M.T., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A juvenile appealed the revocation of his community control and commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice, arguing the trial court violated due process by conducting a revocation hearing without filing a sworn affidavit of the alleged violation and without providing proper written notice. The appellate court agreed, holding that due process requires written notice and an affidavit of violation even when a suspended sentence has been imposed.
The court held that due process requires the filing of a sworn affidavit and written notice of alleged violations before revoking a juvenile's community control, regardless of whether a suspended sentence has been imposed. The trial court's failure to follow these procedures violated the appellant's due process rights.
[1] A juvenile's community control may not be revoked without proper written notice of the alleged violation.
[2] The filing of a sworn affidavit detailing the material facts supporting an alleged violation of community control is required in juvenile proceedings.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“With regard to juveniles, any proceeding alleging a violation of probation shall be initiated by the filing of a sworn affidavit of the material facts supporting the allegations. Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.120(a)(2).”
Establishes the procedural requirement that an affidavit must be filed to initiate a violation proceeding
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceM.T. was adjudicated delinquent of robbery on March 9, 1999, and placed on community control. He admitted to a trespass violation on January 13, 2000,…
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THREADGILL, Acting Chief Judge.
The appellant, a juvenile, appeals an order revoking his community control and committing him to the Department of Juvenile Justice. He claims the revocation procedures followed by the trial court violated his right to due process. We agree and reverse.
On March 9,' 1999, the appellant was adjudicated delinquent of robbery and was placed on community control. On April 12, 1999, the State filed an affidavit, alleging the appellant had violated community control by committing the crime of trespass. On January 13, 2000, he admitted the violation in open court. He was committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice, but the trial court suspended the commitment and continued community control. Later that same day, the appellant was arrested on a charge of possession of marijuana.
The. appellant’s community control officer brought him before the trial court again on January 20, 2000. The trial court announced its intention to conduct a hearing on the violation of community control based on the possession of marijuana charge. Defense counsel objected because an affidavit of violation of community control had not yet been filed and she had just received notice of the hearing on the preceding afternoon through a courtesy call from the prosecutor. The trial court overruled the objection.
Following the hearing, the trial court found the appellant guilty of the violation, revoked community control, and committed him to the Department of Juvenile Justice. The trial court ruled that an affidavit of violation was unnecessary since the appellant was on a suspended commitment, and the effect of revocation would be to move him from community control to the commitment that had been imposed previously.
With regard to juveniles, any proceeding alleging a violation of probation shall be initiated by the filing of a sworn affidavit of the material facts supporting the allegations. Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.120(a)(2). Among the minimal requirements of due process in a revocation proceeding is written notice of the alleged violation. See Burton v. State, 651 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). The same due process requirements apply to a proceeding alleging a violation of community control.. Further, the fact that a suspended sentence had been imposed does not obviate the due process requirements. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973). In Gagnon, the United States Supreme Court held that a probationer under a suspended sentence was entitled to the minimum requirements of due process, which included written notice of the claimed violations, before his probation could be revoked. Here, because the appellant did not receive proper notice of the claimed violation that was to serve as the basis for the revocation of his community control, he was not afforded due process. See State v. Spratling, 336 So. 2d 361 (Fla.1976). We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed.
STRINGER and DAVIS, JJ., Concur.
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B.S. v. State, 886 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)…stay and committed appellant to a Level 6 commitment. Appellant was entitled to the most basic of due process requirements prior to the court lifting the stay on his suspended commitment to a Level 6 commitment. This case is akin to M.T. v. State, 805 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). In that ease, following a violation of community control, the juvenile was committed to the DJJ. The trial court suspended the commitment and continued community control. Appellant then violated his community control and the cour…
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M.A. v. State, 959 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)…ally placed on probation or community control, in lieu of being committed. See B.S. v. State, 886 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (“the court stayed the [level 6] commitment and ‘in lieu of,’ placed appellant on juvenile probation.”); M.T. v. State, 805 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (“appellant was adjudicated delinquent of robbery and was [not committed, but] placed on community control”); see also G.F. v. State, 927 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (“G.F.’s post-commitment conditional release was subsequently…
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McCARRON v. State, 185 So. 3d 666 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)…weapons; not, mentioned in the charging document that formed the basis for the requested revocation of probation. “Among the minimal requirements of due process in a revocation proceeding is'written notice of the alleged violation.” M.T. v. State, 805 So. 2d 898, 899 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (citing Burton v. State, 651 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)). Here, Mr. McCarron did not receive written notice of his alleged possession of five of the six weapons that formed the basis upon which the trial court revoked his…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (U.S. 1973)
- State v. Spratling, 336 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1976)
- Burton v. State, 651 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)