PAUL ALFRED BROWN, PETITIONER,
v.
MICHAEL W. MOORE, RESPONDENT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Paul Alfred Brown, a death row inmate convicted of murder, petitions the Florida Supreme Court for habeas corpus relief, claiming his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise constitutional challenges to his death sentence based on Apprendi v. New Jersey. The court denies the petition, finding that identical arguments have been previously rejected.
The court rejects both claims. The incompetence claim is premature under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.811 and therefore without merit. The Apprendi-based challenge has been previously rejected in identical arguments, and appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise it.
[1] A claim of incompetence to be executed is premature if not yet ripe for adjudication.
[2] Appellate counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise arguments that have been previously rejected by the court.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“significant errors which occurred at Mr. Brown's capital trial and sentencing were not presented to this Court on direct appeal due to the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel”
Brown's central claim in the habeas petition regarding ineffective appellate assistance
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBrown was convicted of the shooting murder of a seventeen-year-old, armed burglary, and attempted first-degree murder, and was sentenced to death. He …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Competency To Be Executed cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM. .
Paul Alfred Brown petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla. Const. We deny the petition.
Brown was convicted for the shooting murder of seventeen-year-old Pauline Co-well, for which he was sentenced to death. He was also convicted of armed burglary and attempted first-degree murder. The facts of the case are more fully set forth in our opinion in Brown’s direct appeal. See Brown v. State, 565 So. 2d 304, 305 (Fla.1990). Brown filed a motion for postcon-viction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The trial court denied relief, and we affirmed that denial. See Brown v. State, 755 So. 2d 616 (Fla.2000). Brown now claims that “[significant errors which occurred at Mr. Brown’s capital trial and sentencing were not presented to this Court on direct appeal due to the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.” Brown makes two arguments for relief in this habeas petition.
Brown first argues that he may be incompetent to be executed. Brown agrees that this claim is premature under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.811. However, Brown asserts that he makes the argument to preserve his ability to pursue a similar claim in the federal system on account of In re Provenzano, 215 F. 3d 1233, 1235 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1256, 120 S.Ct. 2710, 147 L.Ed.2d 979 (2000). We agree with his concession that this issue is not yet ripe, and we therefore find it to be without merit. See Hall v. Moore, 792 So. 2d 447, 450 (Fla.2001); Mann v. Moore, 794 So. 2d 595, 600 (Fla.2001).
Brown’s second argument is that the death sentence in his case is unconstitutional as applied to him in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). He argues that at the time of his penalty phase, section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1983), provided the maximum sentence was life in prison without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years.1 Brown fur ther argues that the aggravating circumstances were required to be charged in the indictment, submitted to the jury during the guilt phase, and found by the jury in a unanimous verdict. Brown claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising these issues.
We have previously rejected identical arguments. See Mills v. Moore, 786 So. 2d 532, 536-38 (Fla.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 1752, 149 L.Ed.2d 673 (2001); Mann, 794 So. 2d at 600. For the same reasons explained in those opinions, we reject Brown’s arguments. Thus, we find that Brown’s appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise these issues. Accordingly, we deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, and LEWIS, JJ., concur. QUINCE, J., recused.
. The murder occurred in 1986; therefore, Brown's citation to the 1983 version of section 775.082(1) is in error. However, the 1985 version and the 1987 version (the year of his penalty phase) were identical to the 1983 version. We have rejected Brown's challenge to the 1979 version in Mills v. Moore, 786 So. 2d 532 (Fla.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 1752, 149 L.Ed.2d 673 (2001), and the 1989 version in Mann. The 1983, 1985, and 1987 versions of section 775.082(1) are identical to the 1979 and 1989 versions of the statute.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (13 total)
-
Parker v. State, 904 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 2005)…ature. Un [*381] der Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.811 and 3.812, the issue of competency for execution cannot be raised until the Governor has issued a death warrant. See, e.g., Cole v. State, 841 So. 2d 409, 430 (Fla.2003); Brown v. Moore, 800 So. 2d 223, 224 (Fla.2001). While Parker is under a death sentence, no death warrant has been signed and his execution is not imminent. Parker’s concession that this issue is not yet ripe is accurate, and we deny relief on this claim. HABEAS CORPUS PETITION…
-
State v. Lewis, 838 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 2002)…ons were denied, and appellate counsel did not raise these claims on appeal. This Court has consistently rejected any requirement that capital sentencing requires that aggravating circumstances must be charged in the indictment. See Brown v. Moore, 800 So. 2d 223, 225 (Fla.2001). Although Lewis’s counsel now argues that this decision is erroneous in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), appellate counsel is not considered ineffective for failing to anticipate…
-
Hitchcock v. State, 991 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 2008)…onsistently held that Apprendi does not require that aggravating circumstances be charged in the indictment, submitted to the jury, and individually found by a unanimous jury verdict. Porter v. Crosby, 840 So. 2d 981, 986 (Fla.2003); Brown v. Moore, 800 So. 2d 223, 224-25 (Fla.2001). III. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Hitchcock raises numerous claims. He primarily argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise certain issues on direct…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (U.S. 2000)
- Brown v. State, 565 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1990)
- Mills v. Moore, 786 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 2001)
- Mann v. Moore, 794 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 2001)
- Hall v. Moore, 792 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 2001)
- Brown v. State, 755 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 2000)
- In re Provenzano, 215 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2000)
- Burket v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 1256 (U.S. 2000)
- Provenzano v. Moore, 530 U.S. 1256 (U.S. 2000)