QUARLES & BRADY, LLP, AND JAMES T. DEMAREST, PETITIONERS,
v.
MIREYA PRIO BIRDSALL AND WILLIAM BIRDSALL, RESPONDENTS
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A law firm and attorney sought certiorari to quash a trial court order compelling a law firm secretary to answer deposition questions about communications with the supervising partner. The court held that attorney-client privilege protected the communications and that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law by granting the motion to compel without applying statutory privilege exceptions.
The court held that the communications were protected by attorney-client privilege under section 90.502, Florida Statutes, because they were made in furtherance of the rendition of legal services. The trial court improperly granted the motion to compel without applying any statutory exception to the privilege, as mere witness importance and party necessity do not constitute valid exceptions.
[1] Certiorari is the proper method to seek review of a trial court's order compelling a deponent to answer a deposition question over the objection of attorney-client privil…
[2] A communication between lawyer and client is confidential and protected by the attorney-client privilege if it is not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[a] communication between lawyer and client is 'confidential' if it is not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than: (1) Those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of legal services to the client. (2) Those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication.”
Establishes the statutory definition of privileged attorney-client communications under section 90.502
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMireya Prio Birdsall and William Birdsall filed a legal malpractice action against Quarles & Brady, LLP and attorney James T. Demarest, alleging Demar…
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BLUE, Chief Judge.
The law firm of Quarles & Brady, LLP, and attorney James T. Demarest petition for a writ of certiorari to quash the trial court’s order that compels Nancy Jarvi to answer a deposition question over the objection of attorney-client privilege. Certiorari is the proper method to seek review of this order. See Robichaud v. Kennedy, 711 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). Because the trial court’s order was a departure from the essential requirements of law for which no adequate remedy exists on plenary appeal, we grant the petition.
Mireya Prio Birdsall and William Bird-sail have filed a legal malpractice action against the law firm and Demarest. They alleged that Demarest represented them in a medical malpractice action and allowed the statute of limitations to expire. De-marest is the only attorney named specifically in the complaint. Nancy Jarvi, a secretary with the law firm, was deposed by the Birdsalls.
Jarvi stated that she had no knowledge of the legal malpractice case against De-marest and the firm until her deposition was requested. Since that time, she had not discussed the lawsuit with anyone from the firm except Robin Doyle. Doyle was Demarest’s supervising partner and initially represented the law firm in this case. Jarvi testified that she discussed the case with him “in preparation for the deposition.” In response to the follow-up question' — “What was discussed in that conversation?” — the attorney-client privilege was invoked and Jarvi did not answer. The Birdsalls filed a motion to compel Jarvi to answer the question regarding what was discussed in her predeposition conversation with Doyle. The motion stated: “Robin Doyle is clearly an important witness in this case. Any conversations between himself and Ms. Jarvi are therefore not protected by the attorney-client privilege.” The trial court granted the motion.
We now quash that order.
Section 90.502, Florida Statutes (2001), states that “[a] communication between lawyer and client is ‘confidential’ if it is not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than: (1) Those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of legal services to the client. (2) Those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication.” Section 90.502(4) states five exceptions to the privilege. Privileged communications are not discoverable unless one of the statutory exceptions applies. Haskell Co. v. Ga. Pac. Corp., 684 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). None of the exceptions were cited by the Birdsalls in their motion to compel.
The motion stated only that Doyle is an important witness in the case. But undue hardship is not an exception, Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Dunn, 705 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), nor is disclosure permitted because the opposing party claims that the privileged information is necessary to prove their case, Volpe v. Conroy, Simberg & Ganon, P.A., 720 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Accordingly, we grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and quash the order on review.
NORTHCUTT and GREEN, JJ„ Concur.
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Citator
Cited By (11 total)
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Worley v. Cent. Fla. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, Inc., 228 So. 3d 18 (Fla. 2017)…iggett Group, Inc., 975 F. 2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1992)). It is an interest traditionally deemed worthy of maximum legal protection. Id. Furthermore, it is not concerned with the litigation needs of the other party. See Quarles & Brady, LLP v. Birdsall, 802 So. 2d 1205, 1206 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (“[UJndue hardship is not an exception, nor is disclosure permitted because the opposing party claims that the privileged information is necessary to prove their case”) (citation omitted)). Therefore, we find that the questi…
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Peter R. Genovese, M.D. v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 74 So. 3d 1064 (Fla. 2011)…ion to the work-product doctrine, and thus are discoverable. On the other hand, the attorney-client privilege, unlike the work-product doctrine, is not concerned with the litigation needs of the opposing party. See Quarles & Brady, LLP v. Birdsall, 802 So. 2d 1205, 1206 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (“[U]ndue hardship is not an exception, nor is disclosure permitted because the opposing party claims that the privileged information is necessary to prove their case”) (citation omitted); see also West Bend Mutual Ins. Co.…
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State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Knapp, 234 So. 3d 843 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)…al services to the client.” Furthermore, there are no “relevance” or “need” exceptions to the attorney-client privilege. See Genovese v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 74 So. 3d 1064, 1068 (Fla. 2011); see also Quarles & Brady, LLP v. Birdsall, 802 So. 2d 1205, 1206 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). The documents for which State Farm asserted attorney-client privilege include emails from State Farm employees that are either directed to or show copies being provided to their attorneys. Thus, because State Farm has estab…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Sheldon v. Teperson, 705 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
- Robichaud v. Kennedy, 711 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
- THE Haskell Co. v. Ga. Pac. Corp., 684 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)
- Volpe v. Conroy, Simberg & Ganon, P.A., 720 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)