ALICE W. SMITH, APPELLANT,
v.
H. J. MOBLEY, APPELLEE
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The Florida Supreme Court reversed a decree that increased an award to the defendant after a rehearing, finding that the defendant should have appealed the original decree rather than seeking modification through a rehearing that did not clearly present new grounds.
The court held that the defendant, if aggrieved by the original decree, should have appealed it directly instead of using a petition for rehearing to seek modification from another judge.
“If the defendant was aggrieved by the decree he should have appealed instead of presenting the same record to another circuit judge on a petition for rehearing which does not clearly present matters that should be adjudicated by another judge of equal jurisdiction.”
This quote explains the court's reasoning for reversing the decision, highlighting the improper use of a rehearing petition.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA final decree was rendered, followed by a rehearing granted by a different circuit judge, resulting in an increased award to the defendant. The appel…
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Per Curiam.
In this case a final decree involving an an accounting as an incident to substantive relief, was rendered by a judge of one circuit sitting in another circuit. A rehearing was granted and a decree awarding an increased amount to the defendant was made by another circuit judge. An appeal was taken from the latter decree. It does not appear that the petition for rehearing was filed within thirty days from the time of pronouncing the decree as required by the statute, Section 3165 Rev. Gen. Stats. 1920 and Rule 90 Equity Rules. But assuming that it was duly filed since it was granted, there appears to be no good ground for granting it. The petition for rehearing states that certain specified items were not allowed by the decree though they were “proved by undisputed testimony.” A consideration of the testimony relative to the items referred to does not show that the first judge overlooked items or that he clearly erred in not including them if they were in fact excluded by the decree. If the defendant was aggrieved by the decree he should have appealed instead of presenting the same record to another circuit judge on a petition for rehearing which does not clearly present matters that should be adjudicated by another judge of equal jurisdiction.
Reversed.
Whitfield, P. J., and Terrell and Buford, J. J., concur. Ellis, C. J., and Strum and Brown, J. J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
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Groover v. Walker, 88 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1956)…the general proposition that a successor judge may not correct errors of law committed by his predecessor and hence he cannot review and reverse on the merits and on the same facts the final orders and decrees of his predecessor. In Smith v. Mobley, 95 Fla. 829, 116 So. 760, a case involving the reversal of a final decree earlier entered by a circuit judge of another circuit sitting as a visiting circuit judge, this Court held that while rehearings are authorized in chancery causes, when parties are aggrie…
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Doyle E. Carlton v. Mathews, 103 Fla. 301 (Fla. 1931)…been recognized in previous decisions of this Court. See Board of County Coms. of Duval County vs. City of Jacksonville, 36 Fla. 196, 18 So. 339; Stewart vs. DeLand, 71 Fla. 158, 71 So. 42, text 490; State ex rel. Atty-Gen’l vs. Tyler, 95 Fla. 811, 116 So. 760. We think the appropriation as provided in the Act is sufficiently definite appropriating a proportionate part of a fixed tax payable monthly to each county which is to be reimbursed under the Act. It will be noted that the basis of the appropriatio…
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Knight v. The Bd. of Pub. Instruction for the Cnty. of Hillsborough, 102 Fla. 922 (Fla. 1931)…Fla. 527, 56 So. 498; Lainhart v. Catts, 73 Fla. 735, 75 So. 47; Berry v. Hardee, 83 Fla. 531, 91 So. 685; Apgar v. Wilkinson, 95 Fla. 457, 116 So. 78; Jackson Lumber Co. v. Walton Co., 95 Fla. 632, 116 So. 771; State ex rel. v. Tyler, 95 Fla. 811, 116 So. 760; State ex rel. v. Daniel, 87 Fla. 270, 99 So. 804; State ex rel. v. Fearnside, 87 Fla. 34, 100 So. 256. Even though when the bill was introduced into the legislature the provisions of its title and those in the body of the Act were of uniform opera…
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