BRANDT COOK, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 2002-01-02
Nos. 4D00-2672 to 4D00-2674, 4D00-2720 and 4D00-3326
STONE and FARMER, JJ., concur.
803 So. 2d 867 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (2002) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

Brandt Cook appeals his sentences in five separate cases, challenging both his guilty plea and the calculation of sentencing guidelines. The court affirms the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea in one case but reverses and remands two cases for resentencing due to improper use of a habitualized offense as a primary offense and improper inclusion of legal status points in the guidelines scoresheet.


Holding

The trial court erred in failing to notify Cook of the consequences of habitualization, and the case must be remanded to allow Cook to withdraw his plea. The use of a habitualized offense as a primary offense in the guidelines calculation was error, requiring remand for resentencing in case 4D00-2674, but not cases 4D00-2720 and 4D00-3326 because Cook received maximum statutory sentences in those cases. Case 4D00-2672 must be remanded due to improper legal status points in the guidelines scoresheet.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court must notify a defendant of the reasonable consequences of a guilty plea, including the impact on early release eligibility.

[2] A habitualized offense cannot be used as the primary offense when calculating a guidelines scoresheet.

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Key Quotes

“The state filed a timely notice of the state's intent to declare him a habitual felony offender but appellant was not notified of the fact that habitualization would affect the possibility of his early release. The trial court erred in failing to give appellant notice of the reasonable consequences of his plea”

Establishes that trial courts must notify defendants of consequences of habitualization when accepting guilty pleas

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Facts & Procedural History

Cook pled guilty to burglary of a dwelling in case 4D00-2673 and was sentenced to twenty years as a habitual felony offender. The trial court failed t…

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Opinion of the Court
HAZOURI, J.

HAZOURI, J.

Appellant, Brandt Cook, appeals his sentences in five separate cases and raises four points on appeal. We affirm his appeal of the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his plea and vacate his sentences but reverse and remand for the withdrawal of his plea or for resentencing as set forth below.

In case number 4D00-2673, appellant pled guilty to burglary of a dwelling and was sentenced to twenty years as a habitual felony offender. The state filed a timely notice of the state’s intent to declare him a habitual felony offender but appellant was not notified of the fact that habitualization would affect the possibility of his early release. The trial court erred in failing to give appellant notice of the reasonable consequences of his plea, see Ashley v. State, 614 So. 2d 486, 490 n. 8 (Fla.1993); therefore, we remand to permit appellant the opportunity to withdraw his plea. See State v. Wilson, 658 So. 2d 521, 523 (Fla.1995).

In cases 4D00-2674, 4D00-2720, and 4D00-3326, appellant was sentenced pursuant to a guidelines scoresheet prepared with the burglary of a dwelling in case number 4D00-2673 as the primary offense. Appellant argues and the state concedes that this was error because a habitualized offense cannot be used as a primary offense. See Brown, v. State, 760 So. 2d 1113, 1115 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). We find that this error does not affect case numbers 4D00-2720 and 4D00-3326 because the trial court sentenced appellant to the maximum statutory sentences on each count in those cases. When the record conclusively shows that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence if it knew the correct score, then the sentence should be affirmed. See Eblin v. State, 677 So. 2d 388, 389 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).

In case number 4D00-2674, however, the trial court sentenced appellant on each of the five counts to three years all to run consecutively. As this was a downward departure from the minimum sentence on the incorrectly calculated guidelines scoresheet and would be within the guidelines range of the corrected guidelines scoresheet, the record does not conclusively show that the same sentence would have been imposed if the trial court knew the correct score. Therefore, we remand case number 4D00-2674 for correction of the guidelines scoresheet and resentencing.

Finally, in case number 4D00-2672, appellant asserts and the state concedes that the guidelines scoresheet used to sentence appellant in this case improperly included four points for a legal status violation. See, e.g., Mills v. State, 723 So. 2d 363, 364 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). Appellant was sentenced to the maximum guidelines sentence on the offenses and a recalculation of the scoresheet reduces the maximum by five months. The record does not indicate whether the trial court would have departed upward if it had known the correct maximum guidelines sentence; therefore, we remand case number 4D00-2672 for correction of the guidelines scoresheet and resentencing thereunder. AFFIRMED in part; REMANDED in part.

STONE and FARMER, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Mayolo v. State, 901 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)
    …m it necessary to remand for the trial court to reconsider appellant’s sentence under a corrected scoresheet because the record conclusively proves that the court would have imposed the same sentence even with the corrected score. See Cook v. State, 803 So. 2d 867, 868 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). When sentencing appellant, the trial court upwardly departed from the sentencing range giving reasons that demonstrate the court would have departed even if these calculation errors had been brought to its attention. A sent…

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