DAVID IAN REAVELL, APPELLANT,
v.
LINDA REAVELL, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Affirmed denial of motion to vacate final divorce judgment; husband's challenge to $1,000 attorney's fee sanction was untimely and procedurally improper as it came after the deadline for direct appeal and motion for rehearing.
A motion to vacate a final divorce judgment filed beyond the time for filing a motion for rehearing, without alleging grounds under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b), must be denied.
[1] A motion to vacate a final judgment filed after expiration of the time for filing a motion for rehearing and without alleging grounds under Florida Rule of Civil Procedur…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn a divorce final judgment entered March 27, 2001, the trial court assessed the husband $1,000 in attorney's fees for failure to attend ordered media…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Attorney'S Fees Dispute cases and more on FLexlaw
WARNER, J.
In the final judgment of divorce entered on March 27, 2001, the court provided that each party should bear his or her own attorney’s fees except for $1,000 assessed against the husband in connection with the husband’s failure to attend ordered mediation and respond to discovery. The final judgment was not appealed. Instead, on April 16, 2001, which was beyond the time for filing a timely motion for rehearing, see Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.530(b), the husband moved to “vacate final judgment of dissolution of marriage in respect to Paragraph 8,” which referred to the $1,000 he owed on attorney’s fees. At most, this might be considered a motion for relief from the judgment pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b). However, the motion does not allege any ground upon which relief could be granted. Instead, the husband simply denies that he was in any way at fault for the failure to provide documents or attend mediation. The motion was denied on June 8, 2001, and this appeal followed.
While the husband continues to maintain in his brief that his failure to provide the financial information was not his fault and that he should not be liable for the $1,000, that issue should have been raised in a direct appeal of the final judgment of divorce within thirty days. It is too late to raise this issue after final judgment and after the time has expired for filing any motion for rehearing of that judgment. Having shown no ground listed in rule 1.540 for vacating the judgment, we affirm.
GUNTHER and GROSS, JJ., concur.