ERIC LEATHERS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The appellate court reviewed an order denying a motion to correct an illegal sentence. While affirming the denial of credit for time served on probation, the court reversed the denial of a claim that the post-revocation sentence exceeded the original suspended sentence.
Leathers is not entitled to credit for time spent on probation prior to revocation. However, the sentence imposed upon revocation of probation cannot exceed the original suspended prison sentence.
[1] A claim that a sentence imposed upon revocation of probation exceeds the original suspended prison sentence is cognizable in a motion to correct an illegal sentence.
[2] A defendant is not entitled to prison credit for time spent on probation prior to the revocation of probation.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When a trial court imposes a suspended prison sentence and places the defendant on probation, upon revocation of probation, the trial court can only sentence the defendant at most to the suspended portion of the sentence.”
This quote explains the legal principle governing the maximum sentence that can be imposed after probation revocation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEric Leathers argued his sentence was illegal because the prison term imposed after probation revocation exceeded the original suspended prison senten…
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[*217] BLUE, Chief Judge.-
Eric Leathers challenges the order of the trial court denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
In the title to the single ground in his motion, Leathers alleged that his sentence was illegal because the trial court, upon revocation of probation, imposed a greater prison sentence than the suspended prison sentence that was originally imposed. This claim is cognizable in a rule 3.800(a) motion. See Royal v. State, 760 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). In the body of the motion, Leathers claimed that his prison sentence was in excess of the suspended sentence because he was not given prison credit for the time he spent on probation prior to the revocation. Leathers is not entitled to such credit, and we affirm the trial court’s denial of this claim. See Mozone v. State, 777 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).
However, both Leathers’ motion and the trial court’s order indicated that Leathers was initially placed on probation for five years with a suspended prison sentence of 47.5 months and that a 48.6-month prison sentence was imposed upon revocation of probation. In its order the trial court stated that Leathers was properly sentenced to 48.6 months’ prison because of the “bump up” for violation of probation.
The trial court is incorrect. When a trial court imposes a suspended prison sentence and places the defendant on probation, upon revocation of probation, the trial court can only sentence the defendant at most to the suspended portion of the sentence. See Royal. We therefore reverse that portion of the trial court’s order that denies this claim. On remand, if the trial court again denies this claim, it shall attach those portions of the record that conclusively refute the claim. Otherwise, it shall resentence Leathers to no more than the suspended portion of the sentence.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
ALTENBERND and NORTHCUTT, JJ., Concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Stanley v. State, 975 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)….75 months imposed in October 1994 and the 1994 guidelines range. We agree that the trial court erred in imposing sentences greater than the 37.75-month suspended sentences. See Beltran v. State, 854 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Leathers v. State, 801 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). We therefore reverse the sentences and remand for resentencing. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. DAVIS and KELLY, JJ., Concur. . The record reflects that during this ten-year period Stanley traveled to other st…
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Green v. State, 4 So. 3d 44 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)…er the defendant incarcerated for a period exceeding the suspended portion because to do so would be a violation of the double jeopardy clause. Mack v. State, 823 So. 2d 746, 748 n. 3 (Fla.2002) (citation omitted); accord [*45] Leathers v. State, 801 So. 2d 216, 217 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (“When a trial court imposes a suspended prison sentence and places the defendant on probation, upon revocation of probation, the trial court can only sentence the defendant at most to the suspended portion of the sentence.”)…
Authorities Cited
- Van Royal v. State, 760 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
- Shink Mozone, Jr. v. State, 777 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)
- Tobin v. Sunshine State Ins. Co., 777 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)