CHARLES MARVIN ASKEW, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court affirmed the trial court's denial of Askew's Rule 3.850 motion to withdraw his guilty plea, finding his claims either conclusory and facially insufficient or lacking due diligence.
A defendant's Rule 3.850 motion to withdraw a guilty plea must be supported by facts that were unknown at trial and could not have been discovered through due diligence.
[1] A Rule 3.850 motion to withdraw a guilty plea requires that the facts supporting the petition were unknown at trial and could not have been discovered through the exercis…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the facts upon which a petition for coram nobis/Wood 3.850 are based must have been unknown at trial, and it must appear that the defendant and counsel could not have known of them by the use of due diligence”
Peart v. State standard for Rule 3.850 motions
Askew filed a Rule 3.850 motion seeking to withdraw his plea on grounds that it was involuntarily entered. The trial court denied the motion.…
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BLUE, Chief Judge.
Charles Askew challenges the order of the trial court denying his motion filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We affirm.
Askew filed his motion pursuant to Wood v. State, 750 So. 2d 592 (Fla.1999). In the motion, Askew sought to withdraw his plea on the basis that it was involuntarily entered. In denying the motion, the trial court relied on Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 121 S.Ct. 1578, 149 L.Ed.2d 590 (2001). However, in Daniels the Supreme Court held that a defendant who has been sentenced in a federal case may not utilize 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to collaterally attack the state convictions used to enhance the federal sentence where he failed to pursue, or unsuccessfully pursued, the state remedies that were available to him. In Daniels the Supreme Court was addressing the proper application of a federal statute, and Daniels has no bearing in the present case. However, we affirm the order of the trial court because the claims raised in Askew’s motion were either con-clusory and facially insufficient or, on their face, demonstrated a lack of due diligence in the raising of the claim. See Peart v. State, 756 So. 2d 42, 45 (Fla.2000) (holding that the facts upon which a petition for coram nobis/Wood 3.850 are based “must have been unknown at trial, and it must appear that the defendant and counsel could not have known of them by the use of due diligence”).
Affirmed.
PARKER and WHATLEY, JJ., Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Wood v. State, 750 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 1999)
- Roan Peart v. State, 756 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 2000)
- Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374 (U.S. 2001)