KEITH BERNARD BROWN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Keith Brown appealed the trial court's summary denial of his Rule 3.850 postconviction relief motion. The court reversed, holding that Brown's motion was timely because his direct appeal tolled the two-year filing deadline, and remanded for the trial court to address his claims on the merits rather than dismiss them as untimely.
The motion was timely because Brown's direct appeal, dismissed on April 15, 1997, tolled the two-year filing period under Rule 3.850(b), making the January 22, 1999 filing date within the deadline. The trial court was authorized to hear the refiled motion on its merits.
[1] A trial court's order summarily denying a motion for postconviction relief is subject to reversal on appeal.
[2] The time period for filing a motion for postconviction relief is tolled during the pendency of a direct appeal.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a judgment and sentence 'become final' when direct review proceedings are concluded, and jurisdiction to entertain motions for post-conviction relief returns to the trial court.”
Establishes that the two-year filing period begins when direct review is concluded, not from the conviction date.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBrown originally filed a Rule 3.850 motion on January 22, 1999, which the trial court dismissed as untimely. On first appeal, this court noted the mot…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Tolling Of Time Limits cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
The appellant challenges the trial court’s order summarily denying his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We reverse.
The appellant originally filed his motion for postconviction relief on January 22, 1999, and the trial court dismissed that motion as untimely. On appeal of that denial, we noted that the appellant’s motion was not untimely because the two-year filing period provided for by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(b) had been tolled when the appellant timely appealed his new sentence. See Brown v. State, 756 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). However, because the appellant had failed to state in his motion that he had previously filed a direct appeal as required by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(c)(2), we affirmed the trial court’s denial of the appellant’s motion without prejudice to the appellant to file a motion that complied with the requirements of that rule within thirty (30) days of the court’s mandate. See id. The mandate issued on May 23, 2000.
The appellant timely refiled his rule 3.850 motion, this time complying with rule 3.850(c)(2). However, despite our opinion in Brown v. State, 756 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), expressly authorizing the appellant to refile a compliant motion, the trial court again denied the appellant’s motion as untimely.
The state argues that the direct appeal did not toll the time for filing a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to rule 3.850 because this Court dismissed the appeal on April 15, 1997, and because no mandate ever issued. However, “[a] judgment and sentence ‘become final’ when direct review proceedings are concluded, and jurisdiction to entertain motions for post-conviction relief returns to the trial court.” See Baggett v. State, 637 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), citing Ward v. Dugger, 508 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Therefore, regardless of whether a mandate ever issued in the ap pellant’s direct appeal, the jurisdiction of the trial court to entertain a postconviction motion was removed when the appellant timely filed his notice of appeal, and did not return to the trial court until this Court dismissed the appeal on April 15, 1997. Thus, it was on that date that the two-year clock embedded in rule 3.850 began to tick. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850.
Because the appellant’s original, January 22,1999, motion was not untimely, we expressly authorized the appellant to refile a compliant motion. The appellant did so, and as his claims are facially sufficient, they must be addressed on the merits.
In his motion, the appellant states two claims. His first claim is that his counsel was ineffective for failing to review his sentencing guidelines scoresheet for accuracy, and that such failure resulted in a departure sentence being imposed. His second claim is that the trial court erred in imposing a departure sentence based on the erroneous scoresheet without providing written reasons for doing so. Both claims are facially sufficient. See Lashley v. State, 741 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); see also Woods v. State, 516 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).
We accordingly reverse the trial court’s order denying the appellant’s rule 3.850 motion as untimely, and remand for the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the appellant’s claims or to submit record attachments which conclusively refute them, or to resentence the appellant following the trial court’s review of a corrected scoresheet.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
DAVIS, BENTON, and BROWNING, JJ., CONCUR.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Maille Joseph v. State, 835 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)…3 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (citing Ward v. Dugger, 508 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)). The two-year limitation period began to run on the date this court dismissed Joseph’s appeal even though no mandate was issued by the appellate court. Brown v. State, 802 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). As such, Joseph had until September 4, 2001, to file his rule 3.850 motion.1 Joseph’s rule 3.850 motion was not filed until September 5, 2001. As a result, the trial court correctly concluded that Joseph’s motion for postconvic…
-
Brooks v. State, 816 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)…timely appealed.” Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 484, 120 S.Ct. 1029. But, in the circumstances of the present case, denial of the petition on account of a pleading deficiency ought not foreclose all possibility of relief. See generally Brown v. State, 802 So. 2d 526, 527-28 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Hickey v. State, 763 So. 2d 1213, 1214 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (“We believe movant should be given a short, specific period of time beyond the limitation period to cure the procedural defect.”); Brown v. State, 689 So. 2d 12…
-
Isom v. State, 325 So. 3d 924 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)…22 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (recognizing that “[t]he two-year limitation period [under rule 3.850] began to run on the date this court dismissed [the defendant’s] appeal even though no mandate was issued by the appellate court” (citing Brown v. State, 802 So. 2d 526, 527– 28 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001))); see also Baggett v. State, 637 So. 2d 303, 303 ---PAGE 3--- (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (“A judgment and sentence ‘become final’ when direct review proceedings are concluded, and jurisdiction to entertain motions for pos…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ward v. Dugger, 508 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Baggett v. State, 637 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
- Woods v. State, 516 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
- Lashley v. State, 741 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
- Brown v. State, 756 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)