C. E. FARRINGTON, APPELLANT,
v.
VICTORIA B. HARRISON, ET AL., APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida Supreme Court reversed a chancery court decree that cancelled a warranty deed from attorney Victoria B. Harrison to her client C. E. Farrington, finding that the lower court's decision was manifestly contrary to the weight of evidence and that the attorney had not abused the confidential relationship in conveying property as compensation for legal services.
The deed should not be cancelled because the chancellor's decree was manifestly contrary to the weight and legal effect of the evidence. There was credible evidence from disinterested witnesses and corroborative circumstances supporting the defendant's contention that the property was conveyed pursuant to a legitimate agreement for legal services with no abuse of the confidential relationship.
“We are mindful of the rule which subjects transactions of this nature, when questioned, to the closest scrutiny of the courts, particularly courts of equity, and of the burden to be borne by the attorney in sustaining such transaction.”
Establishes the heightened standard of review for attorney-client property transactions
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceVictoria B. Harrison, an attorney, executed a warranty deed dated September 1, 1920, to her client C. E. Farrington, conveying real property in Fort L…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Appellate Review Of Chancellor'S Findings cases and more on FLexlaw
Strum, J.
This is an appeal from a final decree cancelling and setting aside a warranty deed bearing date September 1, 1920, executed by the appellee Victoria B. Harrison, as grantor, to appellant, C. E. Farrington, as grantee, recorded in Deed Book 22, at page 104, of the Public Records of Broward County, conveying Lot 22 of Block 26 of the Town of Ft. Lauderdale. The bill of complaint was , brought by Victoria B. Harrison, the grantor. The basis for the relief sought by the bill and granted by the decree appealed from is that the execution of the deed in question was procured by the grantee fraudulently and in violation of the obligations and duties of the grantee arising from the relationship of attorney and client which existed between the parties at the time of the execution of the deed, the grantee being the attorney of the grantor. The grantee contends that the property in question was conveyed to him pursuant to a legitimate agreement with his client, the grantor, as part of his remuneration for services performed, and that there was no abuse of the existing confidential relation.
We are mindful of the rule which subjects transactions of this nature, when questioned, to the closest scrutiny of the courts, particularly courts of equity, and of the burden to be borne by the attorney in sustaining such transaction. Bolles v. O’Brien, 63 Fla. 342; 59 South. Rep. 133; William v. Bailey, 69 Fla. 225; 67 Sou. Rep. 877.
We also bear in mind the oft reiterated rule that while the findings of the chancellor on the facts where the evidence is heard by him, and the witnesses are before him, are entitled to more weight in the Appellate Court than where such findings are made in a cause where the testimony was not taken before the chancellor, yet in either case the chancellor’s findings should not be disturbed by an Appellate Court unless shown to be clearly erroneous. Sandlin v. Hunter Co., 70 Fla. 514, 70 South. Rep. 553; Travis v. Travis, 81 Fla. 309, 87 South. Rep. 762; Lucas v. Wade, 43 Fla. 419, 31 South. Rep. 23.
On the other hand, where a decree is manifestly against the weight of the evidence or contrary to and unsupported by the legal effect of the evidence, then it becomes the dutjr of the Appellate Court to reverse such decree. Carr v. Leslie, 73 Fla. 233, 74 South. Rep. 207; Florida National Bank v. Sherouse, 80 Fla. 405, 86 South. Rep. 279; Gill v. Chappelle, 71 Fla. 479, 71 South. Rep. 836; Lightsey v. Washington Park Properties, 112 South. Rep. 555. The evidence in this case is lengthy and in many essentials unique. The probability of the occurrence of another ease upon substantially the same state of facts as is here involved is too remote to justify a comprehensive review of the evidence. The evidence was taken largely before a master; some of it was by deposition, and some taken before the chancellor. There is much credible evidence, including that of disinterested witnesses, as well as corroborative circumstances, to support the contentions of the defendant below. In its essential features, complainant’s evidence is meager and to us unconvincing.
We entertain great respect for the views of the chancellor, but a careful study of the case convinces us that the decree is manifestly contrary to the weight and legal effect of the evidence.
The decree appealed from is therefore reversed.
Terrell, Brown and Buford, J. J., concur. Ellis, C. J., and Whitfield, J., dissent.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (59 total)
-
Palm Beach Ests. v. Bula E. Croker, 106 Fla. 617 (Fla. 1932)…Water Works Co. v. Wood, 104 Fla. 306, 139 Sou. Rep. 800; McEwen v. Growers Loan & Guaranty Co., 104 Fla. 176, 139 Sou. Rep. 805; Johns v. Bowden, 72 Fla. 530, 73 Sou. Rep. 603; Carr v. Lesley, 73 Fla. 233, 74 Sou. Rep. 207; Farrington v. Harrison, 95 Fla. 769, 116 Sou. Rep. 497. A careful study of the evidence shown by the transcript of the record fails to reveal that the Chancellor committed reversible error under the foregoing rule in deciding the equities, insofar as the facts are concerned, in favor…
-
Gardiner v. Goertner, 110 Fla. 377 (Fla. 1932)…manifest weight of the evidence. Day v. Weadock, 101 Fla. 333, 134 So. 525; Fulton v. Clewiston Limited, 100 Fla. 257, 129 So. 773; Creel v. Abernathy, 102 Fla. 461, 136 So. 229; Jordon v. Jordan, 100 Fla. 1576, 132 So. 466; Farrington v. Harrison, 95 Fla. 769; 116 So. 497; Cramer v. Eichelberger, 96 Fla. 683, 118 So. 737; Shipley-Young Co. v. Young, 97 Fla. 46, 119 So. 522; Weaver-Loughridge Lbr. Co. v., Kirkland, 99 Fla. 426, 131 So. 784; Hancoy Holding Co. v. Lambright, 101 Fla. 128, 133 So. 631; Turni…
-
City of Miami Beach v. The Tex. Co., 141 Fla. 616 (Fla. 1940)…hazard or danger to life and property, and there is evidence in the record to support these findings of fact. The conclusions of a chancellor on questions of fact will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. See Farrington v. Harrison, 95 Fla. 769, 116 So. 497; Atlantic Bank, etc., Co. v. Sengstak, 95 Fla. 606, 116 So. 267; Mock v. [*641] Thompson, 58 Fla. 477, 50 So. 673; Lucas v. Wade, 43 Fla. 419, 31 So. 231; Kent v. Knowles, 101 Fla. 1375, 133 So. 315, 317. We therefore hold Ordinance No…
Previewing 3 of 59 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Travis v. Sim Travis, 81 Fla. 309 (Fla. 1921)
- Rosa Chappelle McGill and her husband S. D. McGill v. Chappelle, 71 Fla. 479 (Fla. 1916)
- Giles v. Garland, 70 Fla. 514 (Fla. 1915)
- Rosanna S. Lucas v. Leonidas E. Wade, 43 Fla. 419 (Fla. 1901)
- Williams v. Bailey, 69 Fla. 225 (Fla. 1915)
- The Fla. Nat'l Bank of Gainesville v. Sherouse, 80 Fla. 405 (Fla. 1920)
- Ida v. Carr and her husband, 73 Fla. 233 (Fla. 1917)
- Bolles v. O'Brien, 63 Fla. 342 (Fla. 1912)