PORTER, BROWN, CHITTY & PIRKLE, M.D.P.A., ET AL. PETITIONERS,
v.
ARTAE PEARSON, RESPONDENT
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A Florida appellate court resolved whether a civil action under Chapter 395 (anti-dumping statute) must comply with pre-suit screening requirements of Chapter 766 (medical malpractice statute). The court held that while the statutes are ordinarily separate and distinct, a complaint that alleges improper quality of medical care—rather than mere refusal to treat—constitutes a medical malpractice case in substance and therefore requires compliance with Chapter 766's pre-suit screening procedures.
While Chapter 395 and Chapter 766 are separate and distinct statutes with ordinarily different requirements, a complaint filed under Chapter 395 that alleges inadequate quality of medical care—rather than mere dumping—raises medical malpractice issues and therefore requires compliance with Chapter 766's pre-suit screening procedures.
[1] Chapter 395, Florida Statutes (anti-dumping statute), and Chapter 766, Florida Statutes (medical malpractice statute), are separate and distinct statutes.
[2] A civil cause of action solely under Chapter 395 requires proof of being "dumped" and resulting damages.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a person seeking to pursue a civil cause of action solely within the confines of Chapter 395 needs only to establish that the plaintiff was 'dumped' and that damages resulted”
Establishes the ordinary requirement for anti-dumping claims under Chapter 395, which does not require pre-suit screening.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePearson filed a civil complaint under Chapter 395, the anti-dumping statute, against medical providers Porter, Brown, Chitty & Pirkle. The complaint a…
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PER CURIAM.
This case raises the issue of whether someone pursuing a civil cause of action under Chapter 395, Florida Statutes, the anti-dumping statute, must comply with the pre-suit screening requirements of Chapter 766, Florida Statutes, the medical malpractice statute. As to this narrow question, we hold that the two statutes are separate and distinct.
Therefore, ordinarily, a person seeking to pursue a civil cause of action solely within the confines of Chapter 395 needs only to establish that the plaintiff was “dumped” and that damages resulted. A medical malpractice action under Chapter 766, on the other hand, which requires pre-suit screening procedures, involves proving that the medical care provided fell below a reasonable “standard of care”. To that extent, the two statutes are totally different and the requirements, if any, for filing under the statutes, are different, to-wit: The filing of a Complaint under Chapter 395 does not require that a pre-suit screening notice be given.
However, the respondent/plaintiff in this case, in filing the Complaint, specifically alleged that the defendants/ petitioners failed to “... treat[ ] his arm appropriately and provid[e] follow-up treatment .... ” (emphasis added). By using the word “appropriately” in his allegations, he raised the issue of the quality of health care provided, as distinguished from the refusal to provide any medical treatment at all by “dumping”.
Consequently, although this case was filed under Chapter 395, it necessitates proving matters that are, in essence, medical malpractice issues because, in reality, this case is actually a “medical malpractice” case masquerading as an “anti-dumping” case.
Accordingly, because of the “medical malpractiee”-type issues that are in the Complaint, the plaintiff below would have had to comply with the pre-suit screening requirements of Chapter 766.
In view of the fact that the time for complying with the above described pre-suit requirements of Chapter 766 had expired, the lower court ignored the essential requirements of the law in denying Petitioners’ motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint. Accordingly, we grant certiorari and remand this matter to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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Morejon v. Mariners Hosp., Inc., 197 So. 3d 591 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)…and South Miami Hospital (“South Miami”) for violation of section 395.1041, entitled “Access to Emergency ■ Services and Care,” which we have previously referred to as the “anti-dumping statute.” Porter, Brown, Chitty & Pirkle, M.D.P.A. v. Pearson, 793 So. 2d 1012, 1012 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). The Morejons alleged that Mariners had a statutory obligation to transfer Dr. Morejon, and that Mariners violated the statute by calling only one hospital, South Miami, in an attempt to transfer Dr. Morejon for medical trea…
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Artae Pearson v. Porter, 862 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)…PER CURIAM. As this court has previously held that appellant’s complaint failed to state a cause of action under Chapter 395, the anti-dumping statute (see Porter, Brown, [*736] Chitty & Pirkle, M.D., P.A. v. Pearson, 793 So. 2d 1012, 1013 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)), the trial court did not have discretion to permit the appellant to amend his complaint on remand. See Dober v. Worrell, 401 So. 2d 1322, 1324 (Fla.1981)(“[A] procedure which allows an appellate court to rule on the merits…