WALTER LEE CHANEY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that a defendant is entitled to resentencing if their original probationary sentence as a habitual felony offender was not the result of negotiations with the State.
[1] A defendant is entitled to resentencing when a habitual offender sentence is imposed upon revocation of probation, if the original sentence was probation and not a habitu…
[2] A trial court may deny a motion for resentencing based on an improper habitual offender sentence upon probation revocation only if record documents conclusively demonstra…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWalter Lee Chaney was sentenced to probation as a habitual felony offender, later violated probation, and was sentenced to prison. He moved to vacate …
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GREEN, Judge.
Walter Lee Chaney appeals the summary denial of his motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Chaney asserted three claims in his motion, and we reverse as to one.
Chaney stated that in 1990 he pleaded no contest in trial court case numbers 90-4782, 90-9634 and 90-9635, and was sentenced to five years of probation as a habitual felony offender. Chaney subsequently violated his probation and was sentenced to prison under the habitual felony offender statute. See § 775.084(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (1989). Chaney claimed it was improper for the trial court to sentence him to habitual offender sentences upon revocation of his probation because he did not originally receive such sentences. See King v. State, 681 So. 2d 1136 (Fla.1996) (stating habitual offender sentence on violation of probation is impermissible where trial court rejected habitual offender sentence by originally sentencing appellant to probation), receded from on other grounds by Carter v. State, 786 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 2001); Pankhurst v. State, 796 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).
Chaney is entitled to be resentenced pursuant to Pankhurst, unless his original probationary sentences were the result of negotiations with the State. See Pankhurst, 796 So. 2d at 620 n. 1 (holding that a defendant who agreed to a sentence of probation as a habitual felony offender is not entitled to relief because such sentence, while not authorized by the statute, is not illegal). Because we cannot determine from the record whether Chaney’s original sentence was negotiated with the State, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court may only deny the motion if it attaches record documents conclusively demonstrating that Chaney’s original sentences were the product of negotiations with the State. Otherwise, Chaney will be entitled to re-sentencing pursuant to the guidelines.
As to the remaining claims, we affirm.
Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.
STRINGER, J., and THREADGILL, EDWARD F., Senior Judge, Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Raines v. State, 14 So. 3d 244 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)…was not sentenced to community control as a habitual offender, then the case law supports his argument that his subsequent ten-year sentence as a habitual offender was illegal. See Bowers v. State, 845 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Chaney v. State, 805 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Pankhurst v. State, 796 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). The problem, of course, is that this illegal sentence «was fully served and expired a decade before Mr. Raines filed this petition. At least as a general rule, a sentence ca…
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Felder v. State, 842 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…ed under the guidelines if the record cannot demonstrate that he entered into a negotiated plea agreement with either the State or the trial court for his probation sentences. See Salters v. State, 840 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Chaney v. State, 805 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). Furthermore, the doctrine of laches does not bar Felder from raising this claim. Laches is sustainable in a criminal case where there has been both a lack of due diligence on the defendant’s part in bringing forth the claim and…
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Ferman Bowers v. State, 845 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…cannot demonstrate that Bowers entered into a negotiated plea agreement with either the State or the trial court for his community control sentence in case number 90-2557, Bowers is entitled to resentencing under the guidelines. See Chaney v. State, 805 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). Furthermore, the doctrine of laches does not bar Bowers from raising this claim. Laches is sustainable in a criminal case where there has been both a lack of due diligence on the defendant’s part in bringing forth the claim and…
Authorities Cited
- Carter v. State, 786 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 2001)
- King v. State, 681 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 1996)
- Collazo v. Moore, 796 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)
- Pankhurst v. State, 796 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)