COLUMBIA/JFK MEDICAL CENTER LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, D/B/A JFK MEDICAL CENTER, PETITIONER,
v.
JUDY BROWN AND CHARITY BROWN, HER DAUGHTER, JAMES GODWIN, M.D., SHARAB MOHAMED, M.D., AND IMMEDIATE CARE, P.A., RESPONDENTS
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A hospital sought certiorari review challenging a trial court's order allowing a medical malpractice complaint to proceed with a count based on alleged negligent credentialing of a physician, arguing this theory differed from the presuit screening notice which focused on emergency room negligence. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the presuit screening statute does not require plaintiffs to identify every possible theory of negligence, only to demonstrate that the claim is legitimate.
The court held that the hospital's negligent credentialing count may proceed despite differing from the presuit screening theory because the presuit statute requires only that an expert affidavit demonstrate the claim is legitimate, not that it identify every possible theory of negligence or instance of medical negligence.
[1] The purpose of presuit notice and an expert's affidavit in medical malpractice cases is to demonstrate the legitimacy of the claim and prevent baseless litigation, not to…
[2] A medical malpractice plaintiff is not required to identify every possible instance of medical negligence at the presuit stage.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the statute requires the expert corroborative opinion to prevent the filing of baseless litigation, not to set forth in protracted detail the plaintiffs theory of the case. Contrary to ORMC's position, nothing in the statute requires that the corroborating expert opinion identify every possible instance of medical negligence.”
Establishes the purpose of presuit screening is to ensure legitimacy of claims, not to require exhaustive identification of all theories of negligence
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePlaintiff Judy Brown received emergency room services at the hospital and also underwent gynecological surgery at the same hospital one day earlier pe…
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KLEIN, J.
Petitioner, a hospital, seeks certiorari review of an order allowing a claim to proceed in a medical malpractice case. The hospital argues that the trial court erred in allowing one of the counts in the complaint to remain because it is based on entirely different conduct of the hospital than the conduct alleged in the presuit screening required by section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1997).
In the presuit screening it was alleged that the hospital is vicariously liable to plaintiff because of the negligence of its emergency room physicians and nursing staff. The corroborating affidavit required by section 766.203 was from an emergency physician.
In their complaint, plaintiffs included a count alleging that a gynecologist had negligently operated on plaintiff at the hospital, one day earlier, which had precipitated her returning to the hospital for the emergency room services described in presuit proceedings. This count alleged that the hospital negligently allowed the physician performing the surgery to have staff privileges. In Davis v. Orlando Regional Medical Center, 654 So. 2d 664, 665-66 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), the fifth district explained that the purpose of the presuit notice and the requirement of an expert’s affidavit to corroborate the claim is not to notify the defendants as to how they were negligent, but rather is to demonstrate that the claim is legitimate. As Judge Peterson explained:
[T]he statute requires the expert corroborative opinion to prevent the filing of baseless litigation, not to set forth in protracted detail the plaintiffs theory of the case. Contrary to ORMC’s [Orlando Regional Medical Center] position, nothing in the statute requires that the corroborating expert opinion identify every possible instance of medical negligence. § 766.203; see also § 766.205(1). In many cases it would be virtually impossible for a medical malpractice plaintiff to identify every possible instance of medical negligence at the pre-suit stage. Medical procedures themselves are complicated and typically require explanation by experts. Also, such crucial issues as causation and proximate cause often defy tidy identification and resolution as surgical patients commonly receive care from a battery of physicians, nurses and staff, as was the case with Davis.
In Davis the hospital was contesting the right of the plaintiff to include post-operative negligence by a nurse in the intensive care unit, in addition to the surgical negligence alleged prior to suit. The hospital argues that Davis is distinguishable in that in the present case the plaintiffs are seeking to hold the hospital liable for a different type of liability, negligently permitting a physician to have staff privileges.
The distinction argued by the hospital is not significant. The purpose of the statute is to prevent the filing of medical malpractice claims which are not legitimate. Stebilla v. Mussallem, 595 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). That purpose has been satisfied where, as here, the pre-suit requirements were complied with as to one theory of negligence against the hospital. See also Patry v. Capps, 633 So. 2d 9 (Fla.1994)(this statute should be construed in a manner favoring access to the courts.) We therefore deny certiorari.
POLEN, C.J., and WARNER, J., concur.
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Largie v. Michael Gregorian, M.D., 913 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)…rse or any other medical professional, with appropriate experience or training, may qualify as a medical expert to corroborate that there were reasonable grounds to initiate a medical malpractice action); Columbia/JFK Med. Ctr. Ltd. P’ship v. Brown, 805 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)(pre-suit requirement satisfied where affidavit ad [*645] dressed one theory of negligence against the hospital despite later negligence claim on a different theory). In Davis v. Orlando Regional Medical Center, 654 So. 2d 664, 6…
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Esteva E. Michael v. Med. Staffing Network, Inc., 947 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)…affidavit must be defendant-specific. As the Fourth District has explained, “nothing in the statute requires that the corroborating expert opinion identify every possible instance of medical negligence.” Columbia/JFK Med. Ctr. Ltd. P’ship v. Brown, 805 So. 2d 28, 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)(noting the difficulty of such a re [*620] quirement at the pre-suit stage and recognizing that “such crucial issues as causation and proximate cause often defy tidy identification and resolution as surgical patients commonly…
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DeCRISTO v. Columbia Hosp. Palm Beaches, 896 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…e v. Orta, 785 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). “The purpose of the presuit notice and the requirement of an expert’s affidavit to corroborate the claim is ... to demonstrate that the claim is legitimate.” Columbia/JFK Med. Ctr. Ltd. P’ship v. Brown, 805 So. 2d 28,29 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). In the instant case, the nature of Dr. Afield’s disqualification in the prior case was based upon his attestation of qualifications, not on the actual opinion rendered. There was no evidence that either the plaintiffs lawyer…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Patry v. William L. Capps, M.D., 633 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1994)
- Stebilla v. Anthony J. Mussallem, M.D., 595 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)
- Agatha Davis v. Orlando Reg'l Med. Ctr., 654 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)