BARBARA JONES, APPELLANT,
v.
LAKELAND REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Barbara Jones appealed the dismissal of her employment discrimination claim under Florida law. The trial court dismissed her case, finding she failed to exhaust administrative remedies with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) after receiving a "no cause" determination from the EEOC. The appellate court reversed, holding that the EEOC notice did not constitute a "no cause" finding and that the FCHR must issue its own independent determination rather than being bound by the EEOC's findings.
The court held that the EEOC dismissal and notice of rights does not constitute a "no cause" finding under the Florida Civil Rights Act, and therefore Jones had no duty to seek administrative review with the FCHR. Additionally, the court held that the FCHR must issue its own independent determination rather than automatically adopting the EEOC's determination.
[1] A dismissal and notice of rights issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) does not constitute a "no cause" finding under the Florida Civil Rights Act…
[2] A claimant is not required to exhaust administrative remedies with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) when the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the notice and dismissal of rights does not amount to a "no cause" finding under the Act.”
Establishes that the EEOC notice at issue is not the type of determination that triggers the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies with the FCHR.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBarbara Jones filed an employment discrimination claim that was referred to the EEOC. The EEOC issued a dismissal and notice of rights. Jones did not …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Employment Discrimination cases and more on FLexlaw
PARKER, Judge.
Barbara Jones seeks review of the trial court’s order granting Lakeland Regional Medical Center’s (Lakeland Regional) motion to dismiss and dismissing with prejudice her employment discrimination action. We find merit in Jones’s argument that the trial court erred in finding that the dismissal and notice of rights issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) precluded Jones from filing a civil claim under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (the Act).1 Accordingly, we reverse.
In this case, the trial court found that the dismissal and notice of rights issued by the EEOC was a “no cause” finding which would require Jones to seek review of the EEOC’s findings with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) pursuant to the Act. See § 760.11(7), Fla. Stat. (1997) (stating that when a “no cause” finding is issued the claimant must request an administrative hearing within thirty-five days or the claim will be barred). The trial court granted Lakeland Regional’s motion to dismiss on the basis that Jones failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under section 760.11(7). However, this court has recently evaluated the form at issue and has concluded that the notice and dismissal of rights does not amount to a “no cause” finding under the Act. Cisko v. Phoenix Med. Prods., Inc., 797 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Thus, Jones had no duty to seek review with the FCHR and should be allowed to proceed with her civil claim. We reject Jones’s challenge to the FCHR’s authority to delegate to the EEOC its power to make a determination under the Act. Id. at 12 n. 1.
In addition, the record in this case reflects that the FCHR never entered its determination in the case. The trial court’s order stated that the EEOC’s adverse determination had the same effect as an adverse determination by the FCHR and, unless and until reversed by the FCHR, the EEOC’s determination barred Jones’s claim. We conclude that portion of the trial court’s order was also error. The explicit language of the 1999 “Worksharing Agreement” between the FCHR and the EEOC, which is applicable to this case, states that each agency will make its own findings. Page 3, paragraph G of the Worksharing Agreement2 states:
[T]he EEOC agrees to provide the [FCHR] with notice of its final actions on all dual filed charges. The [FCHR] agrees to timly [sic] issue its final action and Notice of Right to sue, as appropriate, upon receipt of each of EEOC’s acceptable final action notices.
The language of this Worksharing Agreement states that the FCHR will issue its own findings, agreeing with the EEOC only if it is acceptable to the FCHR. The language is clear and is contrary to the trial court’s finding that the EEOC’s adverse determination had the same effect as an adverse determination by the FCHR. Thus, we reverse the trial court’s order. Reversed.
BLUE, C.J., and FULMER, J., Concur. . §§ 760.01-760.11, Fla. Stat. (1997).
. This is a new provision that was added to the 1999 Worksharing Agreement; the 1998 agreement did not contain this provision.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Cordette Woodham v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield OF Fla., Inc., 829 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 2002)…administrative remedy in subsection (7), and could proceed under subsection (4) with a civil action. Id. The Second District subsequently reaffirmed its reasoning and holding in Cisko as to this issue. See Jones v. Lakeland Regional Medical Center, 805 So. 2d 940, 941 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). In construing the same EEOC Form 161, the Fourth District agreed with Cisko. See White v. City of Pompano Beach, 813 So. 2d 1003, 1007 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). In White, the court recognized the conflict between Cisko and Woodh…
-
White v. City OF Pompano Beach, 813 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)…utes that Cisko complied with this restriction. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting final summary judgment, and Cisko should be allowed to proceed with her civil action. Id. (footnotes omitted); accord Jones v. Lakeland Reg. Med. Center, 805 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). The third district reached a different conclusion in Woodham v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 793 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)(on motion for rehearing and certification). Although faced with [*1007] a different is…
-
Jamela Mitchell v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sch. Bd., 127 So. 3d 707 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)…bject matter jurisdiction.2 We thus reverse the order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings. WARNER, GROSS and LEVINE, JJ., concur. . A determination by the EEOC is not a determination by the FCHR. See Jones v. Lakeland Reg’l Med. Ctr., 805 So. 2d 940, 941 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). . FCHR may not be required to conduct a completely new investigation of the complaint, due to the previously filed complaint and the application of a "Worksharing Agreement” between FCHR and the EEOC. See, e.g., Jones, 805…
Authorities Cited
- Cisko v. Phoenix Med. Prods., Inc., 797 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)