TAMMY SUE DAVIES, APPELLANT,
v.
NORMAN RAY TURNER, APPELLEE
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In this dissolution of marriage appeal, the First District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court judgment on three issues: the calculation of retroactive child support, the award of tax dependency exemptions without requiring the former husband to be current on support payments, and the inadequate award of attorney's fees to the wife given the significant income disparity between the parties.
The court reversed on all three issues. The retroactive child support calculation was reversed because the record did not support the $330 arrearage figure and the trial judge did not explain his methodology. The tax exemption order was reversed because it failed to make the exemption conditional upon the former husband being current with support payments as required by Florida law. The attorney's fees award was reversed as inadequate given the substantial income disparity, and the case was remanded for the trial court to make appropriate findings under the proper legal standard.
[1] A trial court's calculation of retroactive child support must be supported by the record and adequately explained.
[2] A trial court may order the primary residential parent to waive the IRS dependency exemption for the non-custodial parent only if the non-custodial parent is current in s…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the record on appeal, including the testimony, does not support the trial court's finding that the former husband only owed $330 in arrearage notwithstanding the deductions for overpaid childcare costs, and the trial judge does not explain how he reached this figure”
Establishes that the trial court's retroactive child support calculation lacked evidentiary support and proper explanation, requiring reversal
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTammy Sue Davies sought dissolution of marriage from Norman Ray Turner. The trial court awarded retroactive child support from the date of the wife's …
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PER CURIAM.
Tammy Sue Davies (wife) challenges a final judgment of dissolution of marriage from the former husband, Norman Ray Turner. The wife raises four issues on appeal, three of which have merit and require reversal: 1) Whether the trial court erred in computing the retroactive child support owed by the former husband; 2) whether the trial court erred by allowing the former husband to claim the minor child as a dependent for income tax purposes where the former husband has a history of failing to make child support payments and the final judgment contained no requirement that the former husband be current in child support payments in order to claim the exemption; and 8) whether the trial court erred by failing to award the wife reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in light of the wide disparity in income between the parties.
The order on appeal states that the wife shall be entitled to retroactive child support from the date of filing of the wife’s petition for dissolution of marriage, February 3, 1999. The court, found that there was an arrearage amount of $330, and denied any additional claims for support “based on an offset for childcare calculated and paid by the former husband when there were no childcare costs.” The record on appeal, including the testimony, does not support the trial court’s finding that the former husband only owed $330 in arrearage notwithstanding the deductions for overpaid childcare costs, and the trial judge does not explain how he reached this figure. We, therefore, must reverse on the issue of retroactive child support payments for the trial court to explain how it reached its determination or to conduct further proceedings on this matter.
Section 61.30(ll)(a)8., Florida Statutes states that “the court may order the primary residential parent to execute a waiver of the Internal Revenue Service dependency exemption if the non-custodial parent is current in support payments.” The trial court ordered the wife to execute an exemption for each even-numbered year, commencing with 2000.
The trial court erred in not making the requirement conditional upon the former husband being current with support payments. Robertson v. Bretthauer, 712 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). We, therefore, reverse this portion of the order and remand for the trial court to address this issue.
Finally, in light of the great disparity in income between the parties, we determine that the trial court erred in awarding the wife only $2,500 in attorney’s fees. Hamlin v. Hamlin, 722 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). Upon remand, the trial court shall make the appropriate findings in accordance with the dictates of Hamlin in awarding attorney’s fees to the wife.
WOLF, KAHN and BENTON, JJ., concur.
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Fortune v. Fortune, 61 So. 3d 441 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)…ial parent.” Wamsley v. Wamsley, 957 So. 2d 89, 92 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). Additionally, the final judgment must require that the exemption be conditional on the paying spouse’s “being current in his support obligations.” Id.; see also Davies v. Turner, 802 So. 2d 1195, 1196 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). We reverse this portion of the final judgment. On remand, the trial court shall direct the wife to execute the necessary waivers of exemptions and order that the husband’s exemptions be conditioned on his being current in…
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Salazar v. Orestes Salazar, 976 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)…require the custodial parent to transfer the exemption to the non-custodial parent through the execution of a waiver”). The dependency exemption must also be conditioned on the former spouse being current with support payments. See Davies v. Turner, 802 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (finding the trial court erred in not making the exemption to be claimed on alternate years conditional on former husband being current with support payments); see Robertson, 712 So. 2d at 1141 (“transfer of the dependency exempt…
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Miller v. Miller, 826 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)…on petition was filed.” Anderson, 609 So. 2d at 89; Davis v. Davis, 581 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Friedman v. Friedman, 307 So. 2d 926, 927 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). Pitts v. Pitts, 626 So. 2d 278, 282 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Accord Davies v. Turner, 802 So. 2d 1195, 1196 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Bardin v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 720 So. 2d 609, 611 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Beal v. Beal, 666 So. 2d 1054, 1054 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (requiring award where “the child’s need and the [father’s ability to pay existed at the t…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Hamlin v. Hamlin, 722 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)
- Robertson v. Bretthauer, 712 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)