JOHN T. MULLINS, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
STACEY D. MULLINS, AND STACEY MULLINS, P.A., APPELLEES

Fla. 4th DCA | 2001-11-28
No. 4D01-3614
WARNER and FARMER, JJ., concur.
799 So. 2d 450 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (2001) Positive Treatment
Cited by 20 cases

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Synopsis

The court denied a husband's motion for rehearing of an order dismissing his appeal from a temporary relief order in a family law case for failure to timely file his initial brief and appendix within the required 15-day period under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(e).


Holding

The court denied the husband's motion for rehearing and upheld the dismissal of the appeal. The rule requiring initial briefs to be served within 15 days of filing notice of appeal in temporary relief orders should be strictly construed.


Headnotes

[1] Appeals of temporary relief orders in family law cases are governed by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iii).

[2] For appeals of temporary relief orders in family law cases, the initial brief and appendix must be served within 15 days of filing the notice of appeal.

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Key Quotes

“For an appeal of a temporary relief order in a family law case, the rule 9.130(e) requirement that the initial brief be served within fifteen days of filing the notice of appeal should be strictly construed.”

Establishes the strict standard for compliance with appellate procedural rules in temporary relief appeals

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Facts & Procedural History

The trial court entered a temporary relief order on September 5, 2001, requiring certain payments including child support and retroactive child suppor…

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Opinion of the Court
GROSS, J.

GROSS, J.

The husband moves for rehearing of an order dismissing his appeal from a temporary relief order in a family law case for failure to timely file his initial brief and appendix. We deny the motion.

The trial court entered a temporary relief order on September 5, 2001. The husband filed a notice of appeal on September 7. Appeal of a temporary relief order in a family law case travels under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iii); therefore, the appellant’s initial brief and appendix “shall be served within 15 days of filing the notice.” Fla. R.App. P. 9.130(e).

The husband obtained a stay of the temporary relief order pending appeal on September 25, 2001. Although the stay order required a bond, it does not appear that the stay was contingent upon the hus band’s posting of the bond. On October 9, the wife moved to dismiss the appeal, since the husband had not filed a brief. The husband did not respond to the motion. This court granted the motion to dismiss on November 1.

On November 5, the husband moved to set aside the dismissal. As grounds, the husband asserted that the case had been “calendared wrong” by his attorney. Also, the husband stated that his attorney’s office failed “to properly process mail received,” which explains why he did not respond to the motion to dismiss for the twenty-two days it was pending prior to the dismissal.

For an appeal of a temporary relief order in a family law case, the rule 9.130(e) requirement that the initial brief be served within fifteen days of filing the notice of appeal should be strictly construed. Temporary relief awards “are among the areas where trial judges have the very broadest discretion, which appellate courts are very reluctant to interfere with except under the most compelling of circumstances.” Pedraja v. Garcia, 667 So. 2d 461, 462 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Temporary relief hearings are abbreviated and the relief granted is not final, so the trial judge may revisit temporary relief matters in the final judgment. To allow loose and sloppy compliance with the rule’s time requirements is to risk that the appeal is being used for financial leverage in the underlying litigation. That risk is enhanced in a case such as this where the temporary relief order contained a number of required payments, including child support and retroactive child support, and the husband obtained a stay.

WARNER and FARMER, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By (11 total)

  • Schmitz v. Schmitz, 891 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)
    …en that “[tjemporary relief awards ‘are among the areas where trial judges have the very broadest discretion, [with] which appellate courts are very reluctant to interfere with except under the most compelling of circumstances.’” Mullins v. Mullins, 799 So. 2d 450, 451 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (quoting Pedraja v. Garcia, 667 So. 2d 461, 462 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)); Robbie v. Robbie, 591 So. 2d 1006, 1008 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). The court’s handling of the fee issue was well within its discretion. The court was justifia…
  • Hilary I. Inyang v. Tenney-Inyang, 901 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)
    …’s fees and costs. Temporary relief awards “are among the areas where trial judges have the very broadest discretion, which appellate courts are very reluctant to interfere with except under the most compelling of circumstances.” Mullins v. Mullins, 799 So. 2d 450, 451 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (quoting Pedraja v. Garda, 667 So. 2d 461, 462 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)). Having examined the record carefully, we find no abuse of discretion on the trial court’s part. Accordingly, the order awarding temporary attorney’s fees a…
  • Chhouri v. Adoline Chhouri, 2 So. 3d 987 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)
    …eeking fees must prove with evidence the reasonableness and necessity of the fee sought. Safford v. Safford, 656 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Despite the very broad discretion granted to the court in awarding temporary support, Mullins v. Mullins, 799 So. 2d 450, 451 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), we have consistently required that an award of temporary attorney’s fees be accompanied by factual findings regarding reasonableness of the hourly rates and time expended. Ghay v. Ghay, 954 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); K…

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