WILLIAM TIDE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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William Tide appeals his conviction for indirect criminal contempt for violating an injunction against repeat violence. The court reverses because the trial judge impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant, violating his due process right to have guilt proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
The trial court violated Tide's due process rights by impermissibly shifting the burden of proof to the defendant rather than requiring proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The jurisdictional issue was merely a clerical error—the judge retained jurisdiction as a circuit court judge despite temporary reassignment.
[1] A criminal contempt proceeding requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual intended to disobey the court.
[2] Due process requires that a defendant in a criminal contempt proceeding be afforded the same constitutional protections as a criminal defendant.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Because criminal contempt is 'a crime in the ordinary sense,' a contemnor must be afforded the same constitutional due process protections afforded to criminal defendants.”
Establishes that criminal contempt proceedings require full constitutional protections
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA circuit court judge entered an injunction prohibiting Tide from indirectly contacting Thomas Karras. The judge then issued an order to show cause al…
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WARNER, J.
Appellant, William Tide, appeals an order adjudicating him guilty of indirect criminal contempt for violating an injunction for protection against repeat violence.
We reverse because the trial court imper-missibly shifted the burden of proof when entering that order. A circuit court judge entered the injunction at issue which, inter alia, prohibited appellant from indirectly contacting Thomas Karras. That same judge then issued an order to show cause, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.840, containing allegations that appellant violated the injunction by indirectly contacting Karras through a third party.
At the hearing to show cause, the judge explained “[t]he essence of the proceeding today is giving the defendant an opportunity to present to the court a reason why he should not be held in contempt of court for violating the final judgment of injunction.” This explanation of the proceeding properly tracked the language in rule 3.840(a).
However, the judge continued, “[i]n fact, the directive of the order to show cause is really placing, in terms of who has the responsibility of going forward, on the shoulders of the respondent [appellant].”
While this latter comment appears to be a natural implication of rule 3.840(a)’s language, such an implication runs afoul of fundamental due process considerations. “Because criminal contempt is ‘a crime in the ordinary sense,’ a contemnor must be afforded the same constitutional due process protections afforded to criminal defendants.” Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 789 So. 2d 453, 455 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); accord Int’l Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 826, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 129 L.Ed.2d 642 (1994).
Thus, to prove indirect criminal contempt, “there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual intended to disobey the court.” Levine v. State, 650 So. 2d 666, 668 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); accord Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 826, 114 S.Ct.
2552. Because the judge in this case did not require proof of appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, instead placing the burden of going forward on appellant, appellant’s due process rights were violated.
Appellant also claims that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to enter the contempt order because the cir cuit court judge who originally entered the injunction had been temporarily reassigned to the county court. While the contempt order is captioned as a county court order and contains a county court case number, that is merely a clerical error. The judge was still a circuit court judge with the jurisdiction to enforce her previously issued injunction and signed the order as a circuit court judge. On remand, this clerical error should be corrected.
Finding appellant’s other issue on appeal without merit, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
KLEIN and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.
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Forbes v. State, 933 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)…al contempt is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Bowen v. Bowen, 471 So. 2d 1274 (Fla.1985); Demetree v. State ex rel. Marsh, 89 So. 2d 498 (Fla.1956); Kramer v. State, 800 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Tide v. State, 804 So. 2d 412, 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (quoting Levine v. State, 650 So. 2d 666, 668 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)); Braisted v. State, 614 So. 2d 639, 640 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). Moreover, our review of a contempt judgment is the same as it is for any judgment of criminal co…
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Hoffman v. State, 842 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…that Ms. Hoffman “was across the street at the carwash. It’s directly across the street.” “[T]o prove indirect criminal contempt, ‘there must be proof beyond a rea-, sonable doubt that the individual intended to disobey the court.’ ” Tide v. State, 804 So. 2d 412, 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (quoting Levine v. State, 650 So. 2d 666, 668 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)). It appears that the trial court assumed, or inferred, that the carwash was within 500 feet of the daycare. While it may appear obvious that the carwash was…
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DeMARTIN v. State, 188 So. 3d 87 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)…uch proceeding the court shall proceed to hear and determine all questions of law and fact.” “[T]o prove indirect criminal contempt, ‘there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual intended to disobey the court.’ ” Tide v. State, 804 So. 2d 412, 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (citation omitted). “[Ifctent for indirect criminal contempt can be inferred from the actions of the contemnor where it is foreseeable under the circumstances that the contemnor’s conduct would prompt action disruptive of co…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Int'l Union v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (U.S. 1994)
- Levine v. State, 650 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
- Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 789 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)