 2d 1089 (Fla.1981). See also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Link, 416 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (courts should not construe a statute in such a manner as to reach an illogical or ineffective conclusion).
We conclude that the Legislature intended for misdemeanors to qualify as “additional offenses.” The Criminal Punishment Code includes misdemeanors as additional offenses. The Criminal Punishment Code worksheet lists misdemeanors under additional offenses and provides that each misdemeanor scores 0.2 points. See § 921.0024(l)(a), Fla. Stat. Here, the primary offense at conviction was the felony offense of leaving the scene of an accident. The two other offenses, both misdemeanors, were properly listed as “additional offenses.” They were offenses other than the primary offense for which Fudge was convicted and were pending before the court at the time of sentencing of the primary offense. Thus victim injury points for the additional offense of reckless driving were properly scored.
AFFIRMED.
THOMPSON, C.J., ORFINGER, R.B., J., concur. . § 316.027(l)(a), Fla. Stat. . § 322.34(2)(a), Fla. Stat. .§ 316.192, Fla. Stat.
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Calhoun v. State, 813 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)…of an accident, Geary v. State, 675 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), review denied, 680 So. 2d 422 (Fla.1996), and misdemeanor driving while license suspended, Geary; cf. May v. State, 747 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); see generally Fudge v. State, 791 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. [*106] 5th DCA 2001), the order below denying her 3.800 motion is reversed with directions to permit the defendant, at her option, to withdraw her plea or to be sentenced under a correctly computed guidelines scoresheet.…
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Renaldo Champagne v. State (Fla. 2d DCA 2019)
Authorities Cited
- State v. Reinersman, 406 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 1981)
- Armstrong v. State, 656 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1995)
- Bordeaux v. State, 471 So. 2d 1353 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)
- Dewease L. Woodburn v. Woodburn, 416 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
- State v. Bennie Troutman, 685 So. 2d 1290 (Fla. 1996)