GARY D. WALLACE, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, AND MICHAEL MOORE, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, RESPONDENTS
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Gary Wallace challenges the Florida Department of Corrections' forfeiture of gain-time credits that resulted in his negotiated plea agreement not being honored. The court held that when gain-time cancellation undermines a negotiated plea agreement, the inmate is entitled either to enforcement of the plea or the right to withdraw it.
The court held that while the D.O.C. has authority to cancel credits, a defendant is entitled to withdraw his plea when such cancellation results in altering a negotiated plea agreement. The sentencing judge must either resentence Wallace in a manner that effectuates the intent of the plea agreement or allow Wallace to withdraw his plea.
[1] A defendant is entitled to withdraw a plea when the cancellation of gain-time credits by the Department of Corrections alters a negotiated plea agreement.
[2] A petition for writ of certiorari may be treated as a motion to enforce a plea agreement to expedite proceedings.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The D.O.C. has authority to cancel credits. However, we have held that a defendant is entitled to withdraw his plea when such a cancellation results in altering a negotiated plea agreement.”
Establishes the balance between D.O.C.'s cancellation authority and the protection of negotiated plea agreements
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1989, Wallace was sentenced to 12 years for dealing in stolen property and received substantial gain-time credits totaling 2,250 days. After being …
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CAMPBELL, MONTEREY, (Senior) Judge.
Gary D. Wallace, an inmate in the custody of the Florida Department of Corrections (D.O.C.), petitions this court for a writ of certiorari. In 1989, Wallace was originally sentenced to 12 years’ incarceration with probation to follow for dealing in stolen property. During Wallace’s period of incarceration, he was awarded 1440 days of basic gain-time and 195 days of incentive gain-time. Due to prison over crowding, Wallace was also awarded 195 days of administrative gain-time and 420 days’ provisional credits. Wallace was offered early release by way of control release.
In October of 1993, Wallace violated the terms of his release and, pursuant to a negotiated plea, was resentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment and was awarded a credit for the 12 years of his original sentence, plus 84 days.
In November of 1993, Wallace was again offered an early release in the form of control release supervision. Wallace’s release was revoked after he failed to abide by the terms of the release, and he was returned to the custody of the D.O.C. As a result of the revocation of control release supervision, the D.O.C. forfeited all gain-time applying to the 15 year sentence, including the gain-time awarded by the court at sentencing for violating supervision in 1993.
After attempting twice to enforce the plea agreement, Wallace filed the instant petition for writ of certiorari. On the record before us, it is clear that the plea agreement contemplated that Wallace would receive credit for 12 years, plus 84 days. Thus, the sentence imposed was actually 2 years and 281 days. However, as a result of the forfeiture action taken by the D.O.C., Wallace has not received the credit intended by the agreement.
The D.O.C. has authority to cancel credits. However, we have held that a defendant is entitled to withdraw his plea when such a cancellation results in altering a negotiated plea agreement. See Davis v. Singletary, 659 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). In order to expedite these proceedings, we treat the petition for writ of certiorari as a motion to enforce plea agreement. Accordingly, this matter is transferred to the sentencing judge, who shall resentence Wallace in a manner that effectuates the intent of the plea agreement and takes into account the D.O.C.’s cancellation of credit or allows Wallace to withdraw his plea.
Remanded with directions.
FULMER, A.C.J. and STRINGER, J„ Concur.
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Dellahoy v. State, 816 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…allow him to withdraw his plea. The DOC’s forfeiture of the gain time cannot be countermanded by the court, but neither can that forfeiture thwart the plea bargain. E.g., Jones v. State, 782 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); see also Wallace v. State, 793 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Williams v. Dep’t of Corrections, 734 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). ORDER VACATED; REMANDED. GRIFFIN and ORFINGER, R.B., J.J., concur.…
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Miller Seabrooks v. State, 817 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)…during his prior prison term. However, the Department of Corrections forfeited that credit. Appellant claims he is entitled to either the credit or resentencing in a manner that effectuates the intent of the court’s order. He cites Wallace v. State, 793 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), as authority for the trial court to consider a “motion to enforce a plea agreement.” While we acknowledge that the second district authorized the trial court to consider such a motion, under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, t…
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State v. Nashawn P. Jackson, 842 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)…e Department of Corrections thwarted the intent of the negotiated plea agreement. See Williams v. Department of Corrections, 734 So. 2d 1132, 1133 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); see also Dellahoy v. State, 816 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Wallace v. State, 793 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Although there may be a suggestion inherent in the trial court’s Order that the trial court had the authority to countermand the Department of Corrections’ forfeiture of gain time,1 it is clear that the trial court cannot, and di…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Carlton Davis v. Singletary, 659 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)