AMBER REINFORCING, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
HUBBARD CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, APPELLEE
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Amber Reinforcing appealed a final judgment entered in a declaratory judgment action, arguing the trial court lacked proper notice and violated procedural rules. The court reversed and remanded, finding that the notice of hearing was insufficient under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.440(e) and violated due process because it did not adequately inform the parties that a final hearing would be held.
The trial court erred in entering final judgment because the notice given was insufficient under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.440(e) and violated due process. Final judgment was improper when entered without considering evidence and without properly setting the matter for final hearing under Rule 1.440(c).
[1] A notice of hearing stating a party will call up a complaint for declaratory judgment for hearing does not provide adequate notice that a final hearing will be held, viol…
[2] A trial court errs by entering final judgment without considering evidence in support of the parties' pleadings and without properly setting the matter for final hearing.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“strict compliance with rule 1.440 is mandatory”
Establishes that trial courts must strictly comply with the notice requirements of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.440 when scheduling hearings
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHubbard Construction Company filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against Amber Reinforcing. The trial court issued a notice of hearing stating …
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BROWNING, J.
Appellant appeals entry of a final judgment in a declaratory judgment action entered pursuant to a notice of hearing providing in pertinent part that Appellee “will call up for hearing its complaint for declaratory judgment in accordance with § 86.111, Fla. Stat.” As grounds for reversal, Appellant argues the trial court erred by entering judgment because the notice of hearing did not give Appellant adequate notice that a final hearing would be held and violated the rules of civil procedure and due process, Appellant was denied its requested right to a jury trial, and no evidence was adduced that supports entry of final judgment. Because the notice given Appellant was insufficient under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.440(e) and violated due process, we reverse. As our determination on notice is dispositive and further action by the trial court on the merits of this case is required, we do not address Appellant’s remaining grounds for reversal.
Section 86.111, Florida Statutes (1999), provides, inter alia, that “[t]he court may order a speedy hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment and may advance it on the calendar.” Id. The sole reasonable import of Appellee’s notice of hearing was that the court would be considering the cause for the setting of an expedited trial date for final hearing. By entering final judgment without considering evidence in support of the parties’ pleadings and without properly setting the matter for final hearing under Rule 1.440(c), the trial court erred, and entry of final judgment was improper. See Heritage Casket and Vault Ind., Inc. v. Sunshine Bank, 428 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (trial court’s failure to comply with the notice requirements of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.440(c) constitutes a violation of due process); see also Bush v. Holmes, 767 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (reversal required where trial court fails to set matter for trial through strict compliance with rule 1.440); Bennett v. Continental Chems. Inc., 492 So. 2d 724, 727 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (en banc) (“strict compliance with rule 1.440 is mandatory”). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
WOLF and VAN NORTWICK, JJ„ CONCUR.
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Citator
Cited By
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Brown v. Reynolds, 872 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…ents of rule 1.440(c) concerning setting cases for trial because it did not inform the parties that the circuit court intended to make a final adjudication of their claims at the scheduled hearing. See Amber Reinforcing, Inc. v. Hubbard Constr. Co., 801 So. 2d 314, 315 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Int’l Jai-Alai Players Ass’n v. Dania Jai-Alai Div. of the Aragon Group, Inc., 563 So. 2d 1117, 1119 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). The circuit court’s noncompliance with the requirements of rule 1.440(c) is a separate ground requiri…
Authorities Cited
- Rodger H. Bennett v. Cont'l Chems., Inc., 492 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- John Ellis "Jeb" Bush v. Holmes, 767 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)
- Heritage Casket & Vault IND., Inc. v. Sunshine Bank, 428 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)