GARY PALMER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Gary Palmer appealed the denial of credit for time served when his probation was violated on his original sentence. The trial court had sentenced him on multiple counts using a single scoresheet and as a habitual offender, then denied credit for five years already served when he was re-sentenced for the probation violation. The appellate court reversed, holding that Tripp v. State requires credit for time served on one count to be applied against the sentence for a probation violation on another count when both were originally sentenced together.
Yes. Under Tripp v. State, credit must be given for time served on one count against the sentence imposed for a probation violation on another count when both offenses were originally sentenced together using a single scoresheet, even when the habitual offender statute applies.
[1] Credit for time served on a prior sentence is required for a subsequent sentence imposed upon a probation violation when both offenses were considered in the original sen…
[2] Offenses that are sentenced together, even under the habitual offender statute, must continue to be treated in relation to each other when a portion of the sentence is vi…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“both offenses were factors that were weighed in the original sentencing through the use of a single scoresheet and must continue to be treated in relation to each other, even after a portion of the sentence has been violated”
Establishes the core principle from Tripp that offenses sentenced together remain connected for credit purposes
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePalmer was originally sentenced to five years imprisonment for burglary with battery (consecutive) and five years probation for two counts of sexual b…
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PER CURIAM.
The defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of credit for time served following a probation violation on his original sentence.
He was originally sentenced to five years of imprisonment for burglary with a battery consecutive with five years of probation for two counts of sexual battery causing serious injury. The trial court used one scoresheet and indicated that it was sentencing him as an habitual offender for the burglary. The defendant served his time on the first count and after release violated his probation on the remaining counts.
The trial court sentenced him to nine years in prison upon his violation. The defendant asked to receive credit for the five years served on the first count from the original sentence. The trial court denied his request.
In Tripp v. State, the defendant was originally sentenced to a term of imprisonment on one count followed by probation on another count. See 622 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 1993). The defendant violated his probation, and the supreme court ruled that credit should be given for the time served on the first count against the sentence imposed for the probation violation on the second count. See id. The court stated “both offenses were factors that were weighed in the original sentencing through the use of a single scoresheet and must continue to be treated in relation to each other, even after a portion of the sentence has been violated.” Tripp, 622 So. 2d at 942.
We recognize that a few of our sister courts have expressed concern with the application of Tripp. See Priester v. State, 711 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (certifying to the supreme court the question whether Tripp should apply when the reasons prompting it are not present); Ray v. State, 782 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (refusing to apply Tripp where the sentence does not exceed the maximum sentence possible at the original sentencing). However, we apply Tripp as it currently exists.
Here, we find that Tripp applies to sentences where a portion of the sentence was pursuant to the habitual offender statute. Tripp holds that offenses which are originally sentenced together should continue to be treated in relation to each other. See 622 So. 2d at 942. The habitual offender statute does not change that rationale.
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR SENTENCING.
POLEN, C.J., GUNTHER and WARNER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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State v. Matthews, 891 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 2004)…because his sentence on the escape charge “was the only non-habitual sentence and was imposed pursuant to a sentencing guidelines scoresheet.” On appeal, the Fourth District examined this Court’s decision in Tripp, and referred to Palmer v. State, 804 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), in which it had previously held that the Tripp rationale applied even where the defendant was sentenced as a habitual felony offender. See Matthews, 854 So. 2d at 239. Relying upon Palmer, the Fourth District reversed the trial…
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Matthews v. State, 854 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)…y probation on another count. He violated his probation, and the supreme court ruled that credit must be awarded for the time served on the first count against the sentence imposed for the probation violation on the second count. In Palmer v. State, 804 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), we held that the Tripp rationale applies even where the defendant was sentenced as a habitual offender. The record reflects that had Tripp credit been applied in the 1990 case, his sentence in the 1994 case would have started o…
Authorities Cited
- Tripp v. State, 622 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 1993)
- Priester v. State, 711 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)
- RAY v. State, 782 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)