ERIC LAMAR DOWARD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 2001-12-28
No. 5D01-2840
THOMPSON, C.J. and PETERSON, J. concur.
802 So. 2d 518 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (2001) Positive Treatment
Cited by 7 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Eric Doward appeals the summary denial of his 3.850 postconviction relief motion claiming his plea was involuntary due to mental illness and medication affecting his comprehension. The appellate court reversed because the trial court relied on a psychiatrist's report from three months before the plea rather than evidence of Doward's mental status at the time of entry, and the plea hearing transcript was unavailable to conclusively refute his claims.


Holding

The court reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court improperly summarily denied relief because the psychiatrist's report from three months prior to the plea did not address Doward's mental status at the actual time of the plea, and without a transcript of the plea hearing, Doward's claim was not conclusively refuted by the record.


Headnotes

[1] A defendant seeking postconviction relief based on an involuntary plea bears the burden of demonstrating that the plea was not intelligently or voluntarily entered.

[2] A claim for postconviction relief may be summarily denied only if the record conclusively refutes the defendant's allegations.

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Key Quotes

“Although an involuntary plea is a recognized ground for postconviction relief, the defendant has the burden of showing that the plea was not intelligently or voluntarily entered.”

Establishes the legal standard for involuntary plea claims in postconviction relief proceedings

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Facts & Procedural History

Doward entered a nolo contendere plea to second degree murder and was sentenced to twenty years in prison followed by ten years probation. He filed a …

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Opinion of the Court
ORFINGER, R. B., J.

Eric Lamar Doward appeals the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Doward entered a plea of nolo contendere to second degree murder and was sentenced to twenty years in prison followed by ten years probation. In his 3.850 motion, Doward claims that at the time he entered his plea, he was delusional, hearing voices and taking psychotropic medicine for his mental illness. He alleges that because of his mental illness, he did not freely and voluntarily enter his plea because he was unable to understand the consequences of his actions.

In summarily denying Doward’s motion, the trial court relied on a psychiatrist’s report prepared about three months prior to the entry of the plea that concluded Doward was sane at the time of the offense and was competent to proceed, even though he suffered from schizophrenia and alcohol dependency.

The trial court attached a copy of the psychiatrist’s report to its order of summary denial.

Although an involuntary plea is a recognized ground for postconviction relief, the defendant has the burden of showing that the plea was not intelligently or voluntarily entered. Young v. State, 789 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). Doward’s motion states a facially sufficient claim for relief. See Rivera v. State, 746 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). Accordingly, relief may be summarily denied only where the record conclusively refutes the claim. Young, 789 So. 2d at 1161.

In this case, the psychiatrist’s report relied on by the trial court to deny relief was prepared three months prior to the plea hearing.

Consequently, it does not address Doward’s mental status at the time he entered his plea.

Additionally, because there is no transcript of the plea hearing attached to the order denying relief, we cannot determine whether the court questioned Doward about his medications and his ability to understand the consequences of entering a plea, nor can we determine whether Doward responded appropriately when questioned during the plea dialogue. See Onnestad v. State, 404 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Absent a transcript of the plea hearing, Doward’s claim that his plea was involuntarily entered is not conclusively refuted by the record.

Accordingly, we reverse the order denying postconviction relief and remand the matter to the trial court to either attach a copy of the plea hearing transcript if it conclusively refutes Doward’s allegations, or hold an evidentiary hearing on his motion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

THOMPSON, C.J. and PETERSON, J. concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Reyna v. State, 18 So. 3d 1131 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)
    …have granted Mr. Reyna an evidentiary hearing. See Kirkland v. State, 1 So. 3d 1224, 1227 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (“ ‘[RJelief may be summarily denied only where the record conclusively refutes [a facially sufficient] claim.’ ” (quoting Doward v. State, 802 So. 2d 518, 519 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001))). Accordingly, we reverse the summary denial of Mr. Reyna’s second claim and remand for an evidentiary hearing. [*1134] Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded. KHOUZAM, J., Concurs specially with opinion. VILLANTI,…
  • Randall v. State, 885 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)
    …y itself reflects that Mr. Randall answered only yes or no to questions put to him by the trial judge, and did not otherwise engage in conversation with the court. We conclude that Mr. Randall states a facially sufficient claim. In Doward v. State, 802 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), we held in somewhat similar circumstances that an evidentiary hearing was required because the defendant’s mental status at the time of the plea hearing was not conclusively refuted by the record. See also Rivera v. State, 746 S…
  • Stokes v. State, 938 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)
    …850 motion that he was never asked whether he was under the influence of any medications, despite his history of mental illness and psychiatric hospitalizations, was facially sufficient despite finding of competency to stand trial); Doward v. State, 802 So. 2d 518, 519 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (finding that, in denying a rule 3.850 motion, a trial judge could not rely on a psychiatrist’s report prepared three months prior to the plea hearing concerning competency to stand trial because the report did not address t…

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